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I

examine previous philosophical studies of the

scientific status of psychoanalytic theory and argue that
these analyses have assessed psychoanalytic theory against
the wrong epistemological model.

I

take as my point of

departure Adolf Griinbaum's recent book, The Foundations of
Psychoanalysis

Grunbaum criticizes the scientific status of

.

psychoanalysis as discussed by Karl Popper and the
hermeneuticis ts

,

Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas, and stakes

out his own methodological position.

Like Griinbaum,

I

take

issue with the position of Popper and the hermeneuticists
but my position is not coincident with Griinbaum's.

The

debate over the scientific status of psychoanalytic theory
centers on the fact that Freud, himself, described

psychoanalysis as

a

natural science.

I

argue that the

preceding debate has failed to locate Freud's notion of
natural science, because it has assumed philosophical,

methodological paradigms of the natural sciences that give
the methodology of physics central status.

I

propose that

Freud originally assumed that medicine was the natural

v

science that provided the epistemological and methodological

background for his work and that the scientific status and
epistemology of medicine needs to be brought explicitly into
the discussion of the scientific status of psychoanalysis.

Although

I

maintain that medicine is the appropriate

epistemological model against which the scientific character
of psychoanalysis ought to be assessed,

I

recognize that

psychoanalysis involves an extension of medical thinking into
new domains,

forcing breaks with many features of an

originating medical model.

vi
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
It has proved difficult to examine dispassionately the

question of whether psychoanalysis
Intuitively, psychoanalysis

is

a

science.

seems to share features with

science, particularly biology and medicine, in its effort to

explain and alter human behavior, and to share features with
the humanities,

in

its effort to explain the meaning of many

human utterances and behaviors.

To this point, philosophers

who have considered psychoanalysis have brought to

it

conceptions of science derived from other domains of human
knowledge, and have used these to interpret psychoanalysis.
In all of these cases,

the final judgement on psychoanalysis

was implicit in the original assumptions.

will attempt to view this problem in

a

My dissertation

more flexible manner,

realizing from the start that our notions of science and our
reading of Freud's texts may have to change to accommodate

special features of psychoanalytic theory.
The occasion which triggers this dissertation
Griinbaum' s The Foundations of Psychoanalys is

is

Adolf

Griinbaum

surveys previous studies of the scientific status of

psychoanalytic theory in an authoritative manner that
establishes the framework for my own discussion.

On the one

hand, Griinbaum considers the scientistic position,

represented by Karl Popper,

a

position that brings strong

criteria from the physical sciences to bear on
1

2

psychoanalysis, emphasizes the differences between physics
and psychoanalysis, and concludes that psychoanalysis is
not
a

science.

he

r

On the other hand, Grunbaum considers the

meneu t i c is t position, represented by Paul Ricoeur and

Jurgen Habermas,

position that brings an array of

a

articulated notions of science much broader than the

monological conception of the scientistic group to bear on
psychoanalysis, and concludes that psychoanalysis
science, but not
thought.

is

a

natural science, as Freud seems to have

a

The hermeneut icist position must reread Freud's

texts, arguing that Freud failed to understand his own

project.

Grunbaum attempts to locate himself between these

two positions, defending the notion that psychoanalysis

is

a

science against the scientistic position, and defending the

notion that it

is

a

form of natural science, against what he

sees as the loose extensions of the concept of science

utilized by the hermeneut ic is ts

.

Like Grunbaum,

I

wish to

take issue with both the scientistic position and the

hermeneutic position, but my position will not be coincident
with Grunbaum's.
My criticisms of Grunbaum are several.

To begin with,

although he attacks Popper, he brings to psychoanalysis

a

notion of natural science derived principally from physics,
so that his attribution of scientific status to

psychoanalysis

is

partial and guarded.

refutation of Popper.

It is barely a

Although Grunbaum attacks the

3

hermeneuticists

,

he does so on the basis of a naive reading

of Freud's own assertions concerning the scientific status of

psychoanalysis, using these readings simply to contradict the
hermeneuticists.

Further, the presuppositions that Grunbaum

brings to bear on the question of the scientific status of

psychoanalysis are problematic.

His focus on the logical

foundations of psychoanalytic claims and their deductive
structure privileges Freud's etiological hypotheses.

Grunbaum thus restricts his evaluation of the scientific
credibility of psychoanalysis to an attack on the

epistemological and methodological problems inherent

in

Freud's clinical evidence and verification procedure within
the clinical setting.

Grunbaum fails to consider the tension

between the clinical practice and psychoanalytic theory

precisely because he overemphasizes the link between
therapeutic efficacy and the establishment of Freud's causal
claims.

While the foundations of Freud's theory derive from

his clinical practice and while Freud used therapeutic gains

and insights to corroborate his empirical hypotheses, he also

recognized that, due to the contradictory and antagonistic

character of social and individual reality, therapeutic
success alone could not validate nor invalidate his general
theory.

The standards that Grunbaum invokes for establishing

causality are so rigid that even medicine,
exhibits
is

a

a

discipline which

similar tension between theory and practice, but

clearly scientific in its theorizing,

is

scientifically

.

4

suspect
In my view,

the scientific status of medicine,

indeterminate and hardly brought into focus

in past

philosophical discussion, must be clearly recognized and
brought into the dialogue between methodologists.

If

medicine is scientific in spite of its therapeutic

uncertainties and theoretical problems, and
is,

I

believe that

it

then an epistemology adequate to the scientific status of

medicine can appropriately be brought to bear on the more

delicate questions of the scientific status of
psychoanalysis.

When this

is

done, a more robust defense of

the scientific status of psychoanalysis than that provided by
Griinbaum becomes a possibility.

My focus on the need to conceptualize an epistemology of

medicine rests on the view that medicine

is

the appropriate

model against which psychoanalysis should be evaluated.

Medicine

is a

developing science on the border between

theoretical science and

psychoanalysis,

it

a

a

practical art, and, like

does not fall neatly into the usual

natural/human science dichotomies.
science and practice.

In medicine, we have

Medical science relies on numerous

scientific disciplines (chemistry, biology, anatomy, physics,
etc.), using these to explain and to theorize about the

causative factors of diseases, while medical practice studies
and treats diseases in the living patient and makes

therapeutic success its appropriate short-term goal.

The

.

5

clinical data of medicine derive from practice, but since

practice

a

disease is studied in

whole patient

is

a

in

particular patient and the

involved in the treatment, therapeutic gains

are difficult to pin down to specific causative factors.

Therapeutic success and theoretical adequacy are not as
easily linked as theory and experiment in the natural

sciences
I

will argue that

psychoanalysis.

a

similar situation holds in

Initially, psychoanalysis developed as

method of medical treatment.

a

Freud's early clinical work

brought him in contact with patients who exhibited dramatic
symptoms, for which no known physical or other pathological
cause could be found.

Scientific medicine, which had

hitherto attended to the physical causes of disorders and
explained mental events in terms of physical ones, was unable
to account for or to treat these cases.

Freud extended

medical practice and science by developing

a

treatment method

and theory which focused on mental processes and causes,

effect recognizing and treating

a

in

new class of illnesses.

Freud's metapsychology, which uses the language of physics
and biology, stands to clinical practice as medical science

stands to medical practice, and this is the scientific model
that Freud would have used naturally, without lengthy, overt

methodological examination.
In psychoanalysis,

are decoupled.

as

in

medicine, theory and practice

But in psychoanalysis, the link between

6

theory and clinical data

even looser than is the case with

is

medicine because medicine has developed instruments which
give rise to precise data and precise tests, data which

constantly expand the data text of medical science.
Instruments, by breaking the hold of theory on data, allow
theories to adapt to the new data.
in

Freud's only instrument

addition to standard medical practice was

study of

a

language, the statements made by patients, which

not to

is

say that the link between clinical data and theory is merely

subjective, but it is to say that, due to this interpretative
component,

it

is

somewhat relaxed in its logical structure by

comparison to medicine.
While

I

will argue that psychoanalysis is

science and that the medical model

is

standard for assessing its status,

I

a

developing

the appropriate

want to make it clear

that this focus is not an argument for the complete

assimilation of Freudian concepts and techniques to that of
medical science.

It may be the case that the science which

Freud developed will someday be reduced to

a

foundation, but if it were to be grounded at

neurological
a

more

micro-level, we would have

a

different therapy and

different science, perhaps

a

psychoanalytic science whose

scientific credentials would be obvious.
such

a

a

Freud attempted

reduction early on but was forced by the complexity of

emerging data to offer

a

more psychological theory.

Freud

restricted his domain of investigation to psychical processes

7

and psychical phenomena in the face of his onrushing
clinical

observations.

I

suggest evaluating psychoanalysis as

a

science in terms of the domain that Freud staked out, and

in

terms of his model for science that was at first immanent
to

medical practice and theorizing.
The dissertation will have four sections.
chapter,

I

examine the scientistic position of Karl Popper

and Griinbaum's critique of Popper's position.

chapter,

I

In the second

In the third

examine the hermeneu t ic ist position and Griinbaum's

critique of Ricoeur and Habermas.

In the fourth chapter,

I

attempt to isoiace cue presuppositions of Griinbaum's critique
and subject them to analysis.

In the fifth chapter,

I

indicate my own construal of the epistemological position
that will permit

play that

is

a

vision of natural science to come into

not coerced by the features of physics that so

many philosophers of science have taken as foundational.

I

try to develop a conception of natural science that includes

medicine, at least the scientific aspects of medicine, and

I

use this construal to subject Griinbaum's position to the

critique that he also brings to his evaluation of the

scientific status of psychoanalysis.

In this way

I

show how

Griinbaum's critique of psychoanalysis contains the seeds

which undermine his own position,
conception of science that

is

a

position based on

a

borrowed from physics and that

cannot accommodate either medicine or psychoanalysis without

revealing strains that are derived from its point of origin.

.

CHAPTER

2

SCIENTISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
In this chapter

I

will present Karl Popper's view of

science and his position on the scientific status of

psychoanalysis.

My aim in examining Popper's position is

twofold.

I

First,

wish to call into question Popper's view

of science and in particular,

wish to dispute the adequacy

I

of the epistemological and methodological norms that he

invokes as standards against which

evaluated as scientific.

Second,

a
I

theory is to be
intend to show that,

despite Popper's narrow conception of science, his principal
charges against psychoanalysis are false and hence they do
not support his exclusion of psychoanalysis from science.

this regard,

I

In

concur with Adolf Grtinbaum's critique of

Popper
Popper developed his philosophical theory of science with
the intention of solving the problem of demarcation between

science and pseudo-science.

The growing popularity of

psychoanalysis and the ubiquitous confirmations of

it

were on

Popper's mind in 1919 as he wrestled with the problem of when
a

theory should be considered scientific.

Popper noticed

that the questionable explanatory power of psychoanalysis was
the core of its weakness, for psychoanalysis claimed to be

able to explain practically everything that happened within
the field to which its theories referred.'*'

It was the fact

that human behavior could always be interpreted in terms of
8

9

the theory,

that the theory was always "confirmed," which led

Popper to reject it as part of his view that the inductivist

method of confirmation was not an adequate criterion for

scientific status.

specifically

Popper's rejection of inductivism was

reaction against the enumerative inductivism

a

associated with the logical positivists which held that any

positive instance of

a

hypotheses confirmed it.

Popper's

skepticism with regard to this method of confirmation was
triggered not by the fact that psychoanalytic theory lacked
verifications, but by the fact that

seemed to be able to

it

explain whatever happened.

Recognizing that any set of data can be held to support
any number of theories, Popper proposed that for

meet scientific standards,

testable.

A genuine test of a theory

falsify or refute it.

subjecting

it must be

a

Such

a

a

theory to

falsifiable or
is

serious attempt to

a

serious attempt involves

theory to empirical tests by deducing

observations whose falsity would refute it.

Formulating

predictions or observations which risk falsifying the theory
is

central to

a

genuine test of it.

Popper conceptualizes scientific methodology as

a

method

of putting forward bold conjectures and then seriously

attempting

a

refutation of them.

scientific progress in that

it

2

This method fuels

provides

a

basis for the

elimination of inadequate theories which in turn give rise to
new conjectures, new observations and hence the growth of new

10

theories which better explain the experimental
data.
element of risk

hypothesis

is

is

important, for,

if a

The

conjecture or

to be capable of being falsified,

it

must be

"incompatible with certain possible results of

observation ." 3

For Popper,

a

forbids certain happenings;
the more a theory forbids,

it

"good" scientific theory

excludes possibilities; and

the better it is

.

That is, the

^

more restrictive and risky the theory, the more it can be

decisively tested and falsified.

Thus, such

a

theory

is

better because it supports scientific progress.
Popper argues that psychoanalytic hypotheses are

irrefutable because they do not set forth what kinds of
behavior would be incompatible with the results of

observation.

Psychoanalysis presents

a

set of explanatory

ideas and hypotheses which are used to explain any behavior
or dream that occurs.

Psychoanalytic hypotheses thus take no

risks because they do not predict phenomena, nor do they

specify in advance observations or occurrences which would be

incompatible with the theory; any behavior can be explained
by the theory ret rod icti vely

.

Because the theory does not

exclude specific behaviors, it undertakes no genuine test of
its hypotheses and

is

thus immune to falsification.

To the

extent that psychoanalysis does make predictions, these are,

according to Popper, too vague to make rigorous testing of
possible.

Hence Popper concludes that the theory is in

principle not falsifiable and thus

it has

no claim to

it

11

scientific status.
Popper
is

s

second and related charge against psychoanalysis

that adherents of the theory adopt ad hoc immuniz ing

strategies to rescue the theory from falsification.

Rather

than attempting to devise empirical tests which might falsify
the theory, adherents do not take seriously potentially

decisive falsification and instead cling to imprecise,
theoretical constructs which allow them to reconstruct their
interpretations and explanations
findings.

in

light of the new

Because clinicians do not select out clinical

observations that are incompatible with
hypothesis that could serve as
on Popper's view,

a

it

particular

falsifying instance of it,

they are not doing science.

Popper's claim that psychoanalysis

because

a

is

pseudo-scientific

does not meet his criterion of falsif iability

is

echoed by other critics who assume that Popper has settled

Frederick Crews draws on Popper to bolster his

the issue.

repudiation of Freudian explanations:
Popper's:

a

"My position is Karl

body of theory cannot be called scientific

unless its hypotheses can be exposed to tests for

falsification.

By this criterion psychoanalysis, though it

states laws of development and behavior and may be right on

many points,

is

no science."

Reuben Abel dismisses the

scientific status of psychoanalysis because
verified by prediction.

"Freudianism

is

it

cannot be

clearly no more

falsif iable than fatalism or than divine providence.

12

Freudians do offer some piecemeal empirical verification
.

but specific consequences can seldom be deduced
and

predicted.

Any kind of fact whatever could be interpreted

either as hostility, for example, or as repressed hostility.
(Heads

I

win, tails you lose .)" 6

attack on B A
.

Frank Cioffi,

Farrell, who holds that it

.

is

in his

logically

possible to refute psychoanalysis, argues that "refutability

principle

is

not an adequate criterion of the genuinely

empirical character of an enterprise ." 7

Cioffi thus points

to Freud's methodologically defective procedures to show how

Freud's procedures cover up potentially falsifying evidence
in

order to avoid refutation.

Cioffi hence concurs with

Popper that psychoanalysis is pseudo-scientific.

Similarly, Hans Eysenck draws on the eminence of Karl

Popper's stature as

a

philosopher of science to impugn the

probative role of experimental data from the clinical setting
as capable of meeting the requirements for testability.

Eysenck even goes so far as to invoke Popper's self-confessed
friendliness toward psychoanalysis in order to gainsay the
view that Popper was simply operating with positivist
O

prejudices.

While Eysenck maintains that "we can no more

test Freudian hypotheses 'on the couch' than we can

adjudicate between the rival hypotheses of Newton and
9
Einstein by going to sleep under an apple tree," he,

unlike Popper, holds out the possibility that psychoanalysis
is

testable, but only in the extra-clinical setting of the

13

laboratory or otherwise controlled contexts.
A number of critics, basing their claim on
Popper's

relegation of psychoanalysis to the status of myth, proclaim
the death of the science question.

"Psychoanalysis as
a

a

Eysenck states:

self-contained system claiming to afford

scientific view of human nature

is dead,

even though the

embalmed corpse may still be exhibited to the faithful ." 10
Similarly, the biologist, Peter Medawar, praising medical

achievements that utilize "risky" hypotheses in Popper's

methodological sense, asserts:

"The opinion is gaining

ground that doctrinaire psychoanalytic theory is the most

stupendous intellectual confidence trick of the twentieth
century:

a

dinosaur or

terminal product as well
a

— something

zeppelin in the history of ideas,

akin to
a

a

vast

structure of radically unsound design and with no

posterity ." 11

These death knells and animadversions

against the scientific status of psychoanalysis stand out
against its continued prominence as

a

therapy and theoretical

orientation, not to mention the resurgence of philosophical
interest in its claims to scientific status.

Hence if we are

to make sense of Popper's dismissal of psychoanalysis

behooves us to examine his notion of science in
detail.

a

it

bit more

The rationale behind Popper's proposals for what

constitutes scientific inquiry

is

marked by a belief in

science that unwittingly carries forward the positivist
identification of knowledge with science and the concomitant

14

reduction of epistemology to

understood as

a

a

philosophy of science

normative, methodological undertaking.

Popper's View of Science
Popper stakes out the boundaries of science to accord

with what he takes to be cases of good science.

He draws on

the picture of the great scientists, such as Kepler,
Newton

and Einstein, and their activities to serve as his paradigm
for science.

Hence his starting point privileges the

physical sciences and their predictive capacity.

In the

first place, what distinguishes the great scientists for

Popper

is

the boldness of their conjectures.

Kepler's,

Newton's and Einstein's theories not only proposed new
outlooks, new explanatory hypotheses, which conflicted with

prevailing views, but also risked being proved false in

predicting observable appearances or outcomes.

For example,

Newton's theory predicted deviations from Kepler's laws,

predictions which had not previously been observed and
predictions that risked being falsified by empirical evidence
to the contrary.

At first glance,

it

might seem that Freud's theory ought

to have a place within this scheme,

for if nothing else,

Freud's theory certainly clashed boldly with accepted views.

Freud's postulation of unconscious thought processes and his
theory of infantile sexuality were bold conjectures,

explanatory hypotheses that opened up

a

new domain of inquiry

15

and attempted to provide

a

inexplicable phenomena.

However, the boldness of

hypothesis or conjecture

is

radical nature.

is

also

a

a

not merely determined by its

Boldness in the first sense is for Popper

akin to my thmak ing
it

means of explaining hitherto

,

^

an <3 while it is

important to science,

feature of great metaphysical system building

which is not scientific.

scientific sense

it

For a conjecture to be bold in the

must take the risk of being proved false,

of clashing with the reality it postulates.

It is the

boldness of prediction which Popper

is

emphasizing here as

feature of empirical science and it

is

this feature, together

a

with the readiness to look out for tests and refutations,
which constitutes Popper's proposal for demarcation between

empirical science and pseudo-science.

Freud's theory

is

not

bold in this second sense according to Popper.

Popper contrasts the situation of psychoanalysis with
that of Marxism to highlight the way in which his

methodological rule of accepting falsification, though vague,
is

sharp enough to distinguish science from pseudo-science.

Marxism was once

a

scientific theory in that it predicted

that capitalism would lead to socialism and the conditions

under which this would happen.

Marx's predictions were

testable and hence his theory of history was not immune to

falsification to start with.

However, once the predictions

were falsified by empirical events, Marxists re-interpreted
the theory and evidence in order to rescue the theory from

.

.

3

16

refutation. 1

This immunizing strategy broke the

methodological rule of accepting falsification and hence,
according to Popper, Marxism can no longer lay claim to being
sc ient

i f

ic

Popper's discussion of the line demarcating science from

pseudo-science, while

it

is

meant to be subtle, privileges

notion of scientific prediction based on universal laws.

a

in

basing his proposal for demarcation on the "great"

physicists,

he biases his conception of the nature and

methodology of science

in

line not only with philosophical

tradition but also with the development of science

historically.

As George Simpson notes, the physical

sciences, as we now define them, do have primacy, not
logically, but historically. 14

Consequently, our paradigms

of scientific activity have tended to focus on features of

science such as lawlike predictability and hypothesis
testing

— features

that have allowed for the growth of

scientific knowledge in

a

realm such as physics where

scientific prediction can be more robust since

it

is

carried

out in a domain where invariant empirical regularities may be

assumed.

A domain such as biology or psychology, where the

objects of study are not homogeneous

is

hence problematic.

That these fields are somewhat suspect in terms of

a

Popperian picture of science casts suspicion on the narrow
focus on the physical sciences as the paradigm for scientific

activity

17

I

will now focus on the narrow boundary that Popper draws

around science in an attempt to highlight the rigidity
of

Popperian

f als i f

iabi 1 ity when it is brought to bear on

disciplines that, though considered by many to be scientific,
do not fit the more mathematical paradigm of physics.

According to Popper, conditional scientific predictions
are the norms in science and these make claims about what

will happen in certain experimental circumstances.

"Unconditional scientific predictions can sometimes be
derived from these conditional scientific predictions,
together with historical statements which assert that the
conditions in question are fulfilled." 15

Now this state of

affairs does not obtain in evolutionary theory according to
Popper, which leads him to regard biological evolutionary

theory as

a

suspect candidate for scientific status.

Since evolution looks at species, the difficulties in

predicting genetic make-up are enormous given the number of
random mutations and changing environmental pressures.

Scientific prediction

is

hence not possible except to the

extent that one abstracts from the slow evolutionary changes
and treats the biological system in question as stationary.

Against Popper's charge that the theory of natural selection
is

not a testable scientific theory, Gerhard Wassermann has

shown that major population genetic equilibrium theories,

which utilize natural selection to explain adaptation of

organisms to their environment, are falsifiable according to

18

Popper's criterion and that Popper failed to distinguish
between different uses of the term 'natural selection
In general,

however, evolutionary theory

is

.'

17

neither

established nor sufficiently tested by prediction in Popper's
sense.

It cannot predict the course of evolution.

For

Popper, there are no universal laws of evolution, and there

can't be because the evolution of life on earth

historical process.

Though such

a

is

a

unique,

process may be governed by

causal laws, the search for such universal laws could not

proceed within the bounds of scientific method because there
would be no way to test

historical process.

law that refers to a single

A single statement of an

evolutionary sequence
is

a

is not

a

scientific law because there

only the actual historical sequence.

Popper

is

Here we see that

concerned about repetition of observations and

testing possibilities.
At this point,

I

want to call into questions Popper's

dismissal of evolutionary theory's scientific status.

There

is

something suspicious about the way he rules

it

does not fit his characterization of normal, scientific

prediction,
sciences.

a

it

out because

normalcy based on models of more reductive

After all, unique events occur and as Simpson

points out, "evidence on them

confidence that anyone
have observed them."

in a

is

acceptable if there is

position to observe them could

This does not get around the lack

of predictive power, but neither prediction nor manipulation
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of variables

Rather,

is

necessary feature of experimentation.

a

in making observations,

even if they are not

repeatable / we can put our beliefs at risk.

Further, given

the recognition prior to Darwin that
evolution has occurred,

Darwin’s explanation gave an account hitherto
unavailing to
science.
He thoroughly overturned the teleological
view of

the universe with his theory of organic
evolution based on

natural selection.

This was

a

bold, new, unifying idea that

revolutionized biological theory and provided the foundation
for new fields within biology.

Darwin proposed

a

"theory as

to how natural processes could produce organic

adaptation,
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and his explanation of adaptation accounted

for observational data that no rival theory could better

account for.

grounded in

The kind of explanations he gave were not
a

metaphysical teleology, but rather showed the

possibility of

natural science explanation.

a

While the line Popper draws
here,

it

is

is

being called into question

not being suggested that Popper has

notion of falsification

a

simplistic

To clarify Popper's methodological

fals if icat ionism in distinction from dogmatic
f als

if icat ionism,

criterion and
it

is

a

a

variant of the positivist verifiability

notion often mistakenly attributed to Popper,

vital to note that Popper's fals if iabil ity criterion

not a criterion of meaning;

grounded in certainty.

it

therefore is not

a

criterion

For Popper, all observations are

theory-laden, so there are no simple observation sentences

is
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against which

a

theory can be tested.

Scientific

explanations are deductions from potentially falsifiable
sentences.

The

f als

if iabi 1 ity

criterion enables us to find

satisfactory hypotheses to use in scientific
explanations.

We then subject these hypotheses and the

deductive predictions to tests by looking for falsifying data
that will prove our predictions to be false.
is

a

Fals if iabi lity

logical notion, while falsification involves actually

deciding that

a

falsifiable sentence is false. 22

decision as to what kinds of data will falsify
is

The

hypothesis

a

made in advance and cannot depend on logic alone.

in this sense that

It is

falsification depends on methodological

rules that are determined by context.

The context will

depend upon the accepted standards of gathering data in
given field which is established historically.

a

Thus

methodological rules can be modified over time.
methodological rules, upon which falsification of

These
a

hypothesis depends, are, according to Popper, necessarily
somewhat vague for they depend on methodological discussion
and decision by scientists as to the circumstances under

which we should regard the hypothesis or theory as falsified.

What makes

f als if

iabil ity

a

problematic notion when

brought to bear against biology and medicine is the

difficulty involved in isolating relevant facts that would
falsify

a

theory or hypothesis.

Biology, like medicine, does

not operate in terms of only one level of explanation.

For
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example, biological explanations utilize data
and explanatory
principles from the harder physical sciences and
integrate
them at a higher or more global level of
abstraction, that is
at the level of the living organism.

The "how" question is

typical in the physical sciences and this level of

explanation, though it operates in biology,
How is heredity transmitted?")
one. 23

is

(for example,

the more reductionist

Popper's criterion would be relevant at this lower

level of explanation where data may be more easily isolated
and manipulated.

However,

in biology,

functional questions

such as "What for?" and "How come?", questions that involve

a

historical or evolutionary factor, must be added to the
reductionist question if we are to have
explanation.

To say that the latter are

teleological question as opposed to

a

fully biological

a
a

kind of

question seeking an

efficient cause need not imply that they are metaphysical
ones.

Darwin's achievement was to bring functional questions

into the domain of science by explaining functional

adaptation in terms of natural processes.

Biological

explanation is more complicated than explanation in the

physical sciences in that

it

must move to this broader level

of explanation.

At this point we can see that biology shares

a

hierarchical model of explanation with that of medical
science.

The clinical diagnosis of diseases is complicated

by the fact that diseases themselves are described
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and understood using terms from the vocabulary
of different

fields, such as physics, chemistry, psychology,
etc.

Different levels of explanation

in

different levels of organization:

medicine refer to these
atomic, molecular,

cellular, physiological system, entire patient.

Medicine is concerned with phenomena at all of these
levels.

Low-level explanations, explanations that refer to

low-level objects such as electrons, atoms and molecules, are

attractive because the objects are simpler, involve fewer

descriptive predicates and are hence able to be more sharply
defined.

As we move up

a

level of analysis,

for example from

the level of sub-atomic particles to that of atoms, we

discover emergent properties, that

is,

properties of the atom

that are not merely the result of the sum of its parts and

their properties.

In other words, we discover properties we

might not have predicted, given the properties of electrons
and protons at the sub-atomic level.

arise at every shift to
as we move to the higher

a

Emergent properties

higher level but do so more rapidly
levels.

As is obvious,

the higher

level objects will be more complex, will be less exactly

described, and will be more difficult to formalize or render

mathematically.
Due to the simplicity of the lower-level explanations,
the tendency in biology and medicine as in the history of

science in general has been to carry out

reductionist analysis

in

a

"downward" or

order to detect "upward"
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causation.

in other words,

the tendency has been to

descend the hierarchical levels
at a

lower level.

in

order to locate causation

The problem with this kind of analysis

(though it has been the more successful)
is

not always possible

is

not only that it

(due to the problem of emergent

properties) but also that, at the lower-level attributes of

diseases (for example, physics and chemistry), we capture
only partial aspects of the phenomena.

reductionist approach

is

While the

more prevalent, biology and medicine

utilize the opposite approach as well, carrying out an upward

explanation by detecting downward causation.

disorders and stress-related diseases are

a

Psychosomatic
good illustration

that causation proceeds downward as well as upward.

We need the language of all these various subfields of

medicine in order to find the causal connections that operate
in both

directions of the hierarchy.

This is particularly

true in light of the fact that patients are often not aware
of low-level abnormalities and symptoms are often described
at higher

levels of analysis.

The distinction between

low-level and high-level findings more clearly reflects the
status of evidence for diseases than do the terms 'objective'
and

'subjective.'

We have

a

tendency to regard

a

patient's

report of dizziness as subjective, while we regard as

objective evidence of an abnormality low-level dysfunctions
that we detect through the use of instruments.
to equate subjectivity with higher

This tendency

level accounts misses

.

24

the mark.

It's not the case that high-level accounts are

merely subjective.

As Marsden Blois remarks, some diseases,

such as schizophrenia, may have "striking, high-level

abnormalities which cause the patient severe distress and
yet
have no known lower-level dysfunctions

Causality

in

medicine works

." 26

in both

directions.

The

causal connections that medicine seeks are ultimately between
events in the world

(e.g.,

stress on the job)

and the

behavior of cells and molecules in our bodies, and the

causality may run up or down the hierarchy 26
.

Causal

claims can be subjected to empirical tests but the hypotheses

will often not be framed in
falsify them.

a

way that specifies what would

Medical diagnosis and research indicate that

scientific explanation which takes as its object multiple

ontological processes
methodology.

is

often not amenable to

a

Popperian

Another case in point here is what Robert

Ackermann describes as the problem of "currently available
experimentation."

"A theory may make a proposal whose

consequences can't be tested by any known means." 27
a

Though

theory may be potentially falsifiable, we may lack the

means to test it.

For example,

in the case of medical

research which involves experiments on human subjects,

ethical considerations are involved that problematize
testing
Popper gives the following example of scientific

prediction

in

medicine.

"If a physician has diagnosed

.
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scarlet fever then he may, with the help of the
conditional

predictions of his science, make the unconditional
prediction
that his patient will develop

a

rash of

Now this instance of predictability

a

certain kind."^

neat in the abstract

is

but in fact it ignores the complexity and practice
of the

diagnostic process.
largely

a

Making

a

diagnosis in the first place

matter of guesswork and it

is

fals if iable hypotheses that would prove

The failure of

a

is

difficult to frame
a

diagnosis false.

stated outcome would often not be grounds

for rejecting a diagnosis.

Two cases in point here are the

existence of asymptomatic diseases and the problem of false
negatives.

Also, many diseases, while labeled

diagnostically, are not understood in sufficient detail to
allow for causal explanation, much less prediction.

Diagnosis asks not only "How and why this symptom?" but also
"What is this indicative of?".

Diseases have their own

history and develop in response to changing environmental
cond it ions

Given that medicine presents problems for

methodology,

it

is

a

Popperian

important at this point to call attention

to the gap within medicine between theory and practice.

Although clinical medicine draws on the biomedical sciences,
the history of medicine indicates that there is no convincing

evidence that theoretical advances in

a

scientific field

related to medicine were initially important for the practice
of medicine.

This fact lends credence to the view that

26

in medicine

,

theory and practice are decoupled, theory

proceeding independently of medical practice.

discrepancy between theory and practice

This

not simply due to

is

the fact that medical practice clings to rigid,
dogmatic, or

timeworn methods of treatment.

In many respects advances

in

the biomedical sciences are not yet translatable
into

convincing practical results.

As Alvan Feinstein argues,

despite the fact that "anticoagulants, antibiotics,

hypotensive agents, insulin and steroids have been available
for 15—40 years, many of their true effects on patients
and

diseases are unknown or equi vocal ."
just
in

a

Uncertainty

feature of medical practice, but it

is

not

is

more prominent

practice for the simple reason that the subject matter

is

the whole, complex, particular patient, whereas in biomedical

research one can to some extent artificially isolate observed

sequences and the conditions under which they occur.
The point of this discussion is to highlight the way in

which Popper's normative restriction of science to bold

conjectures and severe attempts to refute them draws

a

boundary around science that excludes much of medical

practice and even some low-level medical research.
notion of science focuses on whether
suitable for use in

science

is

a

a

Popper's

theory or law is

scientific explanation.

This notion of

more geared toward ideal science rather than

science as it

is

often practiced.

More recently Popper cautions against

a

dogmatic
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adherence to the acceptance of refuting criticism,
realizing
that scientists do not and often should not
give up their

falsified theories too quickly.

For abandoning a theory too

quickly in the face of apparent refutation could result
in
failure to discover the possibilities inherent in

a

a

theory.

He sums up the methodological form of his criterion
of

demarcation as follows:
Propose theories which can be criticized. Think about
possible decisive falsifying experiments crucial
experiments. But do not give up your theories too
easily not, at any rate., before you have critically
examined your criticism. 1

—

Despite this softening of his original position, Popper has
not changed his position on the status of psychoanalytic

theory

^ ^
.

Unlike Marxism, which immunized itself by ad hoc devices
after its predictions were falsified, psychoanalysis,

according to Popper, was immune to falsification from the
very beginning;

irrefutable.
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it was simply

non-testable and

It undertook no tests of his hypotheses and

furthermore did not even put forth potentially falsifiable
hypotheses.

One might argue here that an individual

practicing analyst might be able to empirically test

psychoanalytic explanations by selecting out clinical
observations that are incompatible with
hypothesis that could serve as

a

a

particular

falsifying instance of it.

But on Popper's view this strategy would be unavailing since
the clinical observation that could falsify the hypothesis
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must be

matter of public observation. It cannot, for

a

example, be left up to an individual analyst to
decide on the
basis of her feelings about the character of

resistance whether or not an interpretation

whether or not

a

iab i

1 i

is

repression has been lifted.

psychoanalytic theory here
fa 1 s i f

a

is

patient's
correct or

What mars

the lack of public

ty and public rules of testing.

Griinbaum's Critique of Popper's Pronouncements

Popper's treatment of psychoanalysis

is

very cursory.

He

never draws on any of Freud's case material or clinical

papers.

What makes his charge even more remarkable is that,

as Grunbaum notes,

"even

a

causal perusal of the mere titles

of Freud's papers and lectures yields two examples of
fa

Is

i

f

iab i 1 i ty

.

"

In light of the fact that Popper

presents no evidence that he

is

familiar with Freud's

hypotheses and mode of procedure, his casual dismissal of

psychoanalysis bears more comment.
Popper acknowledges that he developed his view of science
in

reaction against the attempts of Marx, Freud and Adler

whose theories, once accepted, could find confirming
instances everywhere. 35

While Popper's intuition about the

looseness of these theories may have merit, his own loose

characterization of psychoanalysis and inductivism betrays
the way in which he is using psychoanalysis as

a

straw man

both to bolster his demarcation criterion that privileges the
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physical sciences and to rail against inducti vism

Popper

.

conflates enumerative and eliminative inductivism
under the
term
inductivism, which he sees as warranting the
'

'

scientific claims of psychoanalysis.

As Grunbaum notes, the

real philosophical target for Popper is inductivism
rather

than psychoanalysis. 36

By charging that by inductivist

standards the claims of psychoanalysis are scientific despite
their irrefutability and that his own criterion is more

restrictive, Popper can mount

a

case for the superiority of

his own methodological criterion.

As previously stated, Popper does not document his

allegations against psychoanalysis by referring to actual
Freudian hypotheses and explanations and he seems unaware of
the fact that Freud ever altered or modified his views in

light of clinical evidence to the contrary.

That Freud found

ways of accommodating unexpected data to his theory

commonplace but

it

is

is

a

equally the case that Freud was aware

that falsifying evidence was

a

problem to be reckoned with.

A prime case in point here, and one which Grunbaum uses

against Popper's charge that adherents saw confirming
instances everywhere,

is

Freud's 1915 paper, "A Case of

Paranoia Running Counter to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the
Disease." 37

In this piece Freud acknowledges that his

hypothesis that repressed homosexual love

is

causally

necessary for affliction by paranoid delusions

is

confirmed in the case of the paranoiac before him.

not
For in
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this particular case no trace of

homosexual attachment

a

evident.

is

struggle against
Freud asserts:

present case emphatically contradicted
between paranoia and homosexuality)." 38

it

"The

(the relation

Freud then goes on

to say:
In these circumstances the simplest thing
would have been
to abandon the theory that the delusion of
persecution
invariably depends on homosexuality, and at the
same time
to abandon everything that followed from the
theory.
Either the theory must be given up or else, in view
of

this departure from our expectations, we must decide
with
the lawyer and assume that this was no paranoiac
combination but an actual experience which has been

correctly interpreted

y

.

Here Freud countenances falsifying instances of his

hypothesized paranoia etiology and avows the conditions for
its falsification.

It turns out that during the second

session, Freud did uncover clinical data which indicated both

delusional affliction and homosexual attachment, both of
which accorded with his original hypothesis and thus he did
not abandon his etiological hypothesis.

But this outcome

does not militate against the point that in principle, "The

psychoanalytic etiology of paranoia
falsifiable

(d

isconf i rmable)

is

empirically

and that Freud explicitly

recognized it." 48

Another example of an instance in which Freud confronts
the problem of irrefutability can be found in his 1937 paper

"Constructions in Analysis" 43 in which he addresses the
charge that psychoanalysis protects itself by means of the
concept of resistance.

Specifically, the charge was that "in
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giving interpretations to the patient we treat him
upon the
famous principle of 'Heads I win, tails you lose.'"^
So

that

if

the patient assents to the interpretation,

affirm that the interpretation

is

then we

correct; and if the patient

denies the interpretation, we interpret this denial as
of her resistance,

sign

thereby guaranteeing its correctness.

Here, again, Freud confronts the problem of
and adduces the conditions under which
a

a

a

f als if

"yes" or

iabi 1 ity
a

"no" from

patient warrants confirmation of an interpretation.
Just to show that Freud was cognizant of the problem of

when he ought to regard

a

hypothesis or interpretation as

falsified is not to show that he actually proceeded according
to a Popperian methodology, nor
is

is

it

to show that the theory

falsifiable, but it does indicate that Freud was not as

methodologically naive as Popper's indictment and that of his
followers suggest.

Griinbaum's critique of Popper's charges

against psychoanalysis illustrates that psychoanalytic theory
is

falsifiable and hence

criterion.

is

not pseudo-scientific by Popper's

We will now turn to this critique.

Recall that Popper in 1962 denies even the logical

possibility of testing psychoanalysis empirically.

Referring

to the psychoanalytic theories of Freud and Adler, Popper

states:

"They were simply non-testable

,

irrefutable.

There

was no conceivable human behaviour which could contradict
them.

Again as late as 1974 in response to his critics.

Popper reiterates his charges against the two psychoanalytic
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theories:

"What prevents their theories from being

scientific in the sense here described is, very
simply, that
they do not exclude any physically possible
human

behaviour

." 44

Griinbaum,

in

several articles as well as in

his most recent book, has given numerous examples
of Freudian

causal hypotheses which are falsifiable.

strange that Popper did not deem

it

Indeed,

it

is

necessary to subject some

of the many causal hypotheses in the Freudian
corpus to an

examination, for Freud's etiological hypotheses,

in

particular, are quite specific and at times quite "risky" in
Popper

s

sense.

At the very least, the causal claims exclude

possible behavior.
To return to the paranoia example, note that the stated

etiology, namely that

a

homosexual conflict

is

causally

necessary for the affliction by paranoid delusions,

is

falsified according to Freud when the absence of the pathogen
(the homosexual conflict)

diagnostic disorder.

occurs in conjunction with the

Freud's hypothesis thus predicts that

anyone not subjected to the pathogen will be non-paranoid,
and it retrodicts that anyone who is paranoid also harbors

homosexual conflict.

Freud's etiological hypotheses

generally stated that

a

particular pathogen was causally

necessary and not causally sufficient for
disorder.

a

a

particular

This tempering of his universal etiological

hypotheses was deemed necessary due to the unknown influence
of heredity in a particular case.

Thus Freud recognized that
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the development of paranoia would be positively
affected by
an experience of homosexual conflict or
attachment,

his hypothesis could not predict whether

a

though

given exposure to

the pathogen would cause paranoia in every case.
By analogy with the medical tradition, Freud's

specification of

a

attempt to isolate

particular pathogen for
a

a

disorder was an

pathogen that was rarely an etiological

factor in the pathogenesis of any other nosologically

distinct syndrome.
of a disorder,

Hence, given a differential diagnosis

the etiological hypothesis, which specifies

the pathogen responsible for it,

is

empirically falsifiable

despite the fact that the hypothesis cannot predict that the
mere presence of the pathogen will guarantee that the

disorder will develop.

Freud postulates four different

concepts of causality that can be identified when talking
about neurotic pathology in an attempt to clarify the role
that he assigns to
a

a

specific etiological cause.

specific cause as opposed to preconditions, concurrent

causes and precipitating causes
is

To identify

is

to hold that this factor

the one which is never missing in any case in which the

effect takes place.

Further, this cause suffices,

in enough quantity and/or

if present

intensity, to bring about the

effect provided only that the preconditions are
fulfilled.

Hence the specific cause and the

preconditions are both necessary causes but the specific
cause is distinguished by the fact that "it

is

found in no
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other etiological equation, or in very few."^”^

Freud's Rat Man case provides an example of the

falsification of the specific etiology hypothesized
for an
obsessional neurosis. Also the abandonment of the infantile

seduction etiology of hysteria illustrates that Freud

modified his theory in the face of empirical evidence which

disconfirmed his views.

^

Another example of

a

case of

revision occurs in Freud's 1933 lecture "Revision of the

Theory of Dreams" in which he modifies the wish-fulfillment
as

the motivation for dreaming in light of the evidence

provided by the recurrent anxiety dreams of war neurotics.
For Freud acknowledges that these dreams, unlike punishment

dreams which can be handled in terms of the theory, falsify
his universal claim that all dreams are the fulfillment of

wish.

dream

a

He thus weakens his hypothesis to the claim that "the
is

an attempt at the fulfillment of

a

wish."^

Grunbaum's examples of Freudian hypotheses which are

falsifiable include hypotheses which qualify as "risky"

in

Popper's sense since they make prediction against which rival
theories either could or do disavow.

For example, Freud's

argument for the efficacy of psychoanalytic treatment over

against the rival treatment of hypnotic therapy is predicated
on the claim that only psychoanalytic intervention can

uncover the repressed conflict of which the symptom

is

only a

compromise formation between the repressed idea and the ego's

defense against it.

Hence

a

therapeutic focus at the level

1
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of symptomatology and a failure to lift the
repression, which

only the analytic method accomplishes, will
most likely

engender

a

new symptom, precisely because the unconscious

idea still persists and needs to be defended
against.

Grunbaum points out that Freud's prediction of symptom
substitution qualifies as risky, since rival theories such
as

behaviorism disavow this expectation.^

Grunbaum also notes that Freud's postulated etiology of
paranoia makes

a

statistical prediction that qualifies as

"risky" with respect to any rival theory that denies the

etiological relevance of repressed homosexuality for
paranoia. 5

in the case study analysis of Dr. Schreber,

Freud ties the resulting anxiety and guilt, which ensues from
the failure to repress homosexual impulses,
in turn calls

a

failure which

into play the defense mechanisms of reaction

formation and projection which are attempts to deal with this
guilt, to the social taboo on male homosexuality.

Thus

Grunbaum asserts that
if repressed homosexuality is indeed the specific
etiologic factor in paranoia, then the decline of the
taboo on homosexuality in our society should be
accompanied by a decreased incidence of male paranoia.
And, by the same token, there ought to have been
relatively less paranoia in those ancient societies in
which male homosexuality was condoned or even
sanctioned.
For the reduction of massive anxiety and
repression with respect to homosexual feelings would
contribute to the removal of Freud's conditio sine qua
non for this syndrome."
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Popper's charge that the theory
untestable

is

simply too crude.

is

simply irrefutable and

Indeed Popper, as Grunbaum

points out, has offered no proof that "none of the

consequences of the theoretical Freudian postulates are

empirically testable ." 53

To furnish such a proof, Popper

would have to establish the falsity of the claim that "there
exists at least one empirical statement about human behaviour

among the logical consequences of the psychoanalytic

theoretical postulates

." 54

But such

a

proof is unavailing

to Popper since he denies that we can deductively falsify by

any finite set of basic observation sentences an existential

statement which asserts that
class has

a

a

certain member of an infinite

certain property.

Popper's attack on the non-testability of psychoanalytic

postulates is predicated on loose ascriptions of what
constitutes

a

Freudian or Adlerian explanation, as seen in

the one example he does provide:

Neither Freud nor Adler excludes any particular person's
acting in any particular way, whatever the outward
circumstances. Whether a man sacrificed his life to
rescue a drowning child (a case of sublimation) or
whether he murdered the child by drowning him (a case of
repression) could not possibly be predicted or excluded
by Freud's theory; the theory was compatible with
everything that could happen even without any special
immunization treatment.

—

First of all. Popper does not utilize or invoke any actual

Freudian or Adlerian explanation in support of his assumption
that these theories license the unrestricted postulation of

conditions which motivate people to act

in

various ways.

37

Second,

if we take seriously Popper's earlier
charge that the

theory does not exclude any physically
possible behavior,
then what sense does it make to say that the
theory, no

matter what the initial conditions, deductively
explains

particular behavior ? 56
explain deductively

consequences of

a

is

a

Grunbaum argues that, since to
to exclude,

insofar as the

theory are vague and/or it is unclear just

what empirical statements the theory entails, the
testability
of the theory

is

problematic.

But these two properties of

"consequence vagueness" and "deductive indeterminacy" would
not only hinder the empirical

f alsif

iability of Freud's

theory but would also undercut its explanatory capability and
its

inductive confirmability 57
.

Hence Popper's indictment

of inductivism as licensing the ubiquitous confirming

instances of psychoanalysis falls by the wayside if we allow

him the assumption that psychoanalysis does not exclude.
As Griinbaum's critique of Popper is designed to show, at

least some of the major psychoanalytic postulates are

empirically falsifiable.

Furthermore he provides examples of

instances in which Freud set forth what sort of finding would

constitute

a

refuting instance of

a

particular hypothesis and

instances of Freudian retractions of major etiologies and
C O

theoretical claims.

principle the theory

Hence Popper's charge that in
is

irrefutable and that it was immune to

falsification to start with clearly seems untenable.

Even

Popper's claim, that the criteria of refutation, which must

.
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be laid down beforehand, are in the case of
psychoanalysis

difficult to establish or nonexistent due to the
vagueness of
the analytic concepts, does not lend credence
to the
view

that psychoanalysis is thoroughly marred by

lack of public

a

falsif iability

Popper uses the example of the vague term 'ambivalence'

illustrate his point that such
on criteria for

a

concept makes agreement

falsifying the explanatory relevance of

close to impossible.

it

CQ

To this, Griinbaum points to Freud's

ascription of ambivalence to children (the Little Hans case)
and suggests that "to predicate ambivalence of children

toward their parents is to say that there will be some

behavioural manifestations of hostility as well as some overt
expressions of affection, and one of these two contrary
affects may be largely unconscious or covert at any one
time."

The term 'ambivalence' under this description

does lend itself to testability, precisely because if there
is

no evidence of both sorts of behavioral orientation,

the imputation of ambivalence is d isconf irmed

does not predict which of the two affects

with respect to

a

a

.

then

Though Freud

child will evince

given situation, Griinbaum is quick to point

out that such nonpredictability does not amount to

untestability.

6

1

Popper's obvious objection here would no

doubt be that even the above obser vat iona lly based

description of ambivalence

is

too vague since individual

analysts might interpret behavior differently or impute
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unconscious manifestations of an act where there
are none.
This objection, however, ignores the
very real possibility of
laying down criteria of agreement which
specify
either

beha viora lly or verbally what counts as
evidence for the

explanatory use of certain concepts.

Given Popper's cursory

examination and/or lack of familiarity with Freudian

hypotheses and explanations, his failure to identify
testable
consequences and to isolate obser vat ionally based referents
for Freudian concepts

more indicative of his own

is

shortcomings than those of psychoanalysis.
Even if Popper did provide examples from Freud's corpus
(which he does not)

in support of the claim that Freud

immunized the theory against refutation, this evidence in and
of itself ought not to be conflated with the issue of whether
or not the theory

is

in

principle falsifiable.

For if Freud

and/or his followers were unwilling to accept evidence that
was adverse to their expectations, this methodological

defectiveness on their part does not speak to the issue of
whether or not the theory

is

falsifiable.

The closest Popper

comes to supporting the charge of methodological

defectiveness in the form of Freud's resistance to
falsification is the following:

"Adler's break with Freud

was more Adlerian than Freudian, but Freud never looked on
as a

refutation of his theory."

62

Here we have to ask

ourselves the question, on what grounds ought Freud to
consider it

a

refutation?

Is Popper

referring to Adler's

it
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instantiation of his own "masculine protest"
theory as
evidence that Adler's break with Freud is
itself a refutation
of Freud's psycho-sexual theory? what
does it mean to say,
as Popper does,

that "Freud himself was clearly a Freudian

case, and Adler an Adlerian case"? 63

asserts,

if Freud's

Indeed, as Grunbaum

theory is as empirically empty as Popper

suggests, how can Popper know that Freud

is

clearly

a

Freudian case, how can he know that the personalities
of
Freud and Adler instantiate their respective
theories? 6 ^

Furthermore, why would the mere existence of Adler's rival
theory be grounds for giving up the theory that spawned
it?
In view of the fact that Popper offers no actual Freudian

examples of aversion to falsification or of ad hoc rescue
attempts of the theory, his depiction of psychoanalysis as
loosely interpreting any evidence whatsoever as confirmation
of the theory borders on dishonesty.

Though it may well be

the case that Popper encountered defenders of the theory who

"saw confirming instances everywhere" and who introduced ad

hoc assumptions after the fact to explain unexpected

behavior, this situation does not necessarily bear on

Popper's charge against Freud.

To provide evidence of the

methodological failings of Freud, Popper ought to cite him.
Instead, Popper uses for his case in support of the
unf als

i

f

iabi 1 ity of psychoanalytic theory the purported

methodological laxity of its founder and the looseness of its
hypotheses and explanations of which he gives us no examples.

:
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Up to now we have examined and critiqued
Popper's charges

that the clinical theory is in principle
not falsifiable and
that adherents of the theory adopt ad hoc
immunizing

strategies rather than subjecting the theory or
hypotheses to
tests.
Though we have touched on the problems that Popper
raises with respect to the untestable character
of the

clinical data, Popper's reproaches against psychoanalysis

in

this regard bear more comment, especially in view
of the fact

that Griinbaum shares with Popper

a

profound skepticism about

the probative value of the clinical data.

Recall that for Popper, clinical observations are always

theory-laden; they are always interpretations in light of
theories.

For this reason criteria of refutation must be

specified in advance.

To this point Popper asks what kind of

clinical responses could be laid down beforehand that could
serve as criteria of refutation?
of staking out such criteria,

a

Even give the possibility

possibility Griinbaum

illustrates with regard to Freud's use of the term
'ambivalence' and the at least logical possibility of testing
for

it,

Popper calls into questions the probative value of

the clinical evidence obtained in the analytic session

against which criteria of refutation could be brought to
bear

Moreover, how much headway has been made in investigating
the question of the extent to which the (conscious or
unconscious) expectations and theories held by the
analyst influence the "clinical responses" of the
(To say nothing about the conscious attempts to
patient?
patient by proposing interpretations to
the
influence

42
C
Years a go I introduced the term
effectfn to describe the influence of a theory"Oedipus
expectation or prediction upon the event which or
it
predicts or describes:
it will be remembered that the
causal chain leading to Oedipus' parricide was
started by
the oracle s prediction of this event.
This is a
characteristic and recurrent theme of such myths,
but one
which seems to have failed to attract the
interests of
the analysts, perhaps not accidentally. 5
*

Despite the fact that Griinbaum concurs with Popper
that
contamination by suggestion undermines the probative value
of
the clinical data, he is quick to admonish Popper
for his

uninformed claim that the problem of self-fulfilling

predictions actuated by suggestion has escaped the attention
of analysts.

in support of Freud's grasp of the epistemic

problem of spurious data due to the doctor's suggestive
influence, Griinbaum calls attention to Freud's early 1888

account of several kinds of suggestion, their effects and the
need to take into account the role of different kinds of

suggestion in isolating the symptomatology of hysteria. 66
Subsequently, in 1905

Freud distinguishes between the

harnessing of the suggestive influence of the therapist

in

analytic treatment and the way in which his analytic

technique differs from hypnotic treatment by suggestion.

For

the superiority that Freud claims for his psychoanalytic mode
of intervention over that of hypnotic treatment is predicated
on the capacity of his technique to remove the pathogenic

idea behind the symptoms via the lifting of

a

repression.

Thus analytic therapy, rather than introducing new ideas,

attacks the resistance or

in

other words exposes the defenses
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which keep the unconscious conflict in

a

state of repression

and it does so by utilizing and directing the charged,

affective transference relationship between the therapist and
the patient.

Finally, as Griinbaum notes, Freud's 1917

lecture "Analytic Therapy" 68 is an attempt to establish the

objectivity of psychological discoveries that issue from the
analytic session.

Here Freud explicitly addresses the charge

of the spuriousness of clinical data wrought by the role that

suggestion plays in the transference relationship and

in the

interpretative constructions offered to the patient.

Though

Griinbaum argues that Freud's defense of the clinical evidence

ultimately fails to circumvent the contamination issue, this
failure is due not for want of methodological sophistication,
but for empirical reasons.

Hence Popper's accusation that

analysts are oblivious to the contamination problem

is yet

another instance of his failure to acquaint himself with
Freud's writings. 69

Grunbaum's critique of the probative value of the
clinical data will be discussed in chapter four.

Suffice

it

to say here that Grunbaum's critique of Popper's charges

against the clinical confirmability of psychoanalysis

is

aimed at discrediting both Popper's exegetical rendering of

Freudian theory and procedure and his indictment of
inductivism.

For according to Popper almost any human

behavior could be claimed to be
theory.

a

verification of the

Against Popper's claim that psychoanalytic theory

"
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serves as an illustration of the greater
stringency of his
demarcation criterion in that by inductivist
criteria of

confirmation the clinical observations of analysts
verify
their theories, Grunbaum argues that it is
"precisely Freud's
theory that furnishes poignant evidence that
Popper
has

caricatured the inductivist tradition by his thesis
of easy
inductive confirmability of nearly every theory. 7 ^
For a

careful look at Freud's etiological and causal
hypotheses
reveals that psychoanalysis

is

falsifiable and hence

scientific by Popper's criterion.

Yet,

ironically, by

inductivist standards, Freud's theory has not yet met the

challenge of providing independent evidence that satisfies
the canons necessary to rank as scientific.

extent that Grunbaum shares with Popper

a

Hence to the

skepticism

regarding the probative value of clinical data, he holds that

Popper's case against the clinical confirmability of

psychoanalysis does not discredit inductivism as

a

method of

scientific theory validation. 71
My examination of Popper's charges against psychoanalysis

and Griinbaum's critique of these charges has shown that

Popper's account of psychoanalytic theory and methodology

marred by

a

is

failure to come to grips with the theory he seeks

to criticize.

My analysis has concurred with Griinbaum's

judgement that psychoanalytic hypotheses can be falsified,
though like Grunbaum, but for different reasons,

whether

f als if

iabi 1 ity

is

I

question

an appropriate criterion for
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establishing psychoanalytic theory's scientific
status.
A major problem with Popper's f als if icat
ion is t view of

science when brought to bear on the judgement of
whether

psychoanalytic theory
hypothesis testing.

is

scientific is its focus on

Recall that Popper admonishes analysts

for not subjecting their hypotheses to rigorous
tests.

It is

true that much of Freud's work did not involve hypothesis

testing in the way that Popper takes as paradigmatic from
the

physical sciences.

This is

a

point which Griinbaum does not

emphasize most likely for the reason that, in order to mount
a

case for the falsif iability of psychoanalytic hypotheses,

he needs to focus on causal claims and the possibility of

deriving refutations of them.

In this regard, Grunbaum's

case against Popper is an attempt to establish the

possibility of testing psychoanalytic theory empirically
way that Griinbaum deems scientific.

Popper operates out of

a

in a

Grunbaum's polemic with

similar conception of scientific

activity, one that involves hypothesis testing.
Griinbaum utilizes psychoanalysis in

a

Furthermore,

manner akin to Popper

to show that Popper's criterion of demarcation is less

stringent than eliminative inductivism, at least with respect
to psychoanalysis.

Griinbaum, on one level,

is

thus extolling

the greater stringency of his canons against Popper's claims
of stringency for his demarcation criterion.

Both Popper and

Griinbaum are out to defend their conceptions of scientific

status.

They hold conceptually similar views of science in

46

that they both focus on rigorous testing
of hypotheses, but
they ask different questions.
Popper asks:
"what qualifies

statement as worthy of any attention at all
from
scientists?" while Grunbaum asks:
"what makes a statement,
which science has accepted as scientifically
meaningful,
a

scientifically credible ?" 72
both motivated by

a

These different questions are

conception of scientific activity that

views science as legitimated by methodological
norms, norms
that have been established in areas of science
where

invariant empirical regularities hold.
To return to the point at issue here regarding the lack
of Freud's focus on hypothesis testing, we note that
much of

Freud's work was directed toward establishing the domain and
range of the psychical and the language appropriate to it.

Psychical phenomena and processes are the objects of

psychoanalysis and it is these that Freud was interested in
explaining.

Freud's proposals and evidence are in many

instances attempts to persuade his listeners to take notice
of what they previously regarded as inconsequential.

His

explanations, then, often serve the function of clarifying
and demonstrating what the phenomena are that he wants us to

focus on.

Freud's struggle to establish and win recognition

for a new domain of inquiry is not captured by a

fals if icat ion ist view; neither,

for that matter,

is

it

sufficiently regarded as part of scientific practice by

Grunbaum's eliminative inductivism.
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Grunbaum's focus on Freud's causal
etiological hypotheses
to show that psychoanalysis is
falsifiable emphasizes Freud's
objective claims, claims in which general
interpretations
get fixed and are used to derive
specific interpretations.
In this way, he slides over Freud's
more complicated accounts
of causality and change.
In chapter four, I will argue that

Grunbaum's conception of natural science, while
more flexible
than Popper's, is still too rigid.
in particular, Grunbaum's
standards for establishing causality are so high,
that it is

debatable whether we can ever prove causality in
medicine.
At this point, we need only note that Freud's
causal

explanations do not merely refer to connections between

empirical events; they also refer to experiential
connections.

Understanding can hence be

cause.

a

In this

regard, while we can retain the insight that some of Freud's

hypotheses can be empirically falsified,

it

would be

a

mistake to carry over fals if icat ionism as an adequate
conceptual tool for understanding what Freud was claiming for
his therapeutic treatment.
In conclusion, Popper's falsif icationist view of science,

because

it

both presupposes and legislates norms of

scientific procedure (which it takes to
physics)

,

is

a

large extent from

problematic when brought to bear on the question

of the scientific status of psychoanalysis.

was first and foremost the development of

a

Psychoanalysis
language and

methodology for the understanding, explanation and treatment

.
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of unconscious psychical conflict.

Freud's early treatment

success with hysterical patients, who evinced
dramatic

physical symptoms, spurred him to investigate and
to apply
his theoretical postulates to other areas
of psychical life.

Popper's view of science regulates scientific
activity to
such

a

degree that he rules out some possibly fruitful and

certainly ground-breaking research as non-scient if
ic for the
simple reason that it does not fit his model.

Simplicity or oversimplification

not always

is

a

virtue,

though Popper deems that it is the mark of good science.

Specifically, the advocacy of simplicity or

oversimplification, which

is

essentially an aesthetic

criterion, can be ideologically coercive when applied to the

domain of human behavior, where the objects of investigation
are complex.

tortured.

Freudian explanations are complex and often

But he is

a

good example of

to reduce human motivation to simple,

a

theorist who refused

rationality

calculations grounded on the assumption that people are
conscious of what

problems are.

it

is

For Popper,

attempts to solve them.

starting point.

they want and what it is their

science begins with problems and

Freud's work problemat izes this very

Perhaps this fact, more than anything else,

explains why Popper was both anxious and quick to dismiss
Freud

.
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CHAPTER

3

HERMENEUTICS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
In this chapter

I

will present the hermeneutic position

on the scientific character of
psychoanalysis and Grunbaum's

critique of this position.

The hermeneut icists work within

a

natural/human science dichotomy and place
psychoanalysis
within the latter category, whereas Grunbaum
argues that

psychoanalysis ought to be evaluated as

a

natural science.

Thus the preliminary issue in the controversy
between the

hermeneut icists and Grunbaum concerns the sorts of standards
against which psychoanalytic knowledge claims ought to
be
assessed.

position,

After briefly introducing the hermeneutic
I

will address the claims and arguments of both

sides as to why psychoanalysis ought to be evaluated as

natural or as

a

human science.

I

a

will argue that the claims

about Freud's self-understanding and misunderstanding, that

Grunbaum and the hermeneut icists appeal to in order to
establish their position, are inadequate and problematic as
basis upon which to ground how we ought to evaluate

psychoanalysis.

I

will then turn to

a

more detailed

examination of the hermeneutic interpretation of

psychoanalysis and Gruiinbaum's critique of

it,

situating

myself with respect to these two positions.
Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas bring to their

examination of psychoanalytic theory

a

conception of science

that is much broader than the unified conception of the

53

a

.
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scientistic group.

For the hermeneuticis ts

science model of science

is

,

the natural

not the only one.

This model is

characterized by the explanation of particulars by
subsumption under general laws that allows for
prediction and
retrodiction. The hermeneut icists call into question
the

dominance of this model of science by pointing out
that
textual interpretation, history and social theory, for
example, utilize explanation and make knowledge claims
and

therefore these kinds of disciplines ought to be considered
sciences
Both Ricoeur and Habermas presuppose

a

distinction among

kinds of science which since Dilthey has often been grounded
in

methodological differences.

to differences
fact,'*'

in

These in turn can be traced

the relationship between theory and

the relationship between theory and fact being one

of explanation in the natural sciences and understanding in
the human sciences.

'Understanding'

is

the term often used

to refer to the wider form of explanation that operates more

exclusively in the realm of the human sciences.
Habermas and Ricoeur operate within

a

While

natural/human science

dichotomy, they do not hold that an explanation/understanding

dichotomy

is

an adequate demarcation of the different

scientific endeavors.

distinction as

it

Habermas accepts this methodological

applies to what he calls the empirical-

analytic sciences and the hermeneutical sciences but situates

psychoanalysis outside of these two categories of science.

.
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Ricoeur repudiates the very dichotomy of
explanation/
understanding inherited from Dilthey. On
his view,

dichotomy

is

this

an inadequate characterization of
the

methodology of the natural and human sciences.

Hermeneutics

and the natural sciences utilize both
explanation and

understanding.

The use of explanation in the human sciences

need not be seen as parasitic on the methodology
of the

natural sciences.

After all, not all explanation

is

causal.

In turning to an examination of the scientific
status of

psychoanalysis, the hermeneut icists stress the fact that
many

different "Freuds" can find support from the texts.

Since

different readings of Freud can be gleaned from the vast
Freudian corpus, various "Freuds" can be pitted against one
another.

Therefore, the attempt to make pronouncements on

the scientific status of psychoanalysis depends in part on
the textual emphasis and prejudgments that one brings to the

endeavor
Habermas and Ricoeur repudiate Freud's claim that

psychoanalysis
a

is

a

natural science.

They hold that, unlike

positivistic science methodology, psychoanalytic theory,

which developed from the clinical encounter, was based on
special form of interpretation.

a

Freud's postulation of

unconscious thought processes arose out of

a

logic of inquiry

which focused on the seemingly meaningless and inexplicable

communications of the patient.

In an attempt to explain the

existence and significance of various inexplicable
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communications (e.g., slips, neurotic symptoms,
etc.),

psychoanalysis parted company with physiological
medicine.
Symptoms are signs full of meaning; they have a
sense of

their own.

Symptoms are intentional communications and are

not simply signs from which we can infer physical

correlates.

As intentional communications that are

unconscious, the verbalizations and symptomology of the

patient are akin to

distorted text in need of translation

a

and hence the clinical encounter may be likened to the task
of textual interpretation.

the

i

nter

sub j ec t i ve

,

Because the hermeneu t icis ts view

clinical encounter,

deciphers the meaning of

a

in

which the analyst

distorted text, as the foundation

of psychoanalytic theory, and because this encounter does not

accord with their notion of the aims and methodology of

natural science, they must view as mistaken Freud's claim
that he is doing natural science as well as any attempt to

construe the theory along natural scientific lines.

While neither Ricoeur nor Habermas argues that

explanation modeled on

a

natural science paradigm

is

alien to

psychoanalytic theory, in that Freud did construct lawlike
generalizations, from which predictions could be made, they
do hold that, due to the nature of the object under

investigation in psychoanalysis and due to the interests or
aims that motivate knowledge of the object, psychoanalysis is

first and foremost hermeneutically grounded and should be
seen as an interpretative discipline that opens up

a
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dimension of meaning and knowledge that
natural science methodology closes off.
Habermas, psychoanalysis

is

a

positivistic,

a

For Ricoeur and

human science,

a

science that

arises out of an intersub jective inquiry
that derives from
analytic practice.
My treatment of the hermeneutical construal
of

psychoanalysis will primarily focus on the position of
Ricoeur, since, in fact, in many key respects his

view and

Habermas's view are the same.

However, before proceeding,

I

will pause to note some slight differences in
Habermas's

position on Freud.
Habermas calls psychoanalysis depth or critical

hermeneutics and uses

it

as a tangible example of a

reflective, critical social science that incorporates

methodical self-reflection.

Having drawn

a

distinction

between the empirical and hermeneutical sciences and the
knowledge and interest structure constitutive of each,
Habermas uses psychoanalysis to point to
science,

a

a

third kind of

science that incorporates into its consciousness

an interest which directs knowledge toward emancipation and

self-reflection.

The empirical sciences are motivated by

a

technical interest in that they seek to control, while the

hermeneutical sciences are motivated by
in that they aim at communication.

a

practical interest

Instrumental control and

communicative understanding represent the knowledge

constitutive interests of their respective fields of
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inquiry.

Interest structures are embedded in life
structures
and dictate the form of a science.
The third interest is
discovered by reflecting on the experience of
reflection,
(that is, on the reflexive nature of the
experience of

reflection)

that is inherent in the hermeneutical
sciences

,

but which was not developed by the
practitioners of this

science who primarily practiced what Habermas
refers to as
"philological" hermeneutics.

emancipatory.
in that

This third interest is

Critical or depth hermeneutics

is

emancipatory

knowledge coincides with the interest in autonomy and

responsibility.
model for

a

Using psychoanalysis, Habermas points to the

critical science that will allow us to reflect on

the social structure projected and realized through the other
two sciences.

In this way,

these sciences themselves become

subject to evaluation and criticism.

Psychoanalysis

is

the

model for an emancipatory form of science that frees us for

methodical reflection on the coercive, distorting forces of
the social structure.

Habermas wants to preserve in his idea of critical

science the moment of self-reflection that Freud's science
incorporates.

Yet he sees in Freud's own metapsychological

writings Freud's failure to construe adequately the
scientific status of his own endeavor.

Freud's

metapsychological writings were general theories about his
clinical discoveries that explained mental phenomena

according to their location in the psychical apparatus in

a
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terms of energy distribution.

Habermas charges Freud with

a

scientistic self-misunderstanding because he
holds that Freud
hypothesized correlations between his clinical and

metapsycholog ica 1 theories and then via these stated
correlations accorded
clinical theory.

a

natural science status to his

But this theory was really grounded,

according to Habermas, interpretati vely

.

his theory the status of natural science,

construing his project in

a

Freud,
is

in according

thus guilty of

way that shuts off the

emancipatory process which it originally opened up.
it

to say that

in

Suffice

relation to the point Habermas seeks to

make using psychoanalysis, he must reject any natural science

reading in favor of critical theory and practice.

Having

isolated forms of science, Habermas cannot allow

psychoanalysis to be counted as

a

science dominated by

technical interest, for then it could not serve as

a

a

reflective, critical science.

Habermas's charge regarding the self-misunderstanding of

psychoanalysis as

a

natural science

is

supported by Ricoeur,

who argues that the clinical encounter which is primary often
gets recast into the positivist, naturalistic language of the

metapsychology.

In this way,

which is fundamental,

is

the work of interpretation,

reconstructed in terms of

theoretical models that have become autonomous. 2
.

proceeding to

a

Before

detailed examination of Ricoeur's

interpretation of psychoanalysis,

I

will address the charge
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of scientism brought against Freud
by Ricoeur and Habermas
and Grunbaum's critique of this
charge.

The Debate Over Freud's Self-Understanding
"Truth is unobtainable

,

mankind does not deserve it."
- Freud^

In taking up Habermas's and Ricoeur
's charge that Freud
is

guilty of

a

scientistic self-misunderstanding,

important to distinguish two different questions.

it

is

My major

concern is to evaluate the scientific status of

psychoanalysis.

This is

a

separate question from that of

what Freud thought he was doing.

doing natural science.

Freud stated that he was

When the hermeneut icists charge Freud

with the failure to understand his own project, they are
taking him to task on the latter question.
a

Operating out of

framework that presupposes the parameters of explanation in

the natural sciences,

the hermeneut icists argue that,

though

Freud thought he was doing natural science, he wasn't and
that psychoanalysis ought to be evaluated as

a

human science.

More specifically, Habermas and Ricoeur concur that it is
the clinical encounter between analyst and analysand that

prompted the descriptive language of the clinical theory.
The clinical theory and not the metapsychology derives from

analytic practice and is hermeneutically grounded.
'metapsychology'

The term

refers to Freud's speculative concepts and
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theorizing.

Unlike the clinical theory, the metapsychology

conceptually stable construction that enables
Freud to
theorize further about the empirical data.
Freud's
is

a

metapsy cholog ica 1 papers construct general theories
or models
of the structure and function of the psychic
apparatus using

more sharply defined referents and are scientifically
useful

because they allow him to psychologize about broader
areas of

psychological concern.

As long as the metapsychology is seen

as the systematization of what occurs

in the

analytic

relationship, the language of the metapsychology

problematic for the hermeneut icists

,

is

not

for the language of

force does capture the experience of psychical conflict.

metapsychological edifice
clinical theory;

it

is

a

is

in part an

The

abstraction from the

speculative, hypothetical

construction from which, however, Freud often made deductions
that he then could apply to his clinical practice.

extent that Freud did use the metapsychology as
theory, working downwards to

a

a

To the

deductive

clinical interpretation, he

paved the way for the kind of criticism that the

hermeneut icists level against him.
For they claim that Freud ostensibly invested the

metapsychology with

a

scientific status by hypothesizing

correlations between clinical and metaphyschological
concepts.

Due to the ontologically reductive nature of the

metapsychology, the hermeneut ic is ts charge that Freud's
assertion of natural science status for the clinical theory
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parasitic on the reduction of its
hypotheses to the
metapsychology which they claim Freud
deemed primordially
4
scientific.
Habermas states:
is

UrelY f^umed tacitly that his
which ^severs the structural model from metapsychology,
the basis of
b
ween d °ctor and patient and instead
attaches it to the energy-distribution
by means of
efimtions, represented an empirically model
rigorous
scientific formulation of this sort.^

^

The clinical practice which

is

interpret atively grounded thus

ostensibly gets justified scientifically because
they hold
that Freud then used the metapsychology to
accord
his

clinical theory

accused of

a

a

natural science status

Freud is hence

.

"scientistic" misunderstand ing

because he idolatrously endowed the clinical theory
with
natural science status by misext rapolat ion from the
metapsychology via the stated correlations. And
furthermore, his view was purportedly a
"self-misunderstanding" to the extent that it involved a
philosophical misconception of the clinical theory, a
body of hypotheses which he himself had wrought.
The charge of

scientism" that the hermeneut ic is ts level

against Freud's construal of the status of his clinical
theory refers to Freud's proclamation of scient if icity on the
basis of what they hold are techniques and procedures alien
to the epistemological ground of psychoanalytic theory.

Against this charge of scientistic self-misunderstanding,

Grunbaum argues that after 1896, that

is,

after Freud

abandoned the reduct ionistic program of "The Project for

Scientific Psychology,"

it

a

was on the basis of the clinical

theory and the direct evidential support he claimed to have

.
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for

it,

that Freud assigned

enterprise.

a

natural science status to his

Quoting Freud, Grunbaum adduces evidence
in

support of the view that Freud "forsook his
initial,

ontologically reductive notion of scientific
status
of

methodological, epistemic one ." 7

a

in

favor

So that when Freud

asserts that the psychoanalytic enterprise has
the status of
natural science he is referring to his observat
ionally based
clinical theory upon which his most fundamental
hypotheses
rest

Furthermore, according to Grunbaum, Freud did not use
his

metapsychology to accord his theory natural science status as
Ricoeur and Habermas charge, for he firmly believed that
his

metapsychological hypotheses could be discarded without
damaging the psychological structure or clinical theory.

He

formulated his metapsychology precisely because he wanted to

extrapolate from his psychoanalytic observations and he was
conscious of the speculative nature of this enterprise.
Freud explains:

made an attempt to produce a "metapsychology." By this
meant a method of approach according to which every
mental process is considered in relation to three
co-ordinates, which I described as dynamic, topographical
and economic, respectively.
I
I

Freud goes on to say that he abandoned this venture because
it

seemed that theoretical predictions of this nature were

not at the time fruitful. Clarifying the status of his new

metapsychology, he states that his latest speculative works
have been concerned with analytically distinguishing the

.
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mental apparatus in terms of id, ego, and
super-ego.
of the limitations of language,

Aware

Freud sees it as useful to

treat and separate analytically the processes
of mental

functioning as if they are kinds of objects.

it becomes

useful to objectify processes in order to establish
referents.

Freud states clearly that the ideas formulated
in

his metapsychology "are not the foundation of
science, upon

which everything rests:
alone.

that foundation is observation

They are not the bottom but the top of the whole

structure, and they can be replaced and discarded without

damaging it ." 9

And later, writing in his "Autobiographical

Study," he refers to his metapsycholog ical notions as ideas
which are "part of

a

speculative superstructure of

psychoanalysis, any portion of which can be abandoned or
changed without loss or regret the moment its inadequacy has
been proved

."'*'

9

If we are to argue from Freud's self-understanding,

Griinbaum's textual evidence in support of Freud's own

understanding of the status of the metapsychology seems to
vindicate Freud of the charge that Habermas and Ricoeur level
against him.

Indeed Freud explicitly admits the close

association between fantasizing and his metapsycholog ical

speculation,^ an admission that hardly suggests that

it

was the metapsychology that he deemed primordially
scient if ic
But despite this textual evidence of Freud's assertions,

.
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he often did assume that certain
consequences would follow
from the energy model which he could
then apply to his

clinical practice

12
.

On the one hand,

these deductive

explanations could be viewed as suggestive
directives, but on
the other hand, to the extent that
these explanations operate
out of a closed system, they could direct
attention

away from

the ana ly sand and the clinical encounter
which is itself

resource for corrective interpretative explanations.

a

This

very tendency along with the mixing of the
language of energy

and force from the metapsychology with the
dynamic,

descriptive language of meaning from the clinical theory,
leads Ricoeur to claim that Freud "tends to reverse
the

relations between theory (metapsychology)

,

on the one hand,

and experience and practice on the other, and to reconstruct
the work of interpretation on the basis of theoretical models

that have become autonomous

." 13

if we take Freud at face

value and grant that he was aware of the speculative nature
and derivative status of his metapsychology, we may decide

with Griinbaum that Ricoeur's claim about Freud's

self-understanding

is based on a confusion.

requires that we assign

a

But to do so

marginal status to the

metapsychology
The hermeneut icists and Griinbaum agree that Freud thought
he was doing natural science but disagree as to how we ought
to evaluate psychoanalysis.

Before further elaborating the

hermeneutic reading of Freud and the basis for their
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evaluation of psychoanalysis as

a

human science,

it

is

important to clarify the relevance, if any, of
Freud's own
thoughts about what he was doing. As we've seen,
the

hermeneut icists argue that Freud misunderstood his
own
project in calling it natural science, so they bring

in the

issue of Freud's self-assessment in order to
pave the way for

their reading of Freud.

Grunbaum argues against their

accusation by simply trotting out passages in which Freud
asserts that his enterprise has the character of natural
science.

On this basis, he argues that we ought to evaluate

psychoanalysis by Freud's own standards of scientif icity

.

If

we take Freud's self-assessment and claims about the nature
of his metapsychology as unproblematic,

then Griinbaum's

criticism of the hermeneutic charge, that Freud used the

metapsychology to grant the clinical theory natural science
status, seems accurate.
However, Grunbaum overlooks the hermeneutical problem

involved in assessing someone's self-understanding.

Either

we must take Freud at face value or we must attempt to

rethink what Freud meant by "natural science" when he claimed
this status for his clinical theory.

value is problematic for two reasons.

Taking Freud at face
First of all, most

great theorizers or innovators fail to grasp fully the
.

.

.

.

significance and implications of their own work.
one thinks one

is

.

14

What

doing and what one is actually doing often

diverge, as Freud would be the first to admit.

Further, as
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Ackermann has illustrated with respect to
the history of
science, the present "does not contain
sufficient information
for us to grasp fully its significance." 15

The partial

opacity of the present bears on the ability
of

conceptualize adequately what she

is doing,

theorist to

a

which leads us to

the second problem in taking Freud at face
value.

Face value for Grunbaum seems to mean that
psychoanalysis
is

what Freud says it

evaluated as such.
science

is

and therefore it ought to be

But whatever Freud means by "natural

can't be what Grunbaum means by it, or, to put

it

another way, even if we take Freud at face value, face
value
can't mean that when Freud says he's doing natural science,

that's what Grunbaum means by natural science.

Ackermann

is

Here again,

pertinent:

The distinctions that we can locate in the past from the
viewpoint of the present are likely merely to sort the
past according to the present, but are perhaps not likely
to be a representation of the past as it appeared to its
participants. The supposition that we can understand
what happened in the past on the basis of our current
descriptions of the past must rest on a suppos it ion that
sound scientific practice doesn't change over time. 16
1

In as much as Grunbaum uses quotes from Freud to simply

contradict the hermeneut icis ts
a

'

claims, his position rests on

possibly naive reading of Freud's own assertions.
If we do attempt to rethink what Freud could have meant

by "natural science," we find grounds for suspicion that

Freud's view is the same as the one Grunbaum takes for

granted.

A complete defense of a different reading of what
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Freud might mean by "natural science"
would be out of place
here, so I will simply note the
basis for suspicion.

Grunbaum,

strictly to

a

m

defense of the view that Freud adhered

commitment to natural science in Grunbaum's

sense, quotes from Freud:

"The explanatory gains from

positing unconscious mental processes enabled
psychology to
take its place as a natural science like
any other. "I"7
However, what Grunbaum neglects to observe

is

the statement

made by Freud one paragraph later in which
he states:

science

is

"Every

based on observations and experiences arrived
at

through the medium of our psychical apparatus.

But since our

science has as its subject that apparatus itself,
the analogy
ends here."
in

Grunbaum further extrapolates from the text

defense of his view of Freud's self-understanding, quoting

Freud:

Psychoanalysis is

psychology.

.

.

.

part of the mental science of

Psychology, too,

What else can it be?"
states:

a

is

a

natural science.

However, Freud's next sentence

"But its case is different." 19

If one reads Freud with a view toward understanding what

he means by natural science,

the textual evidence suggests

that the term 'natural science'

for Freud was an elastic

category, one that ranged over all areas included under the
rubric of science which in German includes any disciplined,

scholarly pursuit.

Freud recognized the fact that different

disciplines (e.g., chemistry, anatomy, biology, etc.) may not
always be formulated in the same way and he specifically
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recognized that psychoanalysis was not identical
in content
with established medical science.
Freud uses the term
natural science' to describe his enterprise and
he sometimes
highlights the way in which psychoanalysis differs
from the
harder
science.

natural sciences but natural science for him means
The range of natural science may be extended to

cover areas that may not be formulated in the same way,
but
there will be
Griinbaum,

a

connection.

arguing against the hermeneutic contrast

between kinds of science, notes that Freud did not adhere to
a

methodological separatism.

out that the hermeneut icists

Griinbaum is correct in pointing
'

claim, that lawlike

explanations in the natural sciences are context-free and
ah istor ical

,

misrepresents the explanatory import of

nomothetic explanations and draws

a

pseudo-contrast between

explanations in the natural and human sciences.

Griinbaum

illustrates this pseudo-contrast by showing the way in which

nomothetic explanations

in

classical electrodynamics must

incorporate or take into account the history of and the
context of the object under study.

His point here is that

lawlike causal connections do not exclude an experiential,

historical dimension.
the hermeneut icists

'

On this basis, Griinbaum argues that

appraisal is based on

a

lack of

understanding of the content and methods of the natural
sciences.

Further, he holds that their anachronistic and

naive views of science are the basis for what he terms their
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"scientophobic" reconstruction of Freud's
theory.
Gr unbaunn is correct in pointing out
the problems

While
in the

methodological contrast that the hermeneut ic
is ts invoke, he
is wrong in citing Freud's
rejections of a methodological
separatism as evidence that Freud was claiming

the status of

strict natural science in Grunbaum's sense
for

psychoanalysis.

In contrast to Grunbaum's claim,

appears

it

that Freud rejected this separatism because
he did not

operate with

it

at all,

natural science being

a

category that

covered science in general.
Indeed, Grunbaum may be guilty of anachronist ically

enlisting Freud in

a

methodological struggle that Freud might

repudiate altogether.

Grunbaum writes, "Freud rebuffed the

antinaturalism and methodological separatism that was
championed by the Geis tesw issenschaf ten movement as

a

framework for psychology and the social sciences." 20
Freud's 1933 lecture on "The Question of

a

But

Weltanschauung,"

though it defends the right of psychoanalysis to speak for
the scientific Weltanschauung,

in no way

the Geisteswissenschaf ten movement.

contrasts this to

In saying that

psychoanalysis "is quite unfit to construct
of its own:

it

a

Weltanschauung

must accept the scientific one," 21 Freud is

rejecting the idea that psychoanalysis leads to
view of the universe,

world view.

a

a

particular

view that is outside the scientific

For the scientific world view,

though

the uniformity of the explanation of the universe,

it

assumes

"does so

:
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only as

program, the fulfillment of which is
relegated to

a

the future ." 22

Freud's denial that psychoanalysis
attempts

to set up a self-contained edifice
of its own is an attempt
to purge psychoanalysis of the
epistemological claims to

certainty that characterize the manner in
which religious and
metaphysical systems ground truth claims and
encompass and
explain everything within their purview.

By claiming that

there are no sources of knowledge of the
universe other than
the intellectual working-over of carefully
scrutinized

observations

,

and that this is the scientific

"

Weltanschauung to which psychoanalysis adheres, he situates
his enterprise against claims to knowledge derived
from

"revelation, intuition or divination

evidence to suggest that Freud
G e i s t e s w i s s en s ch a f t en movement,

is
a

There is no

.

rebuffing the

movement based on none of

the above repudiated sources of knowledge.

operates with

a

wider notion of science than does Grunbaum

and does not subscribe to

science.

Rather, Freud

a

separatism regarding kinds of

Summing up his lecture on

a

Weltanschauung, he

writes
Psychoanalysis, in my opinion, is incapable of creating a
Weltanschauung of its own. It does not need one; it is a
part of science and can adhere to the scientific
Weltanschauung. This, however, scarcely deserves such a
grandiloquent title, for it is not all-comprehensive, it
is too incomplete and makes no claim to being
self-contained and to the construction of systems. ^
The reason for this focus on Freud's self-understanding
is

twofold.

Both the hermeneut icis ts and Grunbaum are guilty
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of approaching Freud's assertions
about the status of his

enterprise with their own fixed views
and preconceptions
about natural science. This fact
forces the hermeneuticists,
in their philosophical
re-interpretation of Freud,
to assert

that Freud misunderstood his own
project when he claimed

natural science status for it.

As we will see,

evaluation of psychoanalysis, though

in

their

many respects

accurate, widens the gulf between natural
science and

psychoanalytic theory

in

the service of protecting it from

what they fear would otherwise entail

scientism.

a

lapse into

Grunbaum's defense of Freud's self-understanding

amounts to nothing more than pulling out of
context passages
in

which Freud asserts psychoanalysis

As I've indicated,

is

a

it may be the case that

natural science.
Freud's notion of

natural science is wider than Grunbaum's eliminative
inductivism,

in

which case Grunbaum's proposal for how we

should evaluate it does not rest on Freud's "own canon of

scientific status.

jn any case,

as I've shown,

arguments from Freud's self-understanding are problematic and
are not particularly fruitful in helping us to assess the

scientific nature of his theory.
Indeed, to pursue Freud's self-understanding in any depth

might require

a

psychoanalytic investigation into Freud's

modes of self-deception.

One could venture the claim that

the metapsychology, particularly the texts on culture,

is

Freud's attempt to extend the range of his theories and so to
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realize his own "original objective,"
philosophy.
in a
letter to Wilheim Fliess (1896)
Freud states:
"I see that
you are using the circuitous route
of medicine to attain your
f irst

ideal,

the physiological understanding
of man, while

I

secretly nurse the hope of arriving by
the same route at my
own original objective, philosophy." 27
Might
it not be the

case that Freud's desire to bring his
hypotheses into a unity
and his longing for a comprehensive
understanding of mental
life were motivated by his identification
of comprehensive,

system-building with the philosophical quest?

A few months

later in his correspondence with Fliess, Freud
claims that he
is

in the process of realizing his early
longing for

philosophical knowledge
toward psychology. 28

in his

movement away from medicine

But perhaps Freud's attraction to

philosophy

is

suggests.

Perhaps his psychology of the unconscious

more riddled with ambivalence than this

to overturn philosophical systems.

of the term 'metapsychology'

is

meant

His first published use

occurs within

a

passage in which

Freud anticipates the possibility of transforming metaphysics
into metapsychology.

Speculation of this sort about

Freud's motivations and evaluations gets us entangled in all
kinds of interpretative problems.

Regardless of what Freud

thought he was doing or what motivated his theorizing, we
need to evaluate the status of what Freud did.
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Ri_coeur s Interpr etation of
Psychoanalvs i R
'

We will now focus on Ricoeur's
interpretation and
evaluation of psychoanalysis in an
effort to glean from his
analysis the insights proper to the
science Freud

established.

Ricoeur's assessment of psychoanalysis

emphasizes the differences

in

objects and aims which mark off

psychoanalysis from what he considers
traditional natural
science and the role of self-reflection
in the analytic
situation which has a bearing on the way
claims are

established.

Insofar as Ricoeur does not judge

psychoanalysis against

a

restrictive, normative ideal of

natural science, he gives priority to the
consideration of
the particular form that this science takes
and attempts to

allow for the possibility of judging

it

in terms of an

epistemology that he sees as deriving from it.

The

importance of this starting point for our purposes involves
the recognition that epistemology derives its principles
from
the data supplied by the form that

science takes.

a

In as

much as epistemology has been developed and determined in

terms of the more exact model of the physical sciences,

judging psychoanalysis against such

a

theory of knowledge

prejudices the assessment of it. 30
Ricoeur's philosophical interpretation of psychoanalytic
theory begins with the recognition that Freudian discourse is
a

mixed one.

Generally speaking, we can divide this mixed

discourse along clinical and me tapsycholog ica 1 lines whereby
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a

theory of meaning dominates the clinical work
and

of forces

is

central to the metapsychology.

theory

a

But speaking in

this way is deceptive precisely because
Freud's work

integrated these theories and ways of talking.

Ricoeur states, "This mixed discourse

psychoanalysis." 31
which speaks of

the raison d’etre of

is

Both dimensions, that of the energetics

cathexis as

a

indeed, as

a

unit of force, and that of

hermeneutics which speaks of relations of meaning, as for
example, between

a

wish and

psychoanalytic discourse.

a

symptom, are necessary to

Freud moved between these systems

and attempted to overcome any gap one might posit between

them by treating forces as if they were meanings and by

treating meanings (wishes, etc.)
Hence,
force.

for example,

a

as

if

they were forces.

wish represents both

Ricoeur's reading

is

a

meaning and

based on what he sees as

a

a

correlation between energetics and hermeneutics, between

connections of forces and relations of meaning.
For Ricoeur,

the insight proper to psychoanalysis lies in

"the reciprocity between interpretation and explanation,

between hermeneutics and economics."

o2

Even the "Project

for a Scientific Psychology," Freud's 1895 essay which

represented psychical processes as quantitatively determined
states of specifiable material particles,

is

linked to the

work of deciphering symptoms, and so, according to Ricoeur,

hermeneutics

is

present in even this unlikely text.

For the

notion of quantity is not something that is measured, rather
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inferred from his clinical
observations of hysterics
and obsessional neurotics
whose "excessively intense ideas"
spurred Freud to conceptualize
affect in terms of
transformations and displacements of
quantity.
Hence
quantity is linked to intensity, an
intensity that derives
from, in that it is observed
in, the clinical encounter.
Ricoeur unlike Grunbaum, who views
the metapsychology as
peripheral to the scientific status of
psychoanalytic
33
theory,
traces the way in which the speculative
hypotheses of the metapsychology relate
the hermeneutic
concepts such as hidden meaning,
symptom, instinctual
is

,

representative, etc., with economic concepts
such as
cathexis, displacement, substitution and
projection.

Ricoeur

emphasizing throughout his work the legitimacy
of the
metapsychology when understood as the systematization
is

of what

occurs or

is

observed in the analytic encounter.

Freud fails to integrate completely into

a

Though

single system the

findings of clinical experience, nevertheless, to
the extent
that the metapsychology is seen in this context,

it

crucial to an understanding of Freudian discourse.

is

It

is

when the economic language is treated as an independent

construction, outside of the context of analytic experience
and practice, that we may be led to

understanding of Freud.

a

scientistic

For as Ricoeur notes,

the language

of the metapsychology is narrower than that in which analytic

technique

is

described

34
,

and it is analytic experience
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which engenders the writings on
technique.

Ricoeur

emphasizes the necessity of not
separating the economic
language from its rhetorical function,
for if we view the
metapsychology as systematizing referents
outside of what
occurs in analytic experience, we risk
lapsing into an absurd
35
hydraulics
.

Ricoeur states that:

"The facts of psychoanalysis arise

both from the category of the text,
and hence of meaning, and
from the categories of energy and
resistance, and hence of
force."
Psychical acts and psychical reality are the

objects under investigation and the language
of energy and
force refers to the meaning of the psychical
and not to

neurons or physiological and mechanical explanatory
schemes.
On the one hand,

the language of force refers to the

experience of conflict and by using this language Freud moves
us to experience "what has meaning,"

acts).

(i.e., our psychical

At the same time this language gives an explanation

for the text distortion

processes distorting it.

itself by accounting for the

Hence

it

is

not a question of

a

disjunction between explanation in terms of the language of
energy or force and interpretation in terms of

representations or meanings.

According to Ricoeur, Freud's

"mixed discourse is not equivocal but is appropriate to the

reality which it wishes to take into account, namely, the

binding of force and meaning in

a

semantics of desire.

This

reading does justice to the most realistic and naturalistic

^
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aspects of Freudian theory, while
instincts,'

the 'unconscious,'

to be deciphered

in their

it

never neglects to treat

and the 'id'

as significations

effects of meaning ."^ 7

Ricoeur uses the phrase "the semantics of
desire" to
describe the reality that psychoanalytic
discourse
investigates.

According to Ricoeur, psychoanalytic theory

places the work of interpretation within the
region of
38
desire.
Freud's mixed discourse, the energy metaphors

which account for the displacement of psychical
conflict and
the meaning relations which account for the
representation

and replacement of this conflict, captures the
vicissitudes
of unsatisfied yearnings.

in this regard,

the very concepts

Freud uses are to be judged "according to their status as

conditions of the possibility of analytic exper ience

"
.

As Freud's texts on analytic technique exemplify, the method
of interpretation,

a

method based on an exchange of words,

is

not divorced from the doctrines or theories that Freud

enunciates.

Ideas, affects and the behavioral clues to them

are that which are subjected to scrutiny.
In order to clarify the nature of the reality that is the

subject matter of psychoanalytic investigation and

explanation, Ricoeur argues that "psychoanalysis

science of observation;

it

is

is

not a

rather an interpretation, more

comparable to history than to psychology

.

As such,

attempts to reformulate psychoanalysis along lines of

academic psychology, which

is

an observational science
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dealing with the facts of behavior,
not only miss the unique
origin of psychoanalysis as an
exegetical science, but also
confuse the notion of a "fact" in
psychoanalysis.

According to Ricoeur, the theory behind
psychoanalysis
arose out of the confrontation between
analyst and
ana ly sand

From the very beginning the situation
is an
intersubjective one.
For this reason alone, the analyst
initially counts as data that which is
supplied by the
.

analysand through her language and behavior.

The data are

not reducible to mere observation but
rather are initially

given interpretati vely

,

first by the analysand and second as

interpreted through the person of the analyst.
as a fact and as data

What counts

in psychoanalysis diverges from the

very beginning from notions of facts and data in
academic or

behavioristic psychology.
a

theory,

in

While facts are always embedded

in

psychoanalysis the facts are initially reports

ano as reports are claims about affective and cognitive

experience.

These reports are not subject to direct or

immediate confirmation or

d

isconf irmat ion

.

The

reformulations, which seek to operationally define terms, to

utilize experimental control groups and to predict behavior
so that the hypotheses and theory may be tested and confirmed
or d isconf irmed

,

can only deal with the results of a case

history that are detached from the analytic situation.
becomes operationally defined

is

What

split off from its origin in

interpretation and extracted from the other data with which

.
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it

is

inextricably linked.

For Ricoeu r

,

because psychoanalysis deals with
the

relationships of meaning between
substitute objects and the
primordial (and lost) instinctual
objects 41 it is not an
,

observational science
Ricoeu r

,

m

in the way that

behaviorism

his early work on Freud states,

speaking, there are no 'facts'

in

is.

"strictly

psychoanalysis, for the

analyst does not observe, he interprets

."

42

m

as much as

Ricoeu r uses as his paradigm for academic
or scientific
psychology a reductive, behaviorist psychology
where behavior
is treated as a dependent,
observable variable, he is correct
in recognizing that the "facts"
of psychoanalysis differ from
environmental variables that are manipulable by an
outside
observer.

However, as Grunbaum points out, this contrast

with obser vat iona lly based academic psychology
ignores that
in

physics and cognitive psychology reality

is

not directly

observable either and yet we can still speak of observables
and recognize the legitimacy of countenancing
intrapsychic

states.

4 3

On this basis, Grunbaum accuses Ricoeur of

operating with

a

crude observation-theory dichotomy, and of

oversimplifying the contrast by relying on

a

reductive

behaviorist psychology as the paradigm for academic

psychology
While Grunbaum's point is no doubt true, Ricoeur's use of
the term "academic psychology"

Freud.

is

not without support from

So let's first look at the sense in which Ricoeur's
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point is shared by Freud.
In the essay "The Question of
Lay Analysis,” Freud refers

to academic psychology in two ways:

first as

a

discipline

whose explanations are non-psychological
in his sense,
because mental acts are explained in terms
of their

physiological connections, and second, as

a

discipline which

assumes that all mental acts are conscious,
that

consciousness

is

the criterion of what is mental 44
.

In contrast to academic psychology,
psychoanalysis

depth psychology,"

a

is

theory of the mental unconscious.

Freud expounds the value of this new psychology
in terms of
its capacity to explain the origin and meaning
of dreams and

symptoms and to explain the connections between mental
acts.
He then goes on to describe analysis as an
interpretative

art.

The analyst begins by regarding the patient's remarks

and associations as distortions or allusions behind which
lies what must be revealed.

"In

a

word, this material,

whether it consists of memories, associations or dreams, has
first to be interpreted

." 45

The analyst takes as her point

of departure the language and behavior of the analysand but

attempts to refrain from imposing her own expectations on the
material.

Interpretation

is

arrived at not through

a

rule-governed process but through submitting to one's own

unconscious activity
unconscious.

in an

effort to glimpse the analysand's

The assumption behind Freud's characterization

of psychoanalysis as an interpretative art is that the
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material produced by the analysand can be
viewed as
functioning like allusions.
The point that Ricoeur is trying to
establish, using the
contrast with academic psychology is that,
unlike academic
psychology which is an observational science
that regards
symptoms as segments of behavior, psychoanalysis
is firstly
an exegetical science which regards
symptoms as segments of

meaning.

Psychoanalysis does observe behavior, just as
scrutinizes the language of the analysand, but these

it

observables function, according to Ricoeur, as "signifiers
for the history of desire.

.

.

The object of the analyst's

.

study is the meaning for the subject of the same events the

psychologist regards as an observer and sets up as
environmental variables ." 46

it

is

the meaning that the

behavior or fact has assumed for the subject and in her

history that Ricoeur regards as primary in analytic theory.
Ricoeur,
a

in

emphasizing the semantic nature of what counts as

fact in psychoanalysis,

is

trying to capture an important

feature of analytic experience.

According to Ricoeur, psychical reality and not material
reality is decisively relevant to analytic experience.
a

clinical point of view, what is psychically real need not

be an event that has actually occurred.
is

From

Psychoanalytic truth

not the truth of an ordinary historical past;

mean that

a

this would

correspondence theory of truth holds and we could

speak, as Grunbaum does, of reconstructed past events

:

.
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tallying with what

is

real.

Instead what is psychically real

may be substitute ideas to which
affects are attached even if
these ideas to which they are attached
are not the original
ones.
Of course, Freud wanted to get at the
originally

repressed ideas, but he recognized increasingly
that reality
is a construction, not a fixed
or given entity 47
.

Recall that Freud abandoned his infantile
seduction

hypothesis, which avowed the father's actual
seduction of the
child, in favor of an oftentimes fantasied
seduction.

Repression does not act on experiences;
In that experiences are repressed,

it

acts on memories.

they are so only in

retrospect, only in their being remembered

4 ^

Freud's

early work on "screen memories" illustrates that memories
are

constructed and are not records of objective traces of
events
It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories
at all from our childhood:
memories relating to our
childhood may be all that we possess. Our childhood
memories show us our earliest years not as they were but
as they appeared at the later periods when the memories
were aroused.
In these periods of arousal, the childhood
memories did not, as people are accustomed to say,
emerge; they were formed at that time. And a number of
motives, with no concern for historical accuracy, had a
part in forming them, as well as in the selection of the
y

memories themselves.

Regardless of whether the memory, which

is

itself

a

construction,

is

of a fantasy or an actual event,

memory

is

sufficient to call into play repression

that

a

the fact

indicates that the very notion of psychical reality and truth
claims about it

is

not captured by a common sense, scientific
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naive realism.

Thomas Thompson states:

Psychoanalytic truth, as Janet Malcolm points out,
is not
the truth of an ordinary historical past.
Psychoanalytic
truth is the pr oduct of the working through
of the
resistances and of the analyzing of the transference,
not
the matching up of an independent set of
statements or
ideas with the independent reality to which they
refer
retrospectively
"Truth" in the psychoanalytic
situation, like it or not, is part of an inner myth
by
which a person lives in his or her own world. n^
.

Thompson acknowledges that Freud would have rejected this
paradigm of truth

confronted with it, but he holds that

if

Freud's insights as

a

practitioner pointed to

important point for our purposes

is

it.

The

to recognize that

Thompson's and Malcolm's characterization of the truth claim
of psychoanalysis comes close to Ricoeur's reading of Freud.

To say this, however,

is

not to say that Ricoeur identifies

the data text of psychoanalysis with fiction.

essay,

Ricoeur's

"The Question of Proof in Freud's Psychoanalytic

Writings,"

is

an attempt to stake out criteria for the

justification of the truth claims of psychoanalysis.

In this

essay, Ricoeur argues that psychoanalytic explanations ought
not to be separated from the transformative process of

self-understanding that comes about through the analytic
experience.

Given that Freud's theory

is

built upon what

takes place within the analytic situation, Ricoeur seeks to

justify its claims to knowledge by laying out the context

in

which its claims are made.
In order to establish grounds for the verification of the
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theory

Ricoeur enumerates four criteria for "facts"
in
psychoanalysis. As previously stated, "facts"
,

are reports.

What enters into the domain of investigation

experience which

is

that part of

is

capable of "being said."

This

restriction highlights that even symptoms which
are directly
observable are objects of investigation only in
their

relation to what is verbalized by the analysand.

symptoms are mute,

in the verbal sense,

analysis

Because the
necessary

is

to uncover their meaning and because Freud likens
all

psychical productions (slips, jokes, etc.) to the structure
of dreams and symptoms, he regards the analysand'

itself

a

symptom and as

Secondly,
is

a

a

talk as

s

clue to therapeutic treatment.

"fact" is not only what is sayable, but "what

said or capable of being said to another person."

For

Ricoeur, the transference marks out the intersub j ecti ve

nature of both the structure of desire and of talk.

When

Freud speaks of wish-objects, the lost object, the substitute

object, etc., he is pointing to the intersubject ive structure
of desire, which has as its object another desire.

analysand repeats in the transference relation
is

is

What the
a

wish that

always directed toward another person, an erotic demand

that in being acted out in the analytic relationship becomes

itself an object of analysis.

What

is

demanded of the other

contains the history and the drama that constitutes the

meaning making processes of the analysand's past.

The

analysand's perceptions and reports continue to be pervaded
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by her affect and by her
fantasy life, which are constituted
by her past.

Thirdly, psychoanalysis deals with
psychical as opposed
to material reality so that in
the clinical setting, from an
epistemological point of view, the actual
occurrence of
seduction, for example, is not decisively
relevant.
"What is

psychoanalytically relevant
fantasies ." 51

is what a

subject makes of his

Ricoeur holds that the criterion for

psychical reality

is

that it "presents

a

coherence and

resistance comparable to that of material
reality.

Abandoned objects and their substitutes are
real because they
have meaning for the analysand.
Dreams, slips,
symptoms,

hallucinations, etc., are substitute formations.

"Their

reality is their meaning, and their meaning is
their

capability of mutually replacing one another.

it

is

in this

sense that the notions of the lost object and the
substitute

object

occupy

cardinal notions for analytic exper ience--deser ve to
a

key position in the epistemological discussion as

well."

As Ricoeur makes evident using the illustration

of mourning, the lost object when introjected continues to

exist psychically.

The work of analysis does not simply

dispel the lost object or eradicate the fantasy; rather,
"recovers it as

confusing
imag ina ry

it
"

a

it

fantasy in order to situate it, without

with what

is

real, on the level of the

54

.

On the one hand,

Freud preserves the distinction between
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psychical and material reality, between the
ideas and the
objects they represent, so that we remain
cognizant of the
level of abstraction we are talking in
terms of when We speak
of reality.
But on the other hand, his own theory

obliterates this distinction in that his notion
of
that of

a

The projection of

a

fulfilled wish depends on

the prior experience of a fulfilled wish.
a

wish is

representation of something that orginally gave

rise to it.

that

a

We said previously

wish as an erotic demand in the transference
has

another desire as its object, but its aim

What gives rise to

a

wish

satisfaction.

is

an original experience of

is

satisfaction, an experience of

a

psychosomatic unity that

grounds the possibility of the emergence of

a

split, a split

between material reality understood as necessity and

psychical reality (which strictly speaking

is

the

unconscious) understood as the quest for pleasure, or the

avoidance of unpleasure.
Freud traces the meaning of psychically real ideas to

abandoned wish-objects, which, as he tells us, we never
really abandon, but rather erect substitutions.

A wish

is

a

repetition in the form of

a

objects of satisfaction.

Hence the realm of the imaginary is

substitute satisfaction of lost

not diametrically opposed to
the realm of the imaginary is

material reality which
situate

a

is

fixed material reality because

a
a

mode of reality, a psychical-

constructed and projected.

To

fantasy or wish on the level of the imaginary

is

to
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locate the lost object and the substitute
formations that are
derivative of it on the symbolic level. This
is why Ricoeur
holds that substitute formations have a relationship
of

meaning to what presents itself as lost.

The substitute

formations are substitutes, they are distorted and
they are
derivative; and they would be none of these did they
not
refer to or designate lost objects of desire.

Their

reference to these lost objects and their substitutability
for them is their meaning;

had they not this relationship,

they would not be psychically real.

What presents itself as

lost and is expressed symptomatically is not the "real"

history (understood as an objective, in
sense,

history

correspondence

a

recording of events), but rather the figurative
.

The fourth criterion for what counts as "fact" in

psychoanalysis concerns the putting into

narrative

a

structure one's own story and the facts which constitute this

figurative history.

The work of analysis consists in

overcoming the resistance and the repetition of old patterns
of relating in the service of filling in the gaps in memory.

But since "screen memories" as opposed to actual memories are

often as far back as one can trace the origin of neurotic
conflict, what the work of remembering consists in is the

ability to constitute in
own past.

structure.

a

meaningful, coherent order one's

A fact must be able to be put in a narrative

This last characterization of

a

"fact"

in
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psychoanalysis, like the other three
characterizations,
illustrates that "facts" arise within the
dynamic of analytic
experience and may take on a different
significance in the
course of analysis. They are not in any
predetermined way
isolatable outside it.
Having explicated the peculiar nature of
facts in

psychoanalysis, Ricoeur argues that the relationship
between
facts and theory in psychoanalysis is properly
understood

when seen as mediated by Freud's procedure for
investigation
and method of treatment.

The coordination of these two

aspects of psychoanalysis provides the link between
theory
and data.

The procedure in the observational sciences links

theoretical terms to observables by means of correspondence
rules.

But here the interpretative method, generated out of

the language of meaning that dominates the investigatory

procedure, together with the language of force that dominates
the method of treatment, mediates facts and theory.

practice

both

is

a

work involving

resistances of the analysand and
dreams, etc.

a
a

Analytic

struggle against the

deciphering of symptoms,

We do not grasp the meaning of the distorted

text if we construe the task of deciphering along lines of

exegesis.

symptom and

To be sure, the relations of meaning between
a

a

cause, between the manifest and latent content

of a dream, are discussed in terms of their symbolic

connection.

Still,

in

explaining the mechanisms of the

dream-work and the compromise character of symptom formation,

.
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Freud gives

a

dynamic, causal account in terms of the

mechanisms of force (repression, resistance,
displacement,
regression, etc.) operating between conscious,
preconscious
and unconscious systems.
This explains also why

and how the

meanings are distorted and in need of translation.

Ricoeur

states that analytic practice, as procedure
for investigation
and methoo of treatment, "constitutes the
specific mediation
between theory and fact in psychoanalysis ." 55
The practice

generates both the facts and the theory; the
accommodation of
both to each other must be placed inside the
parameters of

practice
Ricoeur shares with Habermas the view that the theory

is

an attempt to explain the meaning of the distorted
text of

the ana ly sand

(i.e.,

to restore the split off meaning)

the meaning of the forces distorting the text.

and

This is why

psychoanalysis goes beyond philological hermeneutics.

Both

the economic metaphors and the philological metaphors have

their place and neither can be reduced to

other.

or

replaced by the

In that psychoanalysis shares with critical social

science the aim of examining modes of false consciousness and

explaining distorted communications, Ricoeur and Habermas
view it as an emancipatory form of science.

The language

Freud uses to reify mental functioning has its place provided
we view it as capturing the processes of our self-

alienation.

For we do, when we take ourselves as objects of

thought, often view ourselves as we view things.

In this
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regard, thought is incurably metaphysical.
say, however,

This is not to

that it is legitimate to reduce unconscious

processes to the status of objects.
Both Ricoeur and Habermas think that
psychoanalysis, in
seeking causal connections, utilizes forms of
explanation

operative in the natural sciences.

potential problems with the way

in

However,

in

that they see

which reification must be

seen in the service of referring to the experience
and modes
of self-alienation,

they emphasize that the mechanisms of the

unconscious are better understood as "split off symbols."
Hence conversion hysteria, phobias, slips, etc., are

distorted communications, symbolic communications, that have
become privatized.

Viewing symptoms as "split off symbols,"

which both reveal and conceal, enables us to understand how

analysis as "talking cure" makes possible the restoration of
meaning and how it changes our functioning.

After all,

analysis in the process of working-through proceeds through
an exchange of words.

Freud states:

Words are the essential tool of mental treatment. A
layman will no doubt find it hard to understand how
pathological disorders of the body and mind can be
eliminated by "mere" words. He will feel that he is
asked to believe in magic. And he will not be so very
wrong, for the words which we use in our everyday speech
are nothing other than watered-down magic.
But we shall
have to follow a roundabout path in order to explain how
science sets about restoring to words a part at least of
their former magical power.
It

is

the power of words themselves, over against their
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use in hypnotic suggestions, that
marks off Freud's treatment
of hysterics from the hypnotic
treatment of Charcot.
if
Freud's form of treatment does uncover
causal connections,
then speaking of unconscious mechanisms
as split off symbols
explains the possibility of analysis' efficacy.
Analysis,

according to Ricoeur, involves

a

"reappropriation that

inverts the process of splitting off symbols.
As we've seen,

this focus on "split off symbols" or the

semant icizat ion of unconscious thought processes
and their

experiential causal connections

is

not without support from

Freud, who recognized early on that the analysand's
language
and the structure of her story function as clues
to diagnosis
and treatment.

Commenting on his case histories of

hysterical women, Freud writes:
have not always been a psychotherapist.
Like other
neuropathologists, I was trained to employ local
diagnoses and electro-prognosis, and it still strikes me
myself as strange that the case histories I write should
read like short stories and that, as one might say, they
lack the serious stamp of science.
I must console myself
with the reflection that the nature of the subject is
evidently responsible for this, rather than any
preference of my own. The fact is that local diagnosis
and electrical reactions lead nowhere in the study of
hysteria, whereas a detailed description of mental
processes such as we are accustomed to find in the works
of imaginative writers enables me, with the use of a few
psychological formulas, to obtain at least some kind of
insight into the course of that affection. Case
histories of this kind are intended to be judged like
psychiatric ones; they have, however, one advantage over
the latter, namely an intimate connection between the
story of the patient's sufferings and the symptoms of his
illness a connection for which we still search in vain
in the biographies of other psychoses.
I

—

The paralysis of conversion hysterics exemplifies
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behavior is ti cal ly

both by the absence of what is not
said

,

and by what is said bodily,

that which must be put into

language in order to become decipherable.

diseased organ that

is

related to that organ.
is

a

central focus.

For

it

is

not

a'

the cause of that symptom, but an idea

Hence the language of the analysand

The therapeutic process is one in which

words and so thoughts give expression and form
to symptoms
and gradually come to replace them.

Ricoeur's view, that "the proper object of psychoanalysis
is

the effects of meaning

behaviour

dream to

is

a

.

.

."

and that "for the analyst,

segment of meaning ," 59 likens the symptom or

verbal message and in this respect attributes

a

intent iona lity to unconscious thought processes.

The

explanatory role of meaning and its etiological significance,
however, do not mean that for Ricoeur psychoanalytic theory
can be reformulated along lines that exclude explanation in

terms of causes.

Just as the theory

is

not grasped if one

literally reifies the economic metaphors thereby losing sight
of the nature of what is explained, neither is it grasped if

one invokes

a

motive/cause distinction assimilating

psychoanalytic explanations to accounts of motives as reasons
for an action.

This reason/cause distinction, which

separates the domains of action and movement and which may be
viewed as

a

variant of the methodological distinction between

understanding and explanation,

is

rejected by Ricoeur as an

inadequate construal of the nature of psychoanalytic
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explanations.

For what requires explanation is
not only the

meaning of unconscious intentions and
their disguised link
with conscious ones, but also the very
mechanisms of disguise
and the means by which what becomes
unconscious does so and
remains so.

Ricoeur's rejection of the reason/cause
distinction in
his later article on the question of
proof represents
a

change in his earlier position,

which he stated that

in

motives were irreducible to an explanation through
causes.
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in this

regard, Ricoeur endorses Michael

Sherwood's criticism of the separate domain position 61
.

On

this view, psychoanalysis explains human action in
terms of

reasons, motives, and intentions,
in the natural sciences which

explain body movements.

in

contrast to explanations

invoke physical causes to

Ricoeur, following Sherwood, argues

that Freud ignored the distinction between motive and cause
and that it is legitimate to do so.

As previously noted in

chapter two, Freud distinguished four different kinds of
causes, all of which are causally relevant factors.

A

psychoanalytic explanation attempts to account for the origin
of a neurosis, the genesis of a particular symptom,

function and significance, so in order to have

a

its

fully

psychoanalytic account, these levels of explanation must be
integrated.

Depending on what Freud

is

concerned to explain,

that is, depending on the explanatory context in which an

incongruity presents itself, he may explain

a

particular
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symptom using the language of cause or
motive.
the significance of

a

Explaining

dream or symptom, for example, presumes

talk in terms of meaning.

But at the same time, Freud will

connect this significance to the dream's or
symptom's

function and may talk in terms of motives
whether conscious
or unconscious.
in

But explanation by reference to motives
will

turn be connected to an explanation that inserts
these

motives into

a

causal account of the development of

a

neurosis as well as into an account of the working-through

process of analysis.

Ricoeur states:

about psychoanalytic explanation

is

"What is remarkable

that it brings into view

motives which are causes and which require an explanation of
their autonomous functioning

." 62

Because the notion of the

unconscious problemat izes any simple minded view of motives
or

intentions, we can see that intentions are deemed relevant

only insofar as they are explained by

a

network of causal

factors which at the same time reveal their significance.

As

Ricoeur states:
To say, for example, that a feeling is unconscious is not
just to say that it resembles conscious motives occurring
in other circumstances; rather it is to say that it is to
be inserted as a causally relevant factor in order to
explain the incongruities of an act of behavior, and that
this explanation is itself a causally relevant factor in
the work
the working through of analysis. 5

—

—

Ricoeur uses his depiction of the facts and relationship

between theory and analytic experience to stake out an answer
to the question of the nature of the truth claim of

psychoanalytic statements and the verification appropriate to
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such statements.

By returning to the criteria for
facts in

psychoanalysis, Ricoeur specifies
to these facts.

a

truth claim appropriate

Unlike Habermas, who attributes to the

ana ly sand privileged cognitive access and
so grants her the

position of epistemic arbiter regarding the truth
of
interpretative constructions, Ricoeur holds

more

a

complicated account of the truth claim which, for him,
resides in the case histories and the constellation
of

factors that constitute these case histories.
As regards the first two criteria for facts,
truth,

according to Ricoeur, "is closer to that of Greek tragedy
than to that of modern physics

." 64

it involves a process

of recognizing ourself in the past which we re-enact in the

therapeutic encounter.

This is why Ricoeur holds that the

realm of truth is characterized by that of

opposed to

a

a

"saying-true" as

"being-true," for the movement, from forms of

misunderstanding to recognition of both ourself and the other
as that to whom we direct demands and wishes,

coming to self-knowledge through struggle,

a

involves

a

struggle marked

by disguise and illusion in which "saying-true" has a

precarious status initially.

However, the analysand,

in

being brought to experience her past from new perspectives,

dramatically renders or repeats the sources of
misunderstanding.

Hence "saying-true" becomes

in that the process of

recognition

is

a

possibility

one of standing outside

ourself and seeing ourself as both actor in and author of

a
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script which we recognize as our
own.
The positive role that Ricoeur
assigns to fantasies and
so the problem of supplanting
truth with fiction or a
'reasoned mythology" is tempered by
what he, following
Sherwood, calls the "narrative commitment."
A psychological
case history is one which integrates
incongruous phenomena
into a sequence of events that
explains the isolated
phenomena and inserts them into the
context of a larger,
unified narrative. The criterion of
narrativity must retain
a critical dimension in order
to be set against a rhetoric of

persuasion or mere adaptation to social norms.

To accomplish

this, Ricoeur ties narrative intelligibility
to the structure
of stories and story-telling which has both
a tradition and

history by which we judge their intelligibility.
Having set the context for the kind of truth operative
in
the domain of psychoanalysis within the narrative
structure
of the facts, Ricoeur claims that the means of proof
or

criteria of validation "reside in the very articulation of
the entire network constituted by the theory, the

interpretative procedures, the therapeutic treatment and the

narrative structure of analytic experience ." 65

Verification

is a

cumulative process in which the different

means of proof must reinforce one another.

Ricoeur holds

that these different means are not viciously dependent on one

another but rather, together, form

a

constellation by which

to judge the accuracy of an explanatory statement.

Ricoeur
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does not explicitly spell out the means
by which the

non-narrative

,

explanatory commitments of the theory are
to

be verified and this

is

a

serious shortcoming.

However,

in

reaching outside the narrative statements
by invoking the
criteria of the theory itself which includes
generalizations,
lawlike propositions and hypotheses concerning
the

functioning of the physical apparatus, he does
not confine
the means of proof to that of

understanding.

a

hermeneutics of

Further, the interpretative procedures and

the therapeutic treatment can be viewed as
independent of the

other two criteria in that the interpretative procedure
may

uncover new facts which the theory does not cover and the

therapeutic treatment relies on

a

change in the analysand.

While Ricoeur states that this verification process

is

both

complex and problematic, he concludes that "when these
criteria of validation do not derive from one another, but

mutually reinforce one another, they constitute the proof
apparatus in psychoanalysis

." 66

Appraisal of Griinbaum's Critique of the Hermeneutic
Interpretation
Griinbaum argues that the hermeneutic interpretation does

not do justice to the claims and methodology of

psychoanalytic theory and therapy.
that their account

is

incoherent.

Furthermore, he argues
Hence we will now turn to

this critique and to my position with respect to this

.
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critique

Grunbaum contends that Ricoeur truncates
the domain of
facts relevant to psychoanalytic theory
by restricting them
to the verbal productions of
the analysand.
For as Grunbaum
claims Freud's etiologies as well as his
dream theory
,

spring

the confines of Ricoeur's speech
acts 67
.

sense this

is

true.

Now in an obvious

Freud's wish-fulfillment theory of

dreams and his etiological hypotheses are
held to be

applicable to human beings whether they are in
analytic
treatment or not.
For example, Freud's interpretative
explanations of dreams, though they rest on the
verbalized
reports of the dreams, purport to explain not
only
the

significance, function and origin of particular dreams,
but
also the motives for dreaming and the function that
dreams

serve for everyone.

Grunbaum mounts his defense of the claim

"that the import of Freud's clinical theory defies the

ontological restraint of Ricoeur's verbalistic
straight jacket "

by adducing the above-mentioned subject

matter as outside the analytic setting yet clearly within the

domain of psychoanalytic concern.

phenomena
etc.

— transference,

— occur

All sorts of

parapraxes, defense mechanisms,

and are relevant outside the treatment setting.

Freud's utilization of the transference in treatment

predicated on the claim that the analysand

is

is

repeating or

transferring onto the analyst her defensive patterns and

unconscious conflicts which are connected with her neurosis.
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But more generally, he recognizes
that the unanalyzed as well
are caught in the shackles of
transference; all of our adult
relationships are repetitions of an internal
drama in which
we play out and cast others into
roles which are repetitions
of our early parental and sibling
relationships.

Granted that Ricoeur shrinks the domain
of "facts," let
us recall that he does so precisely
because he holds that
"psychoanalytic theory ... is the codification
of what

takes place in the analytic situation

." 69

in as much as

this is his starting point, Grunbaum's emphasis
on the range
of relevance that extends beyond this is
somewhat pedantic.

Furthermore, Ricoeur's emphasis on the intersub j
ective
clinical encounter marks off the empirical basis
upon which
Freud constructed his theory.
of a parapraxis,

for example,

It
is

is
a

true that the observance

public,

"objective" event

and one that Freud explained in terms of conflicting or

interfering intentions.

His approach to the explanation of

parapraxes applied to slips inside or outside the treatment
setting.

But this is not the point.

Freud collected data

from the analytic encounter; his theory was based on the

empirical data gleaned from this encounter.

explanation of

a

available to him

The full

parapraxis became possible because he had
a

willing participant who agreed to free

associate and thereby to comply with his method of
investigation.

It

is

not so much that Ricoeur shrinks the

subject matter to just what occurs in the treatment setting
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but rather that he holds that this is the
empirical domain
which constitutes the basis of proof.
Repressed, infantile
motives for dreaming are not excluded from the
purview of

Ricoeur's interpretation of psychoanalytic theory
just

because he deems the verbal dream reports to be
that which
analyzed or that which is a "fact." Freud never

is

found

empirical verification for his inference of repressed
infantile motives outside the empirical data derived
from the

analysis of the language of the analysand, though he
applied
the verification he received from treatment to the

explanation of phenomena outside of it.
pregnant with data than Griinbaum's view

A "fact"
is

is

more

willing to allow

and in this sense Ricoeur's interpretation widens rather than

truncates the purview of Freudian theory.

Griinbaum neglects

to consider that in the actual Freudian data base,

that is,

the data that Freud attends to and reports when he's relaying
his case histories, how something is said is as important as

what is said.
reports:

For example,

in the Rat Man case,

Freud

"He proceeded with the greatest difficulty."^

Freud also attends to the facial expression and the

omissions, as well as the analysand's choice of words.

point
is

is

that the intersub j ective

central.

,

The

interpretative component

We can concede that Ricoeur's "facts" are facts

even though they have yet to be tied causally to their
referents

.

Griinbaum observes that Ricoeur waffles on the issue of
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the nature of causal explanation as it
pertains to the

evaluation of the status of Freudian theory.

m

appealing to

the non-narrative means of proof by invoking
the criteria of
the theory which utilizes causal hypotheses
to explain

behavior, Ricoeur acknowledges that Freud explains
human

actions causally.

Unconscious motivations are causally

relevant to the symptoms that manifest them.

Grunbaum's

charge, that Ricoeur's account of the epistemological
truth

claim of psychoanalysis

is

incoherent,

is

based on Ricoeur's

acknowledgment of the role of causal explanation and at the
same time a rejection of the means of proof appropriate to
such explanation.

From Grunbaum's perspective, if

psychoanalytic explanations are causal then "the
establishment of

causal connection in psychoanalysis, no

a

less than in 'academic psychology' or medicine, has to rely
on modes of inquiry that were refined from time-honored

canons of causal inference pioneered by Francis Bacon and
John Stuart Mill.""'

7

!

Griinbaum is correct in pointing out that Ricoeur's

account needs to specify by what means causal connections are
to be established.

Ricoeur's vagueness as to the nature of

causal explanation and as to how causal claims are to be

established is exemplified in his remark that psychoanalysis
must include "in the process of self-understanding operations
that were originally reserved for the natural sciences." 7 2

Causal explanation of an unspecified sort

is

a

means of proof
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for Ricoeu r

when taken in conjunction with
the other three
means of proof, these being
the interpretative procedure,
the
therapeutic treatment and the
narrative structure of analytic
experience. Though Ricoeur repeatedly
tells us that
,

he is

not attempting to set up

a

rigid dichotomy between

explanation in the natural and human
sciences,
that psychoanalysis is

a

in

holding

human science and in failing to

specify how causal claims are to be
established, he
equivocates on the whole issue of causality
and the

verification procedure necessary to
establish it.
Grunbaum decries Ricoeur's appeal to the
explanatory role
of meaning as both a misinterpretation
of
how Freud uses the

term 'meaning' and as incapable of validating
the causal
claims of psychoanalytic theory.
it is here that we get to
the heart of his critique.
Grunbaum assumes that
the

hermeneutic appeal to relations of meaning depends
on the
attribution of intent iona 1 ity and therefore agency to
the

unconscious.

On his reading,

to construe symptoms as

intending or referring to the underlying wish or conflict
that is the cause of it is incoherent.

Grunbaum holds that

causal connections between mental events are the foundation
for Freud s theory and not logical connections between

intentional relations of meaning.

Causation

is

necessary for

science, and the hermeneut icists have not established that
there is causation.
a

At best,

semantic relationships are only

hint that causal patterns might exist.

"
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To be sure, Freud speaks of
the meaning of a symptom or
a
dream, but Grunbaum argues that
he uses the term 'meaning'
in
the non-semantic sense of definite
causal origin 73 The
symptom is not a linguistic representation
of its unconscious
.

cause;

does not denote or semantically
stand for the
repressed wish. The symptom is a trace
or sign having no
intention though it can be likened to
a linguistic symbol,
having semantic meaning, once conceptualized
it

psychoanalytically, precisely because, in interpreting
the
sign in terms of its cause ret rod icti vely
,

we infer the

presence of repressed impulses or intentions.

Thus as

Grunbaum states, neurotic symptoms can be called
"symbols"
in virtue of having the conatively
vicarious function
of

affording substitutive gratifications or outlets and
the

epistemic function of attesting to repressed yearnings

.

7^

The fact that we can talk about symptoms as having meaning
does not license the assimilation of the symptom qua
trace to
a

linguistic representation which

is

intentional.

Grunbaum draws on the work of Robert Shope to defend his
interpretation of how Freud uses the term 'meaning.'

Shope

holds that symptoms, dreams, parapraxes, etc., are signs that
are clues to the investigator 75
.

in this way they have the

same relation to their meaning as the relation between an

organic symptom and the cause of it.

Grunbaum argues that

the "meaning kinship" that the hermeneuticists locate between
a

repressed idea and

a

neurotic symptom cannot itself account
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for the hypothesized causal
role of the repressed idea.

For

thematic affinity alone does not
show that the repressed
idea caused or engendered a
particular behavior or symptom

a

and it is precisely this
causal connection that must be
established. On Griinbaum's reading,
we cannot

claim to have

uncovered a hidden intention on the
basis of a thematic
affinity where no causal connection
has been established
trading on the word 'meaning' the
hermeneuticists talk o f
.

By

unconscious intentions and semanticize
symptoms, rather than
viewing them as compromise or substitute
formations.
in this
way, they give up the need to
substantiate
the causal

connection between the symptom and the
repression that
engendered it.
For Griinbaum, the symptom has
no

propositional meaning;

it

is

not

a

message from the

unconscious and ought not to be construed as such.
Unconscious thought processes, on Grunbaum's view,
intend
nothing.

Paranoid behavior, for example,

is

not

representation of repressed homosexuality, nor

linguistic

a

is

it

an

attempt to communicate these yearnings.
Griinbaum

s

point, that

establish that there

is a

a

"meaning kinship" does not

causal connection,

is

correct.

However, he seems to miss the fact that parapraxes, symptoms,

dreams, etc., take on an individual character which

is

explained only by semantic relationships involving material

peculiar to the individual involved.

This individual nature

of a symptom or parapraxis makes neurotic symptoms somewhat
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unlike other diseases or disorders.

Grunbaum's likening of neurotic symptoms
to traces or
signs having no semantic content follows
Jones's
interpretation of Freud's symbolism.

According to Jones,

"symbolism arises as the result of intrapsychic
conflict
between the repressing tendencies and the
repressed.

Only what

is

repressed

needs to be symbolized
that for Freud
a

a

is
." 76

symbolized; only what is repressed
Griinbaum is correct in noting

symptom or dream

substitute satisfaction that

repression.

is

is

a

compromise formation,

engendered by

a

According to Griinbaum, if we speak of symbols

in

this context we must understand that symptoms as symbols
are
not linguistic vehicles of communication, though we can
view

them as disguises for what is repressed in the sense that
they manifest the repression.

Griinbaum quotes from Freud in

defense of his view:

"A dream does not want to say anything

to anyone.

a

It

is

not

vehicle for communication ." 77

However, Freud's next phrase states:

"on the contrary,

it

is

meant to remain misunderstood."

Who means it to remain misunderstood?

Is Freud using

"meant" here to refer to the purposive function of

unconscious thought processes?

Is he giving a functional as

opposed to an intentional account?

If so, we need not

attribute intentionality to the unconscious.
"all dreams have meaning.

Their strangeness

Freud states:
is

due to the

distortions that have been made in the expression of their

107

meaning.

Their absurdity

derision,

ridicule and contradiction ." 78

evidence that Freud
of dreams

is

is

deliberate and expresses

giving more than

in terms of ends.

Here we get
a

purposive account

The dream may not want to say

anything to anyone, but does something
else want to say
something? Freud assumes that dreams
are intelligible, that
they have a meaning, but it is
not at all clear that he
thinks that we have to posit agency
in the unconscious in
order to make explicable this meaning.
A look
at the way in

which he talks about the interpretation
of "typical dreams"
may help clarify this point.

Ricoeur notes that Freud's discussion of
typical dreams
and the representability of the symbols
in them makes use of
a

sedimented, cultural symbolism,

a

symbolism that

is

not the

product of the dream-work and the interpretation of
which
does not require that the dreamer free associate.
a is t

Freud

ingu ishes the symbolic relation between a dream-element

ana its translation from the relation uncovered
via the

associative, analytic technique.
relation between

meaning

is

element is

a

dream-element and its translation or

termed "symbolic."
a

In typical dreams this

Freud states that the dream

"symbol" of the unconscious dream thought 79
.

Typical dreams make use of symbolization which

is

already

present in unconscious thinking, the very same unconscious
thinking and use of symbolization that

is

projected in

mythology, religion, art, linguistic idioms, etc.

This view
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of symbolism in part explains
why Freud emphasizes the
importance of instruction in the history
of civilization,

mythology, the psychology of religion
and the science of
literature for analytic training 80
The interpretation of
the symbolism of typical dreams
is the work
.

of the analyst,

for the ana ly sand rarely has
associations to these elements.

The translation of these typical
dreams

is

more

a

matter of

empirical investigation in that the analyst
draws on her
knowledge of a shared, cultural symbolism.
This particular use of the term 'symbol'
has an important
place in analytic work. Ricoeur holds that
to say dreams
have a meaning is to say they are intelligible
and that we
can substitute for the dream account another
account with a

semantics and

a

syntax 81
.

it

is

not at all clear that the

hermeneut icists hold that symptoms and dreams intend their

underlying causes.

Grunbaum may be guilty here of

misconstruing the hermeneutic position with regard to this
aspect of the issue of meaning.

The unconscious may be

intentional just in virtue of the fact that by influencing
our speech and/or our actions it does say something.

Freud, as Moller notes,
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attributes no neuroses to

inner organs, only to the whole person.

This suggests that

the person speaks, not an underlying repressed wish.

The

whole complicated, conflicted person can be forced to speak
because she is influenced by causal processes.
what

is

said is rarely unambiguous.

Of course,

Generally, symptoms both
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conceal and reveal and this very
opposition would account for
their compromise character.
When Freud talks about the
meaning of obsessional symptoms or actions
he traces them
thematically to the significant scene or
event which the act
IS a repetition or representation
of.
For example, the

hysteric who complained of piercing pains
between her
eyebrows was found to be suffering from
reminiscences of
piercing, enquiring look from her grandmother.

a

Freud cites

examples such as these to illustrate the symbolic
relation
between the determining cause (significant event)
and the

particular symptom.
is

This use of the term 'symbolic relation'

consistent with Griinbaum.

Freud states:

"it is as though

there were an intention to express the mental state
by means
of a physical one;

and linguistic usage affords

which this can be effected
of the link between

semantic one.

a

bridge by

The hermeneutic construal

symptom and its postulated cause

a

As we see,

starting point for

." 83

a

is

a

this semantic link is often the

psychoanalytic explanation.

The problem

with stopping at the semantic link is that this connection

cannot provide evidence for

a

causal connection.

It's not so much that the hermeneut icists give up the

attempt to establish

a

causal connection.

Freud did establish one, but it's

a

They hold that

connection at the level

of communicative understanding rather than at the level of

physical causes.

The hermeneut icists want to establish what

Freud's science accomplished.

Freud's proof that symptoms
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could be explained in terms of
their causes was the fact that
a cure was sometimes
effective.
Freud held that a causal
connection between physical events
was operative, but since
talk was the means of cure, a
reduction of mental to physical
causes was not yet possible. The
hermeneut icists pick up on
the language of intentionality
that Freud uses to explain the
significance, function and development
of a neurosis.
Freud
refers to the "intention of the
obsessional action " 84 and
when he does so, he gives it a
propositional meaning. The
intention is saying something or rather
the obsessional

action

saying something.

is

However, to grant this is not to

say that the symptom intends its cause
or underlying wish.
In many cases the symptom manifests the
wish while also

serving as

a

defense against it.

Hence the symptom may not

intend anything but the conflicted person may.
In order to highlight the tension between
Griinbaum and

the hermeneut icists and the evidence for it in Freud's

writings, let us return to the problem of interpreting
"typical" dreams and symptoms.
traces the meaning of

a

In his case analyses,

Freud

neurotic symptom, dream or parapraxis

to its connection with the individual's past experiences.

What makes an "historical" interpretation possible is in fact
the idiosyncratic,

symptom.

individual features or manifestations of

However, through his investigative, clinical work,

Freud discovered typical symptoms which are practically

identical and which often accompany

a

particular neurotic

a

Ill

disorder.

Similarly, there are dreams which may
be called
typical in that they occur in large
numbers of people and
display an identical content. Now while
these common,

typical symtoms appear to resist an easy
interpretation on
historical lines, and so are difficult to
connect with the
patient's life, they are, according to
Freud, what enables us
to take our bearnigs in forming a
diagnosis 85 Forming a
diagnosis involves positing explanatory-causative
.

factors,

which give rise to the particular cluster of
symptoms.

The

problem lies in the fact that the typical symptoms
resist
along historical lines any interpretation that
links them to
a

common experience.

Freud, commenting on the failure of

historical factors to account for the preponderance or
the
why of typical symptoms states:
So we are now faced by the depressing discovery that,
though we can give a satisfactory explanation of the
individual neurotic symptoms by their connection with
experiences, our skill leaves us in the lurch when we
come to the far more frequent typical symptoms. 8

Freud is seeking to develop an explanatory science that

will relate these typical symptoms to

a

common experience and

when he finds no common experience this throws the historical

interpretative method into doubt.
of

a

symptom

is

Just as an individual form

related to that individual's past

experiences, so Freud thought this ought to hold for symptoms
that were shared in common.

In an attempt to account for

this problem, Freud conjectures:

"If the individual symptoms

are so unmistakably dependent on the patient's experience,

it
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remains possible that the typical symptoms
may go back to an
experience which is in itself typical-common
to all human
beings ." 87
it is clear that, while Freud's
hypotheses seek
to move beyond an individual,
historical interpretation (one
that the hermeneuticists give priority
to) toward an account
of psychological structures and processes
that are more
universal, he holds to the centrality of
pursuing the

historical interpretation of symptoms.

Grunbaum overlooks the experiential character of
analysis
that is at the heart of Ricoeur's reading of
Freud.

If "the

dream is meant to be misunderstood," if "its absurdity
deliberate,

might it not be the case that Freud

describing the experience of unconscious conflict
in

is

is

—a

conflict

which the very substitute gratifications in their

idiosyncratic detail acquire significance by reference to
their experienced cause and to the resistance against this

cause?
if

In analysis,

behavior

is

a

analyst and analysand alike proceed as

segment of meaning.

The resistance and the

transference are crucial precisely because they are
indicators in the present of past conflicts.

experiential point of view, regarding

symptomatic act as intentional

is

slip, dream or

is part of

adopting a psychoanalytic perspective.

attention

a

From an

what is involved in

The analysand's

directed toward what she may previously have

regarded as inconsequential.

Converting to

a

psychoanalytic

viewpoint, viewing symptoms as deliberate distortions, marks

.
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change in the analysand's attitude toward
her functioning
ana allows for an experience of change.
What
a

seems alien,

what is split off is given the possibility
of being

apprehended

Grunbaum ignores that the phenomena of transference
and
resistance are the more immediate indicators of
the

pathogen.

They are present in the analytic encounter
and are

the access to the pathogenic cause in a way
that repression

can't be precisely because the resistance hides
it.

in

focusing on Freud's general etiological claims, Grunbaum
makes programmatic what Freud in his case histories
worked
into an individualized, narrative history.

Grunbaum's focus on the lifting of

a

Furthermore,

repression to the

exclusion of the more predominant tool of analytic therapy
(i.e.,

analysis of the transference and resistance) belies

his exclusion of the experienced domain of the clinical

encounter and the facts which come to light there.
Freud's claim for the efficacy of psychoanalytic

treatment was based on veridical insight but veridical
insight was not

a

sufficient condition.

Memories, alone,

were not reliable and this was why analysis of the

transference was central.

Furthermore, merely informing the

analysand of the meaning of her repression was not
sufficient.

In many cases such a move only served to

intensify conflict, resistance and other defensive

maneuvers.

Analytic interpretations in and of themselves do
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little to effect therapeutic change.

efficacious must be experienced.

Insight to be

As Freud says:

"To have

hearo something and to have experienced
something are in
their psychological nature two quite
different things, even
though the content of both is the same ." 88
The attention
to the analysis and use of the
transference and

resistance

is

crucial because they are the here and now
repetitions of
unconscious conflicts and yearnings. Through
their enactment
and analysis in the present, the analysand
experiences
her

wishes, fears, conflicts and ambivalence as her
own.

Slips,

symptoms, dreams, etc. that serve as clues to
conflicting

intentions are experienced as communicative clues, by
analyst
and analysand.

Insofar as the analysand is committed to

understanding the causes of her conflicts and the way

in

which she remains cut off from her functioning, viewing these

psychical acts as intentional communications affords the

possibility of allowing repressed ideas into consciousness.
Further,

it

affords the possibility of recognizing the agent

of the intentional communication as part of herself,

that

part who in the course of analysis, no longer wants to be cut
off from the way she constitutes meaning and so from the way
she is influenced by the experiences of her past.

We might

say that the extent to which the analysand does regard her

psychical acts as communications

is

the extent to which she

can reappropriate her unconscious wishes as her own.
In this regard, we need to consider Griinbaum's critique
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of Habermas's claim that psychoanalytic
therapy "owes its

efficacy to overcoming causal connections
themselves
On the face of it,

it

is

incoherent, as Griinbaum charges, to

say that the causal linkage between

neurosis the repression engenders
the therapeutic conquest.

being

." 89

is

a

repression and the

overcome or dissolved

in

Griinbaum argues that "far from

dissolved' by the therapeutic conquest of the

neurosis, this very causal linkage even entails the

therapeutic conquest

." 90

To speak, as Habermas does, of

overcoming causal linkages only makes sense if we understand
him to be referring not to the dissolving of the causal

connection, which as Griinbaum points out the therapy makes
use of, but rather to the dissolving of the hold that

repression exerts on us.

In other words, Habermas

is

referring to the experience of self-reflection that is
of therapeutic insight.

lifting of

a

a

part

The causal efficacy involved in the

repression only becomes relevant,

psychoanalyt ically

,

insofar as the analysand experiences the

repression in the present.

While Habermas mistakenly assumes that psychoanalytic
therapy does not make use of known causal connections as does
medicine, 9 1 he is correct in pointing out that

psychoanalysis can overcome causal connections

in the sense

that genuine, experienced insight into the cause of

a

neurosis can change our relationship to our functioning.

Knowledge is

in

this sense

a

form of action.

Self-
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reflection, which analysis

is

supposed to bring about,

is

a

transformative process; the pathogenic idea
is no longer
alien.
By recognizing it as ours, we can
dissolve its power
over us.

This notion of transformative knowledge
differs

from knowledge about the causes of a
physical disease.

For

reflection on the causes of measles, for
example, does not
change the fact that we manifest that disease.
Of course one could argue that if you
come to understand
a

repression, this very understanding can have

effect.

Understanding can itself be

organisms.

a

a

causal

cause if we are causal

On this view psychoanalysis would make use of

causal connections in the same way medicine does,
only
instead of influencing the organism at the physical level,
the influence would enter at the level of understanding.

In

this case, Habermas is wrong to rule out causal efficacy.

But nevertheless, he is correct in pointing to the experience
of self-reflection that psychoanalytic knowing fosters.

Understanding as
therefore
a

cause is not pinned down physically, and

can't be likened to the taking of

it

disease.

a

a

drug to cure

The hermeneut icists capture an experience of

change that operates at the level of the whole person.

Understanding

a

grasp of it.

There

is

cause does not mean the mere intellectual
is

an element of choice in what Habermas

trying to capture in his use of language that Griinbaum's

critique rules out.

Psychogenic causes may operate like

some somatogenic ones, but since our access to these causes

,
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only through our psychical apparatus
and since our
experienced past is the determining cause,
we experience
these causes as meaning structures.
is

Habermas and Ricoeur focus on the intersub
jective
constructive, historical uncovering of meaning

and use as

their model the full analysis of dreams,
the case histories
and the writings on therapeutic technique.

Like Grunbaum,

they argue that the clinical encounter
prompted the

descriptive and dynamic use of language, but unlike
Grunbaum,
they place emphasis on the explanatory role of
meaning.

Though chronologically Freud's analytic work began
with the
treatment of hysterics and neurotics and the interpretation
of symptoms, methodologically,

in his

writings he often used

the dream model, a model that illustrated the workings of
the

unconscious in normal as well as pathological cases, to
clarify the work of deciphering the sense of neurotic
symptoms.

Freud's explanation of the workings of the

unconscious via dreams locates psychoanalysis within
domain than that of

a

a

wider

psychology of pathological processes.

The possibility of extending the dream model,

a

model

that specifically draws on the fields of literature,

mythology, and philology, etc., to interpret symptoms and
other psychical productions,

is

what invites the

hermeneutical classification of psychoanalysis as
science.

a

human

Habermas's and Ricoeur's appraisal of the

scientific status of psychoanalysis focuses on psychoanalysis
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as a form of praxis,

not simply therapeutic practice,
but

praxis understood as the interpretative
explanation of
psychical productions ranging from
neurotic symptoms to
dreams, art, morality, religion
and culture.
However, to
recognize that psychoanalysis draws
on the humanities and
even takes them as its subject
matter, does not force us to
place it within the realm of the human
sciences.
Freud
highlights the difference between medical
science and his
science by stating:
"The experience of an analyst lies
in
another world, with other phenomena and
other laws ." 92

This statement does not entail

a

separation of kinds of

science, though it does call attention to
the role of

experience,

a

role that the hermeneuticis ts give priority
to.

To say, as Freud does, that the only way
it is possible
to understand psychoanalysis
is

is

by undergoing an analysis 93

not to claim that psychoanalytic theory cannot
be grasped

via its theoretical elaboration alone.

But it is to say that

the transformative nature of analytic truth is only
grasped
in the

experience of it.

Though psychoanalytic theory

developed from analytic practice, the bond between
therapeutic success and theorizing widened as Freud grew to
realize the difficulties involved in the whole conception of
a

cure.

In this regard, Griinbaum's focus on the therapy, as

that which lends credence to Freud's scientific claims, may
be misdirected.

Recall that Grunbaum assigns

a

peripheral status to the
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metapsychology in arguing against the hermeneutic
charge of
Freud's scientistic self-misunderstanding.
Grunbaum
holds

that Freud was claiming

a

natural science status for his

clinical theory and since the clinical theory
does not depend
on the status of the metapsychology, the
clinical theory
alone is what needs to be assessed.
In contrast, Ricoeur
attempts to show that while the economic
language of the

metapsychology

is

problematic if viewed literally, when seen

as systematizing what occurs

in

clinical practice,

it

constitutes the unique discourse appropriate to analytic
theory.

Ricoeur does not hold that the metapsychology

historically derived from analytic practice.

is

Rather he holds

that Freud brought to his metapsychological systematization
of what occurs in practice the language and models of the

natural sciences of his day.

The analytic encounter

is

epistemologically prior but insofar as the hermeneutic
reconstruction of psychoanalytic theory gives priority to the
intersub jective, clinical encounter,

it

closes off the

possibility of seeing the way in which the metapsychology
could function as an early model for

psychology.

a

science of

Clinical practice would on this view be the

basis for the scientific theorizing.

The hermeneutic insight that the metapsychology

is

central needs to be retained particularly if we are to follow
the later Freud.

The early Freud did abandon "The Project

for a Scientific Psychology" but he anticipated a future in
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which the study of mental processes
could be integrated with
somatic processes, thereby filling
in the gaps
in his

theoretical articulation of the psychology
of mental
processes.
Freud's claims that the theory was
independent of
its medical application to the
treatment of neurotics, that
the use of analysis for the treatment
of neurotics was only
one of its applications, and that he
did not want the
therapy

to destroy the science

metapsychology

,

though

,® 4
a

illustrate that the

primitive attempt to lay the ground

for the science of psychology, was the
systematization of

a

new discipline that had yet to become fully
scientific.

The point

I

am trying to stress here is that, though

psychoanalytic theory was built upon the success Freud had
the clinical treatment of neurotics,

theory functioned as
or at

a

in

this application of the

proof that the theory was scientific

least on the road toward being so.

The bond between

cure and research that Freud acknowledges to be the basis for
his discovery is restrictive if one limits the scope of the

theory to dependence on this bond.

The later Freud, aware of

the repressive demands of civilization, became increasingly

pessimistic about effecting cures.

Regardless of whether

psychoanalysis was able to overcome the resistances of the
analysand and to lift repressions, Freud held that the theory
at least explained why this was not always possible.

there exists

a

Just as

gap between medical science and medical

practice as well as

a

gap between

a

scientific discipline and
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its fields of applicability
so Freud's metapsychology can
,
be
viewed as an attempt to stake out a
field of inquiry that is

independent of its applicability, though its
research
depended upon the knowledge gained in
analytic practice.
Drawing a parallel with the origin of other
disciplines,
Freud states:
The possibility of its application to medical
purposes
must not lead us astray.
Electricity and radiology also
have their medical application, but the
science to which
they both belong is none the less physics.
Nor can their
situation be effected by historical arguments.
The whole
theory of electricity had its origin in an
observation
of
a nerve muscle preparation; yet no
one would dream today
of regarding it as part of physiology.

What

is

being argued here is that Freud's metapsychology

was the scientific component;
the field of psychology.

psychology as

a

it was

to be the foundation of

Here we can distinguish between

science and therapeutic practice.

In the

case of psychoanalysis, clinical practice suggested

directions or possible lines of connection for the future

scientific advancement of the theory.
as yet

On the basis of this

incomplete and hypothetical model (the

metapsychology), Freud extended the theory's application to
the domains of anthropology, sociology,

literature, art,

religion, etc.

Psychoanalysis dealt with phenomena that biology,
chemistry, psychiatry and other branches of medical science
could provide no account of.

The gulf between the physical

and the mental could as yet not be overcome.

Psychical

.
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phenomena and their causes were investigated
using a
psychoanalytic method, a method that Freud
acknowledged was
one sided in that it restricted
itself to particular
subjects, points of view and methods 96
Approaching the
explanation of neurotic symptoms by looking
for somatic
causes led nowhere.
Psychoanalysis as a depth psychology
could provide the groundwork for the
future birth
.

of a

scientific psychiatry.
Given this view, the language of drives
that the

hermeneut icis ts find objectionable
problem.

is

not really the

The mechanistic character of this language
serves

to point ambiguously to the possible future
connection

between somatic and mental processes.

systematizes and gives

a

The metapsychology

causal account of the meaning

relationships that Freud uncovers

in his

therapeutic

practice
The hermeneutic focus on the meaning relationships

absolutely basic.

is

Freud extended medical practice by

focusing on the gap between appearance and reality in human
speech and behavior and by systematizing explanations for
it.

What he discovered was

a

set of individual diseases,

although they could be collected under such general rubrics
as "neurosis."

The point here is that one individual's

parapraxis or neurosis

is

different from another individual's

because it has to do (semantically) with particular,
individual fears and experiences.

Hermeneutics and
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interpretation are involved and must be
involved because
these disorders stem from our
interactions as people with
important others. This individual,
interpretative component
forces a different model for evaluating
the status
of

psychoanalysis from that provided by Grunbaum.
Because

division

is

I

have argued that the natural/human
science

more problematic than illuminating,
especially

given the tension within psychoanalysis
between theory and
practice, I do not follow the hermeneuticists
in classifying

psychoanalysis as

a

human science.

Their reading widens the

gulf between natural science and narrative
explanation more
than is necessary.
However, I do wish to retain their
insight that an epistemology adequate to the form that

psychoanalysis takes needs to be established.
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CHAPTER

4

GRUNBAUM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
My examination of the scientistic
and hermeneutic

evaluations of psychoanalysis has drawn heavily
on Griinbaum's
analysis of these positions.
in agreeing with
much of

Griinbaum's critiques,

I

have also pointed out where my

position differs from Griinbaum's, but
subjected Griinbaum's position to
this chapter

I

a

I

have not yet

close examination.

in

will isolate the presuppositions of Griinbaum's

evaluation of psychoanalysis and call into question
the

J

adequacy of the epistemological- and methodological norms
that
he brings to his analysis of psychoanalytic theory.

I

ij

will

begin my critique of Griinbaum by noting that the normative

|
*

methodological principles that Griinbaum invokes become
i

problematic once we dislodge his assumption that he

is

following an immanent critique of Freud in assessing

psychoanalysis against Freud's own methodological conception
of science.

I

will then examine Griinbaum's major arguments

in support of the denial that there are at present

"good"

scientific grounds for accepting Freud's theoretical claims.
I

will also argue that, while Griinbaum distances himself from

Popper in that he holds that psychoanalysis meets minimal

requirements for scientific status, Griinbaum operates out of
the same conceptual framework as does Popper in that he

brings

a

rigid notion of methodology to bear on the

scientistic and hermeneutic readings.
129

Griinbaum's
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methodological restrictions may not be defensible
when
psychoanalysis is taken to develop methodologically

out of

medical science rather than out of physics.

Grunbaum uses

physics as his paradigm model for science, and
in so doing
allows that model to dictate the methodological
norms against
which all scientific claims to knowledge are
assessed.

Freud's

C anons

of Science Those That Grunbaum Ascribes to

Him?

Grunbaum begins his critique of psychoanalysis by stating
that he is going to "appraise Freud's arguments for his

monumental clinical theory of personality and therapy by his
(Freud's)

own standards

." 1

Separating himself from the

hermeneut icists who reject Freud's self-assessment that

psychoanalysis

is

a

natural science and the scientistic

proposal that psychoanalysis be evaluated as

a

natural

science, Grunbaum holds that his verdict will not be

"predicated on the imposition of some extraneous

methodological purism,"
own standards.

unsettle.

Now it

because he
is

is

utilizing Freud's

precisely this point that

I

wish to

When Grunbaum pursues this immanent critique he

unwittingly reads his conception of natural science into the
term

'

natural science

error that

a

'

that is advanced by Freud.

This is an

subtler hermeneutical approach to reading Freud

might have avoided.

We want to understand what Freud meant

when he (Freud) said that psychoanalysis was

a

natural

•
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science.

The possibilities are more varied
than Grunbaum
seems to realize, probably because
Grunbaum is reading Freud
after several decades of sophisticated
philosophical

reflection on scientific methodology.

Unlike Popper

Grunbaum

,

vast Freudian corpus.

is

thoroughly acquainted with the

He consequently does not make

uninformed claims about Freud's statements
on methodological
issues.
However, as I argued in the preceding
chapter,

Grunbaum's conception of Freud's self-understanding
anachronistic.

is

In arguing against the hermeneut icists

charge that Freud misunderstood his own
project when he
labeled it na tural science and their proposal
that it should
be evaluated as a human science, Grunbaum
cites the evident

passages in which Freud reveals that he thought of

psychoanalysis as

a

natural science.

The basic hermeneutical

problems involved in assessing Freud's self-understanding

in

these texts given intervening methodological discussion cast

suspicion on the idea that Grunbaum's notion of natural
science is necessarily identical with Freud's and these

problems have already been noted.
as

I

Indeed, there is evidence,

have indicated, to support the idea that Freud's notion

of natural science is considerably wider than Grunbaum's,

in

which case Grunbaum's methodologically sophisticated

proposals for how we should evaluate the scientific status of

psychoanalysis may not be coincident with Freud's own
standards.

Grunbaum may still hold that Freud's arguments

.
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are flawed, but he cannot hold that he is
criticizing Freud
on Freud's own terms

if

in

fact he is misreading Freud's

terminology by subtly substituting

a

modern conception of

natural science that Freud could not have intended.
As

I

argued in the preceding chapter, Freud does not

subscribe to

a

works with

quite general notion of science.

a

separatism as regards kinds of science, and
He speaks of

different sciences, but physics, chemistry, mythology and
literature, for exa mp le, all fall under the rubric of

science
Any estimate of psycho-analysis would be incomplete if it
failed to make clear that, alone among the medical
disciplines, it has the most extensive relations with the
mental sciences, and that it is in a position to play a
part of the same importance in the studies of religious
and cultural history and in the sciences of mythology and
literature as it is in psychiatry.
Griinbaum claims that Freud's standards or "criteria of

validation are essentially those of hypothet ico-deduct ive
inductivism" and he cites passages from Freud to document
this allegation. ^

What is perhaps most striking about the

passages to which Griinbaum refers

is

not their compatibility

with the hypothet ico-deduct ive model of explanation but their

general focus on the empirical nature of scientific activity
and the pragmatic value of basic concepts.

One can find

passages in Freud's texts which assert that psychoanalysis
related to lots of sciences, but the major claim that

is

that psychoanalysis is an empirical or

almost always made

is

natural science,

science based on investigations that are

a

is
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grounded on observation and
experience.

it might have been

the case that Freud would
have recognized

a

less

observations lly based science, such
as literature or
mythology, as non-empirical or
non-natural, but it would not
follow that he would have regarded
these disciplines as
unscientific.
We need to remember that Freud's
emphasis on the

observational basis of his clinical theory
on

a

reductive empiricism.

investigation

is

is

not predicated

The psychoanalytic method of

fundamentally grounded upon inferences from

observation.

Basic to the ontology of psychoanalytic
theory
is an inference to the unconscious,
something that we can
neither directly observe nor directly
be conscious of.
Freud
says that what warrants the inference
of the existence of

phenomena such as the unconscious are "other
proofs or
5
signs ."
These other proofs or signs are given in clinical
experience.
Freud refers to Bernheim's experiment of
post -hypnotic suggestion as one such proof, but
interestingly

enough labels laboratory productions or proofs as artificial
facts in contrast to natural facts which are instantiated
by

neurotic patients.
to Freud

s

Here we see the medical thinking immanent

theoretical remarks.

His reference to signs in

the quotation above specifically suggests that he is thinking
of psychoanalysis as a science utilizing natural science

techniques analogous to those already implicated
medicine.

in

Freud's use of observation and experience, his
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theorizing from them and his reliance
on the evidence of
clinical proofs or signs point to
the fact that medicine, and
not physics, provides the scientific
model that legitimates
its natural science status.
It

is

of course true that medicine
utilizes hypothetical-

deductive explanations

,

but it is also true that this form
of

explanation often fails to compel

practice

in

connection with

a

a

particular therapeutic

particular case of

particular

a

disease.

For example,

person

the focus of investigation and the
relevant data

is

in

clinical medicine the specific sick

that need to be incorporated into

a

diagnosis of suggested

treatment of the illness include her particular
symptoms as
well as her environmental background (her history
prior to
illness, her habits,

life style, etc.).

complexity and uniqueness

is

This interactive

difficult to encapsulate into

the hypothetico-deductive model.

In medicine,

as

in

psychoanalysis, the idiosyncratic details are often the most
revealing.

In diagnosis,

or even in therapy,

chains of

hypothetico-deductive inference may be utilized that will be
appropriately supplemented by the physician's personal
recognition of the situation.
a

The model of physics, based on

conception of experimental sampling from large homogeneous

populations, does not exhaust the thinking involved in

a

medical or psychoanalytic situation.

Hypothetical-deductive explanation

is

often inadequate

when applied to discussions about the etiology of

a
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particular medical disorder.
as

The term 'etiology'

the study of the causes of disease.

is

defined

Diseases are often

recognized as having an aggregate of causes and
not just one
cause.
"Etiology applies to the entire mass of factors
that
relate, somehow, to the disease in question.
a

necessary cause

in

To speak of

medicine generally involves abstracting

from an aggregate of causes in the interests of
therapeutic

efficiency, thus reducing

a

recognized complexity of context

to a focal point for treatment.

Lester King explains that

using the term 'necessary cause'

in

distorting overtones and that

a

medicine carries

better gloss of the term

'causa sine qua non' would be "indispensable factor

Generally, more than one indispensable factor
a

definition of the cause of

disease.

a

is

." 7

required for

Freud enunciates

universal hypotheses, but when he applies them to the
interpretative explanation of
their universal character

a

particular clinical case,

tempered by

is

a

specific life

history in which remote and, at first, seemingly

insignificant causes can prove most revealing and relevant

suggesting diagnosis and therapy.

Depending on the context,

Freud emphasizes different remote causes when he is

explaining the "why" behind

psychical production.

a

particular response or

When Freud

is

speaking in terms of

generalities, the hypothetical-deductive model seems more

appropriate to capture what he
noteworthy, however,

is

is

in

asserting.

What

is

the fact that from some general
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diagnostic and etiological hypotheses
one would not be able
to deduce a convincing
psychoanalytic interpretation that was
specific to an individual partly because
of the complexity
and peculiarity of individual
cases.
As Sherwood notes:
The process of psychoanalytic explanation
is

not one of

explanations
V choanal ytic
beqin
egin wUh
with an individual case history,
and
the
real -job
3
of explanation occurs through
ordering the mass of
biographical material and attempting to
organize it into
P!

h ° le

so^e sorfof
1

iS
J hiS aCCOUnt

-

poss^

^constructing
COntaini "9 as ™»=h of the

Grunbaum's hypothet ico-deduct i ve model
except in unusual cases.

not used by Freud

is

Freud's practice in selecting

particular relevant etiological factors

is

i

close to the

\
*

practice associated with medical treatment.
to be using the wrong

n

Grunbaum seems

immanent model to grasp Freud's

i

«
ii

self-understanding.

ii

i

i

The point that

I

am trying to highlight and one which

will further clarify in the next chapter

is

I

that causal

explanation and validation in medicine as well as

in

psychoanalysis, may vary from the models of causation and

explanation in the physical sciences.

Freud's familiarity

with explanation in the medical sciences and the fact that
his domain of inquiry was initially confined to the treatment
of patients growing out of medical settings would suggest the

medical model.
is

If this was Freud's model, and if this model

significantly different from the model of explanation

physics, then Grunbaum

is

in

imposing standards of assessment

.
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for scientific status that are
inappropriate for assessing
the foundations of psychoanalysis.
However, even if i am

wrong and Freud did not specifically
have
model,

in

mind

a

medical

point that would be difficult to establish
in view
of the thin nature of the relevant
textual material,
a

this

fact does not vitiate my claim that
medicine is the

appropriate model against which psychoanalysis
ought to be
assessed
Lest my aim in calling for the medical model
as the

standard for scientific evaluation in the case of

psychoanalysis be misinterpreted, let me remind the
reader
that

I

am not suggesting that psychoanalysis be viewed
as

subdiscipline or specialized branch of medicine.
suggesting

is

What

I

a

am

that the relationship of theory to data in

medicine is more like the relationship encountered in

psychoanalysis than
in

it

like the relationship encountered

is

physics, where more direct testing of claims

possible.

is

The practice of methodologists has simply not

been sensitive to the possibility of

a

medical science with

a

distinctive methodological structure.
Using the medical analogy, one is tempted to view the aim
of medicine as that of curing illness, and, by extension, the

aim of psychoanalysis could be taken to be the cure of mental
illness.

In fact,

neurosis was that

brought to

a

Freud's initial therapeutic conception of
it

was

a

hidden disease that could be

crisis in therapy, and overcome.

This

is

138

precisely the trajectory of the successful
treatment of an
infectious disease.
Later, Freud tempered this
original
model, treating the neuroses as more
like chronic illnesses
which pass through periods of
apparent remission and then
break out again with renewed symptoms.
The same

developmental trajectory can be seen in
Freud’s descriptions
of the therapeutic situation, where
Freud in his
later

writings substitutes the term 'analyst'
for that of 'doctor,'
indicating that he is breaking with any simple
analogy to
9
medical practice
Freud's extension of medicine forces
.

breaks with the medical model.
more than

a

Further, psychoanalysis

medical treatment and its theoretical insights

reveal why and how the whole notion of

problematic.

is

a

"cure" is deeply

What is being argued for here is that medical

science provides the relevant epistemological model for
an
initial assessment of methodology in psychoanalytic theory.
In the debate between methodologists over the scientific

status of psychoanalysis, there is

a

need to address the

question of the scientific status of medicine.

Once this

is

done, different guidelines for evaluating psychoanalysis

become available.

Therapeutic Effectiveness and the Tally Argument
My discoveries are not primarily a heal-all.
My
discoveries are a basis for a very grave philosophy.

9
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Having set up the terms of
assessment, Grunbaum proceeds
to evaluate psychoanalysis
as a natural science
using his
const rual of that term's denotation.
He focuses on what he
takes to be the logical foundations
of psychoanalytic claims
and Freud s arguments and evidence
in support of
,

‘

them.

Grunbaum's scrutiny of the relationship
between these claims
and the evidence in support of
them highlights the

epistemological and methodological pitfalls
that beset the
verification of these claims. His analysis
of the

epistemological liabilities that plague the
clinical data and
of the problems in establishing the
hypothesized,
causal

connections between

a

pathogen and

a

neurotic disorder

concludes with the pronouncement that psychoanalytic
theory's
scientific credibility is not well-founded.
According to
Grunbaum,

it

may be the case that some of Freud's theoretical

insights will turn out to be correct, but Grunbaum
argues
that such confirmation cannot come from the clinical

setting.

This verdict also follows from his logical

reconstruction of Freud's defense of his therapeutic method
as warranting the testing of psychoanalytic hypotheses
within

the treatment setting, a defense which Grunbaum claims fails
to uphold the conclusions which Freud drew from it.

But

perhaps Grunbaum proves no more than that the linkage of
theory and data in medicine and psychoanalytic theory

is

different from the linkage in physics.

not

Because he

is

sensitive to this possibility, he resolves his arguments by
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an implicit appeal to the only
methodological standard that
he recognizes.
As previously noted, Griinbaum
restricts his evaluation to

Freud’s clinical theory because he holds
that Freud claimed
natural science status for psychoanalysis
on the basis of it
and therefore it is what needs to be
assessed.
in chapter
three I argued that when Griinbaum assigns
Freud's

metapsychology

a

peripheral scientific status, he closes off

the possibility of viewing the metapsychology
as the early

systematization or theoretical elaboration of

a

future

science of psychology, and of noticing the complex

relationship between clinical practice and theorizing
about
it.

Griinbaum'

s

emphasis and focus on Freud's clinical

arguments assumes that therapeutic success

is

the only

evidence that can lend credence to Freud's scientific
claims.

Now it is quite clear that Freud viewed therapeutic

success as

a

kind of proof of diagnostic correctness and that

he viewed clinical practice as an appropriate arena within

which to test knowledge claims.

However, this is not to

establish that the link between therapeutic effectiveness and
the truth of psychoanalytic theory is that therapeutic

success and failure confirms or refutes theory in the same
way that physical theory

is

confirmed and rejected by the

truth or falsity of its deductive observational consequences.
If we take medicine as our model, we note that

satisfactory forms of therapeutic practice are often retained

^
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spite of wide shifts in theory, perhaps
because the
linkage between theory and therapeutic
practice is not

obviously deductive.

For example, Harvey's discovery of
the

circulation of the blood, though

it

refuted the theory of

humors and thereby removed any theoretical
foundation for the
practice of bleeding, entailed no immediate shift
in medical
therapeutics, and the practice of bleeding continued
as an

accepted treatment until the nineteenth century.

By

contrast, discoveries about the germ transmission of
disease
led to immediate shifts toward more aseptic
practices.

Just as theoretical advances can affect therapeutic
practice,
so insights gleaned from therapy can advance changes

body of medical theory, but

a

in the

shift in one or the other

sphere need not force or entail

a

shift in the other sphere.

The link between theory and therapeutic practice in medicine
may well be different from the link between theory and

experiment in physics.
Griinbaum carefully documents Freud's reasoning in defense

of the probative value of the clinical data.

Freud's

vindication of the psychoanalytic method of investigation as
capable of licensing psychoanalytic interpretations rests on
what Griinbaum labels the "tally argument."
Griinbaum,

According to

the tally argument was Freud's reply to the charge

that psychoanalysis worked by means of suggestion.

It was,

therefore, his defense of the objective validity of his

clinical interpretations.

Griinbaum's focus on the tally

:

.
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argument is central to his
examination of the scientific
credibility of Freud's theory.
On the one hand, he
praises
Freud for his attempt to
justify psychoanalytic knowledge
claims.

Freud's strategy, according to
Grunbaum,

indicates
his methodological sophistication
as well as his genuine
concern to lay to rest the
contamination of data by means of
suggestion problem. Having extolled
Freud's acumen in this
regard, however, Grunbaum
demonstrates how the argument is
flawed and why Freud was forced
to abandon it.
He then
indicts Freud for continuing to
regard the clinical data and
the repression etiology as
validated once he acknowledged the
falsity of the premise upon which
he had rested their

legitimacy
The crucial passage from which Grunbaum
constructs
Freud's defense is from his 1917 "Analytic
Therapy" lecture.
In

it

,

Freud

,

countering the objection that psychoanalysis

works by means of suggestion, asserts:

"After all, his

conflicts will only be successfully solved and
his resistance

overcome if the anticipatory ideas he
what is real in him." 12

is

given tally with

Grunbaum spells out the

assumptions behind this claim and refers to

it

as Freud's

necessary condition thesis" which Grunbaum formulates as
follows
(1) Only the psychoanalytic method of interpretation and
treatment can yield or mediate to the patient correct
insight into the unconscious pathogens of his
psychoneurosis, and (2) the analysand's correct insight
into the etiology of his affliction and into the
unconscious dynamics of his character is, in turn,

:
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neurosis.

r5CeSSarY

^

the thera P eu tic conquest of
his

Given these two premises in conjunction
with the
therapeutically successful analysis of a
patient, Freud could
legitimate the objective certainty of
his clinical

interpretations.

The tally argument, as Grunbaum
construes

ties the truth of clinical interpretations
to therapeutic
success thereby making the therapy the
epistemic guarantor of
the veracity of the psychoanalytic
method.
Grunbaum states
the two conclusions which follow from the
argument as
it,

follows

Conclusion 1. The psychoanalytic interpretations
of the
ldden causes of P's (a patient's) behavior
given to him
by his analyst are indeed correct and thus
as Freud put
it
these interpretations "tally with what is real" in
P.

—

Conclusion 2. Only analytic treatment could have wrought
the conquest of P's psychoneurosis. 14
The tally argument as Grunbaum formulates

it

assumes

correspondence view of truth whereby the interpretations,

a

in

order to be true, not only must seem to be true to the
ana ly sand

(i.e.,

tally with what is real in her)

but also

must be true in the sense that they must correspond to some

state of affairs.

Grunbaum argues that the questionable

premises of the tally argument undermine the credibility of
the clinical evidence that Freud used as support for his

theoretical claims.

In this way Grunbaum mounts his case

against the possibility of testing psychoanalytic hypotheses

within the clinical setting.
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The tally argument fails first and
foremost in Griinbaum-s
eyes because the premises are
in serious question.
For in
stating that correct insight is
causally necessary for
therapeutic success and that correct
insight is meditated
only by the psychoanalytic method,
the necessary condition
thesis rules out such events as the
spontaneous remission of
symptoms and cures by other therapeutic
treatment

modalities.

Grunbaum cites comparative studies on
treatment

outcome using rival therapeutic models
which show that
psychoanalysis is often not provably more
therapeutically
efficacious than its rivals.
Indeed, Grunbaum argues that
might not be therapeutically effective at

it

all, at least not

for the reasons claimed, given that the
spontaneous remission

rate is so high, and given that existing
studies have not

established specific factors which can bring about

therapeutic change.

Grunbaum notes that Freud in his later years abandoned
the necessary condition thesis when he acknowledged
phenomena

such as remission of symptoms due to ext raclinical life

events.

The later Freud declaring that he has "never been

a

therapeutic enthusiast" comments on the therapeutic

achievements of psychoanalysis by remarking,
our cures can compete with those of Lourdes.

do not think

"I

There are so

many more people who believe in the miracles of the Blessed

Virgin than in the existence of the unconscious

.

Here

Freud acknowledges the possible psychogenic role of faith or

6
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belief in any type of cure.

Grunbaum doesn’t come to grips
with the role of belief,
expectation or suggestion in
the
treatment process viewing these
rather as contaminants that
must be controlled. Grunbaum
uses the possibility that
psychoanalytic therapy may work due
to an inadvertent placebo
effect to discredit the claim
that favorable therapeutic

outcomes must be explained by
psychoanalytic theory.
never considers how placebos
work or why
they work.

But he

That

they work at all requires an
explanation that Grunbaum cannot
give in terms of his paradigms of
physical causation. It is
ironic that Grunbaum can rely on
skeptical studies involved
in medicine to discuss the
effectiveness of therapy without
apparently recognizing that the very existence
of the placebo
effect may ultimately require a psychogenic
explanation.
How
can there be a placebo effect unless
there are psychogenic
causes of a kind that Grunbaum is attempting
to rule out by
means of his use of placebo studies? We will
return to this

problem in the final chapter.
Freud knew his cures could not compete with
Lourdes, in
the same way that he ironically recognized that
the

conversion to

a

psychoanalytic viewpoint seemed necessary for

therapeutic effectiveness.

The later Freud avowed that there

were many other methods for treating neurotics, yet still
clung to the claim that psychoanalysis was the most

powerful.

1

this claim.

We need to ask on what basis he could maintain

Grunbaum simply uses the fact that Freud gave up
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the claim that insight was necessary
for any change

(a

therapeutic conquest of the neurosis)
and the fact that
therapeutic success is questionable to
drive home the point
that psychoanalytic interpretations
as the mediators of
correct insight are not guaranteed as
they would be if the

premises of the tally argument were true.
Griinbaum states:

"Once Freud gave up NCT (the necessary

condition thesis), he seems to have simply
disregarded his
own 1917 avowal that the authenticity of
clinical
data

is

epistemically parasitic on therapeutic achievements." 17
This oversight
for,

if

is

a

devastating one, according to Griinbaum

in t r a c 1 in ica 1

validation is to carry any weight,

there must be some grounds for holding that therapeutic

success is due to the veracity of psychoanalytic insight
rather than to some other factor.

In particular,

the

suggestibility problem comes back to haunt the clinical data
as well as the therapeutic improvement.

Griinbaum argues that psychoanalytic treatment has not

proven itself to be the paragon of therapies but he doesn't
specify what actually constitutes therapeutic success.
changed his mind on this issue.

Freud

This by itself indicates

that Freud wasn't projecting "a priori" hypotheses about

causes and notions of disease.

As previously indicated,

Freud's more externalist conception of neurosis as
that could be brought to

shifted.

a

a

disease

crisis in therapy gradually

He moved from an externalist, organicist conception
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Of medicine to a more generalist
or holistic conception,

viewing disease, and in particular,
psychopathology, as
conflict or disequilibrium and as a
struggle to regain
equilibrium. This shift, when viewed
against the background
of medical theory and medical
history is scientific in the
sense that it was gradually forced by
accumulating

therapeutic evidence.
Freud
in

s

line with

later conception of therapeutic success
was more
a

chronic disease model.

Therapeutic success,

for Freud, does not mean that the
analysand's symptoms and

neurosis are permanently removed.

This kind of success

is

currently claimed only by such more recent
therapies such as
behavior therapy.
in a sense, rival therapy usually claims
to attain more secure objectives than
psychoanalysis.

Therefore, Grunbaum’s claim that rival treatments have
the
same kinds of success is curious.

It

is

curious because no

other therapy claims the same objectives or shares the same

conception of success as do the psychoanalytic schools.

psychoanalytic therapeutic success

is

Once

spelled out, the facts

that behavior therapy effects some cures, that faith-healing

causes remission of symptoms, and that favorable life events
can cause anxieties and the symptoms that manifest these to

disappear, cannot be used as the basis for arguing that

a

psychoanalytic treatment success rests on an inadvertent
placebo effect.

Such an argument conflates the different

notions of success involved into an umbrella term of dubious
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significance.

From

positivistic point of view, cures
across treatment modalities may
look the same, but
a

the kind

of cure psychoanalysis claims

is

based on changing the

awareness of the person under treatment. 18

Psychoanalytic

cures do not hold out the promise
of happiness.
on the fact that most men live
in a hell,

Commenting

Freud says:

"My

knowledge, my theories and my methods
have the goal of making
men conscious of this hell so that
they can free themselves
from it." 19

Consciousness is the main goal here; Freud

does not guarantee that, given insight
by the therapeutic
process the analysand will choose to act on
that insight.
,

Griinbaum's discussion of the failure of the
tally

argument drives

a

wedge between therapeutic effectiveness and

the possible truth of psychoanalytic theory,
but at the same

time his very discussion fails to consider that
the complex

relationship between theory and practice

is

not just

a

problem that could be overcome if one resorted to laboratory
experiments, instead of clinical data.
is

Psychoanalytic theory

about total human beings and it is in humans that it must

be studied.

Laboratory experiments designed to screen out

the individual complexities of neuroses can only test partial

aspects of human beings.

All Griinbaum can prove in

connection with the tally argument

is

that there is as yet no

logical or necessary relation between therapeutic

effectiveness and the truth of psychoanalytic theory.
Griinbaum,

For

the clinical evidence may provide only spurious

.
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confirmation of the theory, and for
this reason, he concludes
that the verification of
psychoanalytic hypotheses must
inevitably also involve extra-clinical
studies. As Lieberson
notes, Grunbaum's conclusion is
not as controversial
as

Grunbaum at times suggests.

Orthodox analysts have put forth

similar views and as Philip Holzman
rightly states:
"many
such theories in the history of
science have not been
testable by the methods from which they
arose ." 20 Hence
the fact that adequate experimental
tests have yet to be
designed to test many of Freud's hypotheses
is not itself a
compelling argument against its scientific
status.
Parallels
with the open development of medicine
are obvious.
it

is

rare that medical practice can "close the
book" on diseases
or their cures given the complex
interaction of disease

origins, the human hosts of disease and forms of
mutation

in

both

This much said, what is striking about Grunbaum's

critique

is

the fact that having drawn out the consequences

of the failure of the tally argument and Freud's
recognition

of it, he continues to drive home the point that the clinical

data and the theories which explain it are bereft of

scientific credibility.

According to Grunbaum, there

is

no

sound argument that licenses the causal inferences that Freud
drew.

Rather than asking,

"On what grounds Freud might have

continued to regard his insights and interpretations as true,
given the failure of the tally argument?" Grunbaum persists
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uncove r ing the methodological flaws in
Freud's reasoning
and the problems associated with
verification within the
clinical setting. Though he has shown
that therapeutic
success cannot vouchsafe the scientific
claims of

psychoanalysis, Grunbaum continues to argue as
if some
logical link, based on a physical paradigm,
between
therapeutic success and the establishment of
psychoanalytic
claims was the basis upon which Freud rested

the truth of the

theory, despite the fact that he acknowledges
that Freud

abandoned the tally argument.

possibility of

a

What Grunbaum misses is the

development like that of medical science,

a

development hampered by the complexity of the irreducible
unit of the person.

It

is

mere philosophical arrogance to

call for the sudden attainment of inappropriate standards
in
a

medical science.

While Griinbaum's careful analysis of

Freud's early reasoning in defense of the probative value of
the clinical data is instructive,

it

glosses over the whole

problem of what Freud may have meant by correct insight and
therapeutic success, as well as the reasons behind Freud's
changing conception of

a

cure.

Grunbaum construes Freud's line, "tally with what
in him"

in a

straightforward, naive realist sense.

problem with this assumption of
theory of truth

is

a

is

real

The

common sense correspondence

that it ignores the increasing weight that

Freud gave to a possible psychical reality (as opposed to the

material reality given by ordinary medicine) and the changing
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character of the reality that the
analyst and analysand are
in the process of constructing
in the analytic encounter.
Therapeutic success is not necessarily
with the same person
who entered analysis. Of
course, analysis aims at learning
what is true about the analysand,
but Freud was driven by the
nature of the clinical data to
accept the possibility that
this truth was not confined to a
relation between a set of
statements about a fixed personal
identity and some external
events in the world. Grunbaum brings
to psychoanalysis a
conception of truth that is a methodological
dogma which
becomes obvious when he states:
“an event that never
happened could hardly have been the pathogen ." 21
But

someone’s belief that something happened can
be

a

pathogen.

If this ultimately can be grounded in
the current ontology of

physics, Grunbaum doesn't supply so much as

clue as to how

a

that could be done.

Grunbaum'

s

notion of reality is based on

reality as revealed by physics and

non-psychoanalytic.

it

is

a

conception of

decidedly

A pathogen can be an idea.

This is

a

fundamental psychoanalytic premise, one that distinguishes

psychoanalysis as

form of diagnosis and treatment from the

a

old medical paradigm.

some neurotics:

As Freud describes the diagnosis of

"the signs of their illness originate from

nothing other than

a

their bodies

and the immediate cause of their disorder

is

.

.

.

to be looked for

change in the action of their minds upon

in their minds ." 22

Do ideas really
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happen?

is this even a meaningful
question?

Of course ideas

refer, but not necessarily to
events that actually happened.
For, as indicated in the previous
chapter, Freud held that

repression acts on memories rather
than on experiences and
memories are in turn constructions
rather than objective
traces or recordings of events,

while there are many

mysteries about ideational discourse, at
present, it is our
only means (as it was for Freud) of
describing the events for
which

a

scientific explanation

is

ultimately to be sought,

and to which psychoanalytic theory
is addressed.

Marshall Edelson describes the analytic treatment
process
as the search for closer and closer
approximations to
"what

is

true of the analysand

1,23
.

of course this includes what

actually happened, it includes her history, but

it

also

includes her mental life, her fantasies, her wishes,
her

propensities to interpret ambiguous experience

in one

particular way rather than another, her particular

configuration of projections and especially her feelings.

Veridical insight

is

more than one interpretative statement

or etiological claim put forth by an analyst which tallies

with something real, where "real" is understood as "what

happened.

Edelson's statement, while

it

captures the nature

of the psychoanalytic quest, would come closer to the

dynamics of the therapeutic process if he said that treatment
is

the search for what is becoming true of the analysand in

the course of therapeutic interaction.

The reality
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constructed in the analytic encounter

not static.

is

The reality that psychoanalysis
unmasks is first of all a
reality riddled with projections and
illusions. Veridicality
from the viewpoint of the analyst
and analysand must begin
with the real nature of these projections
and illusions where
real" stands for the felt, lived
character of these

projective understandings

in terms of

which the analysand

structures and moves within the world.

To come to recognize

these projections as projections changes the
nature of what
is real and what is illusory and this
is the way in which

psychoanalytic knowledge

transformative.

is

The experiential

nature of the mode of truth operative in
psychoanalysis
not restricted to the experience of the analysand.

analyst is also

a

measure,

a

guide toward recognizing

defenses and resistance in the analysand.

uncovering these patterns of meaning
analysand says

is

The

clinical instrument, trained to

a

utilize her own feelings as

is

is

The process of

gradual.

What the

true is not taken at face value;

this

so-called truth may be yet another mask, defense or
resistance designed to ward off the recognition of another,

perhaps more painful truth.

The task of peeling off the

projective layers that constitute reality
truth is never attained.

is

ongoing.

Final

Projective layers always

con j ectu ra 1 ly remain, which is to say that we never know

ourselves completely.

At different times we come up against

limits, partial truths which explain

a

way that we are.

.
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Correct insight

is not a

either true or false.

straightforward assertion that

is

The insight itself shifts the knower

to a new understanding of the insight,
but

in so

doing

retains its own partiality, even when progress,
marked by

refinement and coherence of the explanatory, narrative
account,

is

obviously achieved.

The notion of correct insight is

a

complicated one and

Freud certainly recognized that it was not necessary
for

therapeutic success, where success
from symptoms.

is

understood as relief

As far as therapy goes, the later Freud could

accept whatever worked.

But it seems that he held to the

idea that psychoanalytic therapy was at that time the most

powerful because of its explanatory depth,

a

comprehensive by the language of the theory.

depth made more

Summing up

a

lecture on the applications of psychoanalysis Freud explains:
have told you that psychoanalysis began as a method of
treatment; but I did not want to commend it to your
interest as a method of treatment but on account of the
truths it contains, on account of the information it
gives us about what concerns human beings most of
all
their own nature— and on account of the connections
it discloses between the most different of their
activities
I

—

Freud states here that psychoanalysis contains truths,

but on what basis?

First of all perhaps because it has

pragmatic value, but more fundamentally the theory
systematizes an organized body of data and phenomena and
gives an account of them.

Some of these phenomena are

conceptually conjectured as clear notions on the basis of
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very messy data, but clarifying
the facts to be explained by

conceptual organization

is

not foreign to science.

account changes the way the world looks;

it

Freud’s

changes our

relationship to our functioning and so
our relationship to
ourselves.
Freud does make a weighty, perhaps
debatable,
assumption here:
that what concerns humans
most of all is

their own nature.

The fact that this assumption does not

hold for many people may account for
the failure of analytic
treatment, for this very kind of motivation is
important for
a

certain kind of therapeutic success, one which

I

would
j

.describe as

peculiarly psychoanalytic therapeutic success.

a

J

This success involves learning how to apply the
theory and
insights one has acquired in analysis to oneself and
in such
a

way that one is able to continue

a

process of understanding

and analysis that began in the treatment setting.
Grtinbaum
a

s

response to this claim would no doubt be that

therapeutic success, as I've defined

circular.

it,

is

viciously

For the insights may rest on fictions and the

successful analysand may be she who can continue to create
fictional accounts about her unconscious motivations and

mental functioning.

Though the truth claim must be tied to

something, that something need not be external to the reality
being discussed.

Griinbaum has failed to allow for the

development or conceptualization of that reality, by
restricting the domain and range of psychical reality to that
which can be correlated with material reality.
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As a method of treatment, Freud
increasingly came to
restrict the domain for which
psychoanalysis could expect to
be the treatment of choice.
He revised his claims about
the

prophylactic power of psychoanalysis and
stressed the
limitations of the therapy due to
individual, constitutional
factors and to societal restraints.
Freud was also quite
pessimistic about the capability of his
techniques
for

handling psychosis, although the
psychoses could be
recognized and conceptualized to a degree
within the Freudian
framework. To the extent that Freud did
rely on therapeutic
efficacy as a kind of proof, the guarantor
of the link

between truth and efficacy seems to have
resided in the
experience of analysis.
Freud was himself convinced by his
experience, by his own self-analysis.
Psychoanalysis
was

true for him because it was the only coherent
explanation of

these psychical phenomena.
A psychoanalytic cure based on insight turns
out to be

more akin to an education than to

a

medical cure.

The fact

that the analysand has acquired knowledge about herself does
not guarantee that she will act on these insights or change
her behavior in one way rather than another.

By analogy with

the educative process, a psychoanalysis does not entail that

the learner will utilize in a particular way the knowledge

gained.

The link between

a

successful analysis and correct

insight is complicated by this unpredictable factor of what
looks like human choice.

Commenting on the limitations of
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therapy, Freud states:

"after all, analysis does not
set out

to make pathological
reactions impossible,

but to give the

patient's ego freedom to decide one way
or the other ." 25
Another factor complicating the whole
notion of a
therapeutic success, and a factor that
Grunbaum does not
explore the implications of, is the
fact that according to
psychoanalytic theory the demands that society
places on us
(our institutions, customs, laws,
traditions,
etc.)

large role in causing the neuroses.

well,

a

Biological factors as

for example, our prolonged dependence
on our family,

must be thrown into the etiological
equation.
is

play

Civilization

built upon or requires the repression of
instincts, and

the psychoneuroses are substitute
satisfactions or compromise

formations that are the result of the denial or
repression of
impulses that if allowed expression would arouse
excessive
anxiety.

An individual cure must be seen in the context of

that individual's position within society and the
demands it

places on her.

This is why, paradoxically, psychoanalysis

offers the most promise for those who suffer least, at least
those who suffer least from the material hardships and

repressive demands of

a

harsh social reality.

Psychoanalytic

theory is critical of society and its role in causing
neuroses; much of Freud's pessimism with regard to
stems from his recognition that society, as

coercive entity,

forces

a

a

a

cure

powerful,

neurotic character; society imposes

renunciations of desire and offers only substitute

.
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gratifications.

Regression to deeper desires

is

permanent
possibility, a possibility that highlights
the instability of
the domain being theorized.
Adjustment to a neurotic society
cannot be the aim of a successful
psychoanalysis, and
further,

it

a

ought not to be the aim since relief from

neurosis is why one seeks treatment.

In one sense,

a

successful analysis, one which involves making
the analysand
conscious of her own defensive functioning,
leads inevitably
to a critical examination of the defenses
of others and the

externalizat ion of these defenses in the social structure
to
wnich she belongs. As social criticism, psychoanalytic
theory pushes toward exposing the features of

inevitably make people neurotic.

a

society that

As Freud recognized,

in as

much as psychoanalysis criticizes society and destroys

illusions, society will strike back and therapeutic success
will have

a

temporary and paradoxical character.

permanently well-adjusted person

is

The

the fiction, and the

"cured" are cripples who can at best achieve restricted

goals
Freud viewed what he called the "gain from illness," the

flight from conflict into neurosis, as too high
pay for relief from anxiety.

a

price to

He nevertheless acknowledged

that life circumstances sometimes contraindicated pursuing

psychoanalytic treatment.

This is clearest where

circumstances produce afflictions that are more pernicious
than neuroses.

Arguing against therapeutic fanaticism, Freud

:
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states

Neuroses have in fact their biological
function as a
protective contrivance and they have
theirr social
ication:
Tt e "9ain fro/illness”
th ey°pJovide is
ITl
t always a purely
subjective one.
is there anv one of
you who has not at some time looked
into the causation of
a neurosis and had to allow
that it was the mUdeft
° f the
itUation? And should such heavy
sacrifice° be
sacrifice
burned
made in order to eradicate the
neuroses in^
the W ° rld iS ful1 ° f other
unavoidable
misery?^"'
?

/

For Freud there was no easy answer
to this question.

The

"gain from illness" was ultimately harmful
to the individual
and to society at large, and
psychoanalysis as therapy and as

education could help change the conditions
which contributed
to bringing about this misery.
But at the same
time,

understanding one's psychodynamics and those of
others was no
guarantee for happiness. After all, psychoanalysis
was the

basis for

a

very grave philosophy precisely because it

neither promised nor claimed to be capable of fulfilling
our
longings.

We cannot have our lost objects of desire, though

we can acquire some knowledge of what those longings are.

On the one hand,

the gap between therapeutic success and

psychoanalytic theory can be explained by the theory itself,
but on the other hand, this gap is not an anomaly if we adopt

medicine as our scientific model.

Freud's essay,

"Psychical

Treatment," notes that psychical or mental treatment
historically the oldest medical treatment.
treatment Freud

is

is

By psychical

referring to treatment, of either mental

or physical disorders, which aims at curing the disorder by

.
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influencing the patient's mind.

The fact that miracle cures

and faith healing have worked
throughout history and have
influenced diseases of mental and
physical origin requires
explanation.
Beliefs and expectations affect
treatment
outcome.
Freud acknowledges that the
patient's faith is also
a powerful force in
his own medical efforts.
In this regard,
he's in step with medical tradition.
However, he's extending
medicine insofar as his focus on
psychogenic causes is a

movement away from the prevailing mechanist
(externalist)
concept of psychopathology.
Freud explicitly harnesses
patient faith, expectation and belief by
developing and
exploiting the transference relationship,
making it an object
of analysis while at the same time using
it as a treatment
tool
I

suggest that the reason Freud continued to view
the

treatment setting as

a

scientifically credible arena in which

to test psychoanalytic hypotheses had to do
with his

recognition and familiarity with the factor of mental
influence and the variability and uncertainties associated

with it.

In the "Psychical Treatment" essay, Freud states:

All the mental influences which have proved effective in
curing illnesses have something incalculable about them.
Affects, concentration of the will, distracting the
attention, expectation coloured by faith all of these
forces, which occasionally remove an illness, sometimes
fail to do so without there being anything in the
character of the illness to account for the different
result.
What stands in the way of regularity in the
therapeutic results achieved is evidently the autocratic
nature of the personalities of the subjects, with their
variety of mental differences.

—

,
il

*

.
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What distinguishes psychoanalysis
as

treatment

is

a

kind of psychical

the attempt to understand the
nature of the

personalities involved and the psychical
processes, and to
make more predictable the
incalculable character of mental
influences. Therapeutic uncertainty
was and is endemic to
medicine

^ enepression
.

T h e°ry

!

is It Well-Founded?

Ts

Tt

Griinbaum's second major argument
against the scientific

credibility of psychoanalysis focuses on the
logical
foundations of the theory of repression.
He argues "that
even if clinical data could be taken at
face value ," 28
that is, even if the clinical data were not
epistemically

contaminated, there is as yet no clinical evidence
capable of
supporting the causal role that Freud assigns to
repression.

According to Griinbaum, Freud's major hypotheses and
theoretical claims rest on the cogency of his reasoning about
repression and that reasoning is fundamentally flawed.

Before looking at Griinbaum's criticism of Freud's reasoning,
I

want to call into question

a

fundamental premise upon which

Griinbaum rests his case.
Griinbaum utilizes the doctrine of repression and its

theoretical significance to illustrate Freud's early view
that repression is causally necessary for the initial

development of

a

neurotic disorder and for its maintenance.
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This etiological hypothesis is the
pillar of the clinical
theory according to Griinbaum.
Though repression is only one
etiology, Griinbaum restricts his
analysis to this one

etiological case,

a

case where his logic can get

a

grip.

According to Griinbaum, Freud assimilates
other psychical
productions to that of neurotic symptoms
and explains their
significance by reference to and on the

basis of the dynamic,

causal role assigned to repressed ideas.

in defense of the

centrality of the repression etiology,
Griinbaum quotes from
Freud:
"The theory of repression is the
cornerstone on which
the whole structure of psychoanalysis
rests." 29 Armed with
this assertion, Griinbaum's strategy
consists in undermining
the grounds for inferring the pathogenic
role of repressed

ideation, and in this way attempts to weaken,

if not

topple,

the foundations in repression for the
psychoanalytic edifice.

The problem with this foundational claim and Griinbaum's
use of it is that it freezes the significance of

psychoanalytic findings
was doing and claiming.

in

ways that misrepresent what Freud

Repress ion is not

a

hypostatized

concept, nor an unalterable cornerstone of the structure of

psychoanalysis, but rather
studies it.

a

concept that changes as Freud

The mature Freud can in fact, be taken to have

significantly narrowed his concept of repression.

In 1925

Freud revives the original term 'defensive process' which he
had replaced by the term 'repression.'
to this concept of defense,

He suggests reverting

using it to refer to the
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techniques the ego makes use of in
dealing with conflicts
which may lead to neurosis.
That is 'defense' covers the
many processes which we now refer
to as defense mechanisms
which serve to exclude from
awareness instinctual demands or
thoughts which threaten the ego.
Repression then is viewed
as special method of defense
and is subsumed under it as a
special case 30 Freud's revision of
the referent of
.

repression demonstrates that repression
all that is psychical;

it

is

is

not fundamental to

but an aspect of unconscious

thought processes and thus causally
relevant sometimes in
direct sense and sometimes not.
Hence, although many of
Freud's accounts of psychical processes are
formulated in

a

terms of repression, oftentimes he is using
'repression' to
refer to defense processes in general.

Grunbaum's focus on the repression etiology to the

exclusion of other "cornerstones" which Freud at different
times enunciates 33 narrows the diversity and range
of

pathogens and instigators of the psychoneuroses as well as of
parapraxes and dreams.

By holding that repression plays the

pathogenic role, Grunbaum ignores Freud's characterization of
intrapsychic conflict and the variety of motives and defenses

which Freud invokes to explain the phenomena or behavior
question.

He cleanses Freudian interpretations and

hypothetical claims of ambiguity
discredit them.
repression

in

is

It

is

in order

to more decisively

not at all clear that Freud held that

always involved in mental disorders, though

it

.
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is clear

that he used the term often
as the analogue of
the

pathogen

Grunbaum's persistence in holding
Freud to the
hypothetical claim that "repression
is the

sine qua non for
the pathogenesis of the
patient's psychoneurosis " 32
aims at
showing the lack of evidence
for this hypothesis.
He

examines Freud's reasoning in
defense of this hypothesis
and
shows how the suggestibility
problem as well as the

possibility of

placebo effect contaminate the
results used
to explain the therapeutic
value of lifting repressions.
Grunbaum reconstructs Freud's early
reasoning and empirical
rationale for the postulation of
the repression etiology and
then shows how this rationale
was undermined in a number of
ways by Freud's clinical findings.
Grunbaum
a

then goes on to

chastise Freud for extrapolating from
the repression
hypothesis of the psychoneuroses to explain
dreams and
parapraxes along the lines of mini-neuroses
when,

in fact,

these latter phenomena lacked the
therapeutic base that
grounded the causal claims of the
psychoneuroses. On

Grunbaum's reading, reliance on the method of
free
association as

a

probative clinical tool also depends on the

soundness of the repression theory, since free
association
held to uncover repressed ideas,

stand in

engender.

a

is

ideas which are held to

causal connection to the slip or symptom they

With the failure of the repression theory, we get

the image that the whole Freudian edifice has crumbled.
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As

indicated earlier, Freud revises
the repression
theory and this revision
needs to be considered in
its own
tight.

I

Griinbaum treats revisions
that move away from

deductive predictability as
methodological flaws.

in doing
this, Griinbaum is not
sensitive to the experiences
and data
that Freud took to force a
change in his theoretical
insight.
it is at least as important
to understand Freud's
movement of tnougnt
thouaht as it is^ to _point out
that psychoanalytic
theory has methodological
problems when it is assessed
against the standards imposed by
the current philosophy of
-

-j

•»-

;

•

,

science.

Freud's continued attention to the
clinical data
and to revisions of the metapsychology
indicate
that the

medical model may have been guiding
or at least providing the
methodological rationale for his continued
belief in the
scientific character of his enterprise.
in terms of a
medical model, clinical data provide the
facts calling for an
explanatory theory. Observed displacement
or projection, for
example, calls for an explanation as to how
and why

displacement or projection
mechanism.

is

seized on as

a

defensive

The metapsychology functions as an attempt to

provide the theoretical account that would ultimately
link up
the facts obtained in clinical theory.

Griinbaum,

in

restricting scientific assertions to the clinical theory
and
to what can be rigorously proven, has set his sights
too low

to find the medical link between theory and practice.

Clinical data, and clinical theory fitting aspects of the
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clinical data, call for

metapsychology

a

scientific theory, and the

the attempt to provide
it.

is

Clinical
results, alone, do not test
an established theory; they
provide guidelines for its
construction.

Grunbaum's portrayal of the failure
of therapy to confirm
Freud's different claims about
the specific pathogenesis
of a
neurosis illustrates only that
psychoanalytic confirmation
does not follow his epistemological
model
imported from

physics, where experiment can be
designed as a direct test of
theoretical conjecture.
For Grunbaum, the epistemic
liabilities of the treatment setting
and the clinical data
obtained therein indicate that support
for the causal claims
of psychoanalytic theory must
come from extra-clinical
experimental studies. Because Grunbaum
adheres to the

program of evaluating psychoanalytic etiological
claims

in

their early, simpler version as if they
were claims about

electrons rather than about human beings whose
neuroses are
particularized and intimately connected with their

idiosyncratic past, he ends up calling for studies
that
couldn't be designed, studies that reveal that
he is not

sympathetic with the evidential basis for the theory that
he's attempting to assess.
In order to support the hypothesis that a
particular

repressed idea

is

the pathogen or specific cause of a

particular neurotic disorder, Grunbaum argues that one would
have to establish that exposure to the pathogen "makes

a
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difference" to developing the
neurosis.
Hence, in addition
to finding positive
instances of obsessional
neurotics who
harbor repressed infantile,
sexual wishes or fears, one
would
need to find evidence of
people who are not so afflicted
and

who are not obsessional neurotics.

Griinbaum states:

"to

provide evidence for the causal
relevance claimed by Freud,
we need to combine instances
of N's (neurotics) that were
P's
(exposed to pathogen) with instances
of non-P's who are
j!
n °"'N's-"
asserting this, Griinbaum states
that he
takes it for granted that "there
are both N's and non-N's as
well as P's and non-P's ." 34 This
assumption is however
extremely naive.
Is there according to psychoanalytic
theory
anyone who is a non-P?
one sense, there

m

example,

is

is not.

For

there anyone who does not have repressed

infantile desires?

Once Freud gave up the idea that the

neuroses have specific determinants 35 and
included the
influence of civilization as

a

determinant, the very idea

that one could locate people who could be
used to test

hypotheses in the manner Griinbaum advocates loses touch
with
the reality of the theory.

Developmentally

,

no one escapes

pathogenic events and defensive repressions; repression

is

one means by which every immature ego in an appropriate

social setting repels or fends off excessive demands caused
by either drives from within or excitations from without.

These demands operate like "traumas."

As Freud states:

"No

human individual is spared such traumatic experiences; none
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escapes the repressions to which
they give rise." 36 The
request for a control group of
people free of repressed
desires is like a medical doctor
looking for a control group
of patients without bodies. 3 ^

Grunbaum's demands, that psychoanalysis,
in order to have
legitimate claim to scientific status,
find conclusive proof
for the existence of causal
relationships between theoretical
conjectures and clinical data, reflect
his adherence
to a

mono log ica 1 epistemology.

when we set Grunbaum's objections

and demands within the context of
medical theorizing, they

reflect

a

mechanist-causalist bias,

partial and inadequate.
of a pathogen is that of

a

bias long recognized as

For example, Grunbaum's conception
a

hostile, foreign agent that

invades the organism and thereby causes the
disease.

This

externalist conception, while it has often proved
successful,
has always been tempered and supplemented in
medical theory
by a holistic or generalist theory of disease
which views

illness as the result of an internal disharmony or

imbalance.

Unlike the externalist, who localizes the

cause of the disease and the defect, the generalist views

disease as

a

defect in the pattern of interaction between the

whole organism and its environment. 39

Freud was initially

tied to the externalist model but moved to

conception.

a

more generalist

Grunbaum's objections are most effective only

against Freud's initial positions.

Freud's focus on

etiologies, his use of surgical analogies and his notion of
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cure as the ridding of the pathogen
through abreaction in
therapy give way to a notion of
the compromise character of
symptom formation, the interplay
between equilibrium and
disequilibrium, and the rejection of
the idea that the
neuroses have specific determinants.
On the generalist or
holistic conception of pathology, a
pathogen can only enter
to cause disease if equilibrium
is already disturbed.
Freud's mature views are better understood
on this

alternative medical model rather than on the
model of
bullet which invades from outside and does

a

specific,

localized damage to an organ.
causal link between

a

If generalism is correct,

pathogen and neurosis

is

the

screened by an

intervening factor of disequilibrium.

This more systemic,

global view allows for therapy to play

a

role in

understanding pathology and its treatment without

a

recognition of the nature of the disequilibrium.

Grunbaum's

insistence that medicine be externalist, which

implied by

his assumptions,

is

is

clear

yet another bias of the mechanistic

influence of the physics model.
Freud's more complex, multicausal medical model, the one

associated with his developing views, indicates that

Grunbaum's conception of etiology
analytical target.
is

I

is

not that of his

have not tried to argue that Griinbaum

wrong, or that psychoanalytic theory is satisfactory.

What

I

have tried to establish

result from the imposition of

is
a

that Grunbaum's criticisms

methodological model that may

not be appropriate to the
subject matter of psychoanalytic
theory, and that progress
may be more appropriately

stimulated by considering
medical science,

a

methodological model based on

with this, the criticism
of Grunbaum's
critique is in view, but it
is incumbent for my
project to
attempt exploration of an
epistemological model based on
medicine.
Little has been attempted by
philosophers of
science in this area, but I
shall attempt some tentative
movement into this new region in
my final chapter.

„

NOTES
Grunbauin, The Foundations
of Psyohoanalvs

i

.

p.

94

.

Ibid.

Freud

Qra°

S.E. ,18;252

,

rUn

^ Um

^

'

.

Foundations of Psychoanalysis

„„

Freud, S.E. ,12:260.
Ph i losophy of Medicine

King, Med ica 1 Thinking

,

,

p.

211.

219.

p.

Sherwood, The Lo^ic of Explanation
in Psychoanalysis
See^Stone,
p

•

Psychoanalyti c Situation

TVhe

112.

pp.

,

p.

12-17 and

Freud in a conversation with Hilda
Doolittle in Tribute
to Freud
p. 18.
,

Fing^ Med ica 1 Think inq
296-97 and McWhinney, Ian,
pp
Medical Knowledge and the Rise of Technology,"
p. 295.
,

Freud

,

S .E

.

,

16

:

452

.

.

Grunbauin, The. Foundations of Psychoanalysis

Ibid

.

,

p.

.

pp

.

139-40

140.

Freud, S.E. ,22 :151-52.

Ibid

.

,

p.153.

Griinbaum, The Foundat ions of Psychoanalysis

,

p.

172.

Ann Ferguson has raised an important question
with me
concerning the analogy of a psychoanalytic cure with a
medical cure. The major point of disanalogy is that
a
cure in psychoanalysis is not necessarily coincident
with the removal of symptoms. This is a point which
requires considerable elaboration.
I have not attempted
such an elaboration in the text because of the
complexity and debatable nature of this problem. No
matter what the resolution of this problem, I think that

.

.,

172

** *

explicitly with this question

=;p"s-u;£F
?«.

V.»ss
3

G

does not deal

a

EF

"k™

:

r
s“

f^

0 ™ 3 even thou h this
by
9

need'not result in'th
am grateful to Ann
Ferguson^or'point
1

the
19.

lS

"
itself
*

i^oSt"^”;
n
b
rff?L:rof rn^ y ^L trfat^1rfv^^° eS "" “ k -

Helmut Dahmer cites this remark
of Freud's in a review
of B. Goetz, Er innerunqen an
Sigmund Freud, in Psyche
24
1970 p. TJT.
,

,

20.

Lieberson,

21.

Grunbaum, The Foundations of
Psychoanalysis, d. 151.
Freud, S.E. ,7 286

22.
23

.

"Putting Freud to the Test,"
p. 26.

:

.

Edelson, Hypothesis and Evidence in
Psychoanalv sis, p
JU
•L

•

24.

Freud, S.E. ,22:156-57.

25

.

Ibid., 19:50.

26

.

Ibid.,

27

.

Ibid., 7:292.

11:150.

28.

Grunbaum, The Foundations of Psychoanalysis, o.
172.

29.

Freud, S.E. ,14:16.

30.

Ibid., 20:164.

31.

See S.E. ,18: 247 where Freud refers

cornerstones

t-n

other

32.

Grunbaum, The Foundations of Psychoanalysis, p. 175.

33.

Ibid

34

.

Ibid., p. 253.

35

.

Freud, S.E. 23 183

.

,

p

.

254

,

.

:

.

,

173
36

.

37

.

Ibid. ,23:185.

This observation arose out
of a a
ion in
which I gave a preliminary
sketch
of
some
of
the
ideas
in this chapter.
My thanks again to Alison,
Ed
George
Phil, and Reyes.
,
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Whil e

^

I

do not want to suggest that
there is no
lfferenCe between Eastern and
Western
,

^d

and

n
medicine, the history of Western
'medicine
has "been^^
r atelY and sometimes
simultaneously
dominated byY
both ngene ra 1 ism and externalism.
without saying that the externalistHowever i
model'has been the
more privileged, given the
mechanist bias of the rise ot
of
mooern science.
i
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Fried and Agassi, Psychiatry as
Medicine, p.

7

.

CHAPTER

5

MEDICINE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

^

Ce
e
allZe that althou<3 h epistemology
is the
o?
ii empirical
Of aall
sciences, it can only derive itl basis
th
data SUPPUed bY them ' and once
realize, Lrther
?eaUze
turther, the
th
extent to which epistemoloav h^
hitherto been profoundly influenced
exact sciences, then it is clearly by the idea^of the
oui duty to inauire
how the problem will be affected
when
other sciences are
Ire
taken into consideration 1
,

,-

.

My examination of the position of
Popper, Ricoeur,
Habermas, and Grunbaum on the status

of psychoanalysis has

stressed their failure to bring the
scientific status of
medicine into the arena of methodological
debate.
I have
argued that what

is

common to all positions in the current

space of methodological discussion is that
physics

constitutes the methodological paradigm of the
natural
sciences, and that this assumption pre-judges the
assessment
of psychoanalysis.

Up to now

I

have argued that Freud

implicitly used the standards of medical science rather
than
of physics as the epistemological and methodological

foundation of his work, and that he claimed

a

natural science

status for his enterprise because he assumed that medicine
was a natural science.

This remains true even though Freud

gradually became aware that the epistemology and methodology
of psychoanalytic theory and psychotherapy involve an

extension of medicine into new domains that finally forces

a

break with some of the commonly accepted features of

scientific medicine.

It

is

now time to address the issue of
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the scientific status and
epistemology of medicine. My aim
in this chapter is to
develop a conception of the natural
sciences that includes medicine among
them, and to suggest
that this conception is
appropriate for the philosophical

evaluation of the status of psychoanalysis.

Implicit in my

approach is the assumption that medicine
is scientific, at
least in much of its theorizing and
in some of its practice,
and that an understanding of the
nature of medical knowledge
will open up alternatives both for
assessing psychoanalysis
and for thinking about the epistemology
of science.

Since

Freud did not explicitly discuss the
epistemological status
of medicine, I offer this only as a
suggestion of how Freud

might have defended his intuitions concerning the
natural

science status of psychoanalysis had he chosen to
do so.

I

am assuming that this discussion might have been
formulated
in Freud's

terms, on the grounds that the sense of medical

science has remained stable enough in the twentieth century
to circumvent any anachronisms

intuitions can be defended in

in my
a

suggestions that Freud's

more articulate

epistemological theory.
should perhaps first deal with the potential objection

I

that

I

am merely using the suggestion that the relationship

of theory and practice in medicine is different from that of

physics to protect
it

a

special status for psychoanalysis.

Is

the case that medical knowledge is not robust enough to

sustain an epistemological scrutiny based on physics?

Modern
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Physical theories are tested
primarily by laboratory devices
which are in turn explicitly
constructed to test certain
theories. The connection between
theory and instrument or
device as a physical instantiation
of theory is what permits
physical data to directly test
physical theory. Physical
theory, in the context in which
instruments for testing are
produced in physics, directly predicts
certain experimental
outcomes.
if the predicted outcomes
are observed,
confirmation of the predicting theory
is obtained, otherwise
the theory is not confirmed by
the experimental results.
in
some areas of medicine, for example
in serology, medical
theory makes predictive assertions
about laboratory

preparations that can be tested in the same way.

if all of

medicine were pursued in laboratories in
this way, medical
science could accept the same methodological
designs that
have proven effective in discussing the
epistemology of

physics.

Special sub-disciplines of medicine satisfy the

most stringent epistemological criteria suggested
by

paradigms from physics, but med icine connotes much that

is

outside of biomedical science, and inevitably brings up the

epistemologically awkward problems associated with therapy.

Therapeutics

is

directed at individuals, and human beings are

not ideal instruments constructed for the testing of

therapeutic conjectures that may be derived from laboratory
medicine.
a

A drug which might have cured a target disorder in

person on certain assumptions can be screened out by

^
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unexpected activity on the part
of the patient.
The
individual is simply too complex
and engaged in too many
activities to provide an ideal
test of medical opinion,
isolated, in the hospital under
continual surveillance, the
individual can perhaps provide
reliable
data.

Much of normal

therapeutic practice occurs with
individuals who are seen
only on occasion, whose activities
a doctor is only partially
familiar with, and whose relevant
properties are only
partially studied with respect to the
problem calling for
therapeutic attention. We don't have a
physics of corn
growing because of the variability in the
specific situations
which corn is grown. A physics of medical
therapy

m

seems

even more remote.

It is the fact that the individual
human

being is given as the focus of therapeutic
practice that

seems to stand as the irreducible problem for any
attempt to
bring medicine into epistemological conformity
with theory
and experimental evidence in physics.

Outside of the

laboratory, theoretical conjecture is constantly buffeted
by

unknown variables.

Therapeutic success or failure

is

underdetermined by

medical theory, but this situation should not be interpreted
as though clinical medicine is the applied science to which

medical science stands as pure science.
not
or

a

Clinical medicine

is

simple application of various "basic medical sciences"

"p re-cl in ica 1

"

sciences

(e.g., pathology, physiology,

anatomy, biochemistry, etc.).

Clinical medicine is
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scientific in that it utilizes and
draws on the theorizing of
these sciences
integrating the explanatory modes of
various
other sciences, and in that it
revises its hypotheses in the
light of clinical failure.
it is not an applied science
in
the reductive sense of having a
simplified object domain to
which it applies pure theory.
,

Following Feinstein and Forstrom
will adopt

is

3
,

the position that

I

that clinical medicine has a unique
domain,

a

domain that differs from the domain of
biochemistry, for
example, where a given molecule, that can
be repeatedly

encountered in interchangeable instantiations,
object of theorizing.
is

the person.

is

the basic

The focal entity of clinical medicine

People are not interchangeable from the

standpoint of medical theory in the way that uniformly
prepared molecules are identical from the standpoint
of

physical theory.

This subject matter marks clinical medicine

off from specialized biomedical disciplines whose
testable
laws and hypotheses are utilized in the conjectures of

clinical medicine.

The clinician must work with an

experimental entity that

is

already arranged and given.

This

complex entity, the patient, places permanent constraints on
the link between theory and data.

The person involves unique

genetic and molecular material, social and behavioral
factors, and factors such as values, purposes, consciousness,
and reflection,

factors all of which may be relevant to the

course of therapy.

As Pellegrino notes,

the biomedical
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sciences, often referred to as
basic, are not by themselves
sufficient to constitute medicine
either as clinical science

medical practice.

Relevant genetic, social,

environmental and psychological factors,
as well as data such
as age, sex, race, occupation,
social and economic
status,

educational background, geographical
setting, etc., are
important for forming a diagnosis
and prescribing treatment.
These factors are not specialized
forms of the variables
studied in the basic medical sciences.
Clinical medicine

relativized to the individual

is

patient, but unknown aspects of the
patient's situation may
be as important as the clinical
profile. To handle
complexity, medicine has long looked for
"types" of patients
order to control this complexity, but hasn't

m

found

scheme hinting at

a

therapeutic science.

problem of individuality
psychoanalysis.

I

is

a

In any event,

the

especially acute for

should mention here that my adherence to

the position that the individual is the focus of
clinical

medicine may be only an historical observation, an

observation that

is

true of western medicine at least from

Freud's time to the present, but which may not reflect trends
in,

for example, traditional Chinese medicine.

If medicine

were more holistic, if the person— in— the- envi ronment were
treated, the problems of

a

complex focus would still remain.

A medical diagnosis functions like a hypothesis
it

is

a

in

that

conjecture subject to revision and refutation when
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evidence mounts up that contradicts
it.
However, unlike the
case in a laboratory setting
where an experiment may be
aevised that isolates various variables
so as to clearly
instantiate the hypothesis under test,
the therapeutic
procedures which follow from or seem to
be indicated by a
given diagnosis may or may not be
causally implicated in
producing results.
in other words, the specific
patient
response to treatment does not logically
entail the truth or
falsity of the original diagnosis or the
aspects of medical
sciences that were involved.
Patient improvement does not
mean that the diagnosis

is

correct nor that the specific

therapeutic intervention causes the improvement.
clinician continues the specific therapy

if

The

the patient shows

improvement and in this practical sense, at least
some of the
time, uses the therapy as confirmation of the
diagnosis.

The

circumstances in which the clinician aims at healing sick

people inevitably temper any optimism that clinical results
can be read off as establishing scientifically testable

generalizations.

The pragmatic method of knowing gains

ascendancy in medicine due to the fallibility of medical
knowledge,

a

fallibility attributable in part to the fact

that the clinician works with

may not rule out

a

a

very complex data base.

This

scientific status for medicine, but when

the same situation is encountered in therapy based on

psychoanalytic theory,

it

is

often taken to impugn the

scientific status of psychoanalysis, as in Grunbaum's case.
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My thesis attempts to bracket
medicine and psychoanalysis
together, epistemologically,
forcing those who would reject
psychoanalytic theory to explain why
medicine seems to have
more robust scientific status
on grounds that are not
mere
reflections of prejudices.

Medicine

a

including clinical medicine, shares
clear
characteristics with other disciplines
normally considered to
be scientific, at least in the
opinion of methodologists who
do not make a fetish of physics.
Stephen Toulmin highlights
the usual uncertainty involved in
moving from general
scientific principles to particular
applications in practice
and argues that the positivist equation
of the mark
,

of

science with prediction distorts the nature
of scientific
endeavors.
Drawing a parallel with atmospheric physics,
Toulmin argues that a scientist's "understanding
is

frequently shown far better by his ability to explain
why
'telling what is going to happen'

is

impossible in some

particular case than by his capacity to generate trivial
predictions.

Medical forecasting bears comparison to

weather forecasting in that prediction

is

very difficult in

situation constituted by many variables outside of the
control of the predictor.

The medical experiment

is

typically arranged by nature, and not by the physician, and

predictions must fail as frequently as picnics based on the
prognostications of the weather channel.
The point of this discussion

is

to highlight the general

a

.

.
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fallibility inherent in moving from
explanations involving
general hypothetical relations to
explanations or predictions
of particular facts, especially
where predictions escape the
preconstructed confines of laboratory
tests.
The precise
experiments in certain areas of physics
are the
result of

unusual circumstances of preparation,
and should hardly
constitute the norm for a general scientific
methodology.
Toulmin states:
To understand the physics of the
atmosphere is
understand why weather forecasts are so often, to
practice, unreliable; similarly, to understand in
the
physiology of cell division and the immune
system
is to
see why many clinical problems, for
example, the cancer
problem, are so extraordinarily complex and
b

intractable

Scientific understanding that moves beyond scientism
and
physics fetishism must reflect on the limits and conditions
of its own particular discourse.

Freud noted the limits of psychoanalytic therapeutic

treatment, but did not for this reason deem it unscientific.
In doing so,

he acknowledged the general fallibility of

scientific prediction, and was not coerced by philosophical
visions of logical rigor.

In a letter

(May 28,

1911)

to

Ludwig Binswanger he comforts himself with the thought:
if we accomplish so little therapeutically, we at least
learn why it is impossible to accomplish more. Our
therapy seems to me the only rational one in this
sense

The sense of rationality Freud is referring to here is akin
to the general, pragmatic scientific understanding
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articulated by Toulmin.

Freud's rationality inheres
in his
self-reflective stance with respect
to his own enterprise,
in
his refusal to cover up the
limitations of his findings,
in
his refusal to resolve
the tension and contradiction
between
theory and therapy, and in his
revisions of theory in the
light of accumulating evidence.
The specific contradictions
and tensions involved in the
concrete analytic encounter, an
undertaking which fosters regression,
acting out, as well as
transference to the analyst, preclude
predictions based on
the repetition of closely
similar cases. Therapy was
rational for Freud. Although it did
not promise

a cure, it
could be guided by the standard
feedback of clinical
medicine, continuing a procedure that
seemed to be working to
benefit the patient and switching
course of treatment where
improvement was not observed.
Freud comments

on the lack of

predictability and the reasons for

it

in the following way:

So long as we trace the development from
its final
outcome backwards, the chain of events
appears
continuous, and we feel we have gained an insight
which
is completely satisfactory or
even exhaustive.
But if
we proceed the reverse way, if we start from
the premises
interred from the analysis and try to follow these
up to
t e final result, then we no longer
get the impression of
an inevitable sequence of events which could
not have
been otherwise determined. We notice at once that
there
might have been another result, and that we might
have
been just as well able to understand and explain the
latter.
The synthesis is thus not so satisfactory as the
analysis; in other words, from knowledge of the premises
we could not have foretold the nature of the result.
It is very easy to account for this disturbing state
of affairs.
Even supposing that we have a complete
knowledge of the aetiological factors that decide a given
result, nevertheless what we know about them is only
their quality, and not their relative strength.
Some of
them are suppressed by others because they are too weak.
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and they therefore do not
affect the final result
Bur
we never know beforehand
which of the determining
th
weaker
the stronger.
We only say at
thp end that those which
succeeded must have been the
stronger
Hence the chain of causation
can alwavs be
recognized with certainty if we
follow the line of
analysis, whereas to predict it
along the line of
5
synthesis

\

is

Freud

s

impossible

.

adherence to the claim that
psychoanalysis

is

scientific in spite of its failure to
yield precise,
repeatedly confirmed predictions
indicates that neither a
probabilistic nor a deterministic
hypothetical-deductive
model of explanation, sufficiently
captures what he means by
the scientific character of
psychoanalytic investigation
and

explanation.

As in the case of medicine, such
models do not

seem to capture the subtlety of medical
reasoning, in the
specific therapeutic situation. Predictions
about the
behavior of an organic body part derived from
observations of
that part in the laboratory may prove not to
hold when the

body part is treated in the context of the whole
person.

number of variables within

a

influence the outcome in

variety of unanticipated ways.

a

therapeutic context can

seems wrong to bring down medicine as

express

a

The

a

It

science in order to

prejudice concerning psychoanalytic theory.

An

epistemology of medicine may well cover the essential aspects
of psychoanalytic practice.

I

will now turn from

a

general

discussion to an examination of some more specific methods of
inquiry and modes of acquiring knowledge that are

characteristic of medicine.
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Med ical Knowledge and the
Medical Model

have emphasized that clinical
medicine, and in varying
degrees other biomedical sciences,
have as their object
domain the whole person in her
complexity and particularity.
I have also suggested
that this ontological difference
in
subject matter marks off medicine
from philosophically
paradigmatic experimental situations in
physics and may at
least partially account for intuitions
that the epistemology
of medicine differs from that of
physics. Medical knowledge,
like all scientific knowledge, arises
out of a comprehensive
set of meaningful social practices 9
Changes in medicine
and the social practices that give rise
to these changes
occur within a social climate which at least
partially
I

.

determines what

is

seen as

a

medical problem.

By focusing on

changes in medicine, we can perhaps locate some
features of

medicine that will prove useful in developing an account
of
its epistemology.

History intrudes everywhere into medicine,

whereas its appearance in physics may be quite discrete.
Fried and Agassi view medical theory as primarily

nosology (theory of illness or disease) which they further
narrow to etiology (theory of the cause of disease).^
concept of disease

is

The

an historically evolving one, and one

that raises clearly epistemological concerns since the term

'disease'

and its correlative

'health'

raise havoc with the

fact/value dichotomy put to so much methodological use in the

development of the epistemology of physics.

In an obvious
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way the terms 'health' and
'disease' are value-laden
and to
varying degrees culture-relative.
The social

interpenetration with these conceptual
categories is more
pronounced than the social
interworking with some other
area
of scientific terminology.
The application of the
evaluative
or normative concept of
health assumes a goal or purpose
partly determined by a social and
historically given
context.
One is healthy with respect to
a norm in a certain
cultural context, given a certain
constitution in
a

particular environment.

Medicine

is

designed to move people

toward the appropriate concept of
health.

evolving concept of

a

The changes in the

disease shed light on the constructive

nature of the concept of disease and
on the ways in which
medical facts and explanations draw upon
a wider range of

explanatory presuppositions than those noticed
by

philosophers of science who concentrate on physics,
or at
least on the areas of physics which are most
ahistorical.

Ludwik Fleck demonstrates how the concept of
syphilis,

which was originally conceived
labelled

in

ethical-mystical terms and

the carnal scourge," evolved and was given

"scientific" grounding,

collective process.

a

grounding that

is

a

the result of a

Tracing the disease concept of syphilis

from demonology to serology. Fleck shows how the

proto-scientific idea that syphilis was connected with impure
blood became established as

a

scientific fact with the

discovery of the Wassermann reaction.

No specific
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methodology yielded the Wassermann
reaction and the ensuing
tests which allowed for the
diagnosis of syphilis by means of
serum.

In fact,

the Wassetmann test is
instructive because

exemplifies the craft skill involved
in both scientific
discovery and practice.
Fleck notes that the working out
of
the improved technique of the
test was a purely trial and
error process. The Wassetmann reaction
became useful when
various reagents were tried in varied
concentrations and in
various ways that slowly increased the
reliability of the
it

test.

The Wassermann reaction came to define
the presence
of syphilis and it created the discipline
of serology,

despite the fact that the test
reliable.

is

known not to be completely

it came to be used because its

reliability seemed

to suggest the presence of the disease
and later its cure.

The invention or discovery of the Wassermann reaction
and its

subsequent extension to other serological methods were
intimately tied to the practical experience involved in
hands on

a

feel for how to prepare and dilute the extract.

Fleck notes other cases where "experience involving the

irrational 'serological touch'

is

specifically needed." 11

The results of the Wassermann reaction, which led to the

coupling of the disease with successful treatment, were not

uniformly reproducible by experiment nor fully explicable by
a

logical explanation of the way in which the test

worked. 12

Yet the results were accepted because they were

useful and successful.

The thinking that gave rise to the
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discovery was conditioned by
progress
associated germ theory of
disease.

in

bacteriology and the

This theory reflects the

externalist point of view
disease as the result of

in
a

medical theorizing,

causative,

a

view of

foreign agent which

invades the organism and brings
about the disease. Though
this disease model proved
extremely useful to the discovery
of the Wassermann reaction,
Fleck notes that one cannot
define syphilis epistemologically
on the basis of the
causative agent, spirochaeta pallida.
Humans can harbor the
bacteria without becoming ill; that
is, they can be carriers
without exhibiting the illness. The
disease and the presence
of the causative agent are not
coterminous. This is a
typical situation in medicine.
Fleck states:
"the idea of
the causative agent has lost the
overriding importance it

enjoyed during the classical period of
bacteriology." 13

Klerman remarks that the search for the single
or major
cause of disease, which was thought to be
necessary but not

necessarily sufficient for the development of

a

specific

disease, reached its high point with respect to
psychiatric

illnesses in the early twentieth century.

As late as the

1920s, when the relationship between pellagra and a specific

nutritional deficiency was established, some medical
theorists hoped to bring mental illness under the rubric of

standard medical nosology.

Externalism can explain the

presence of some mental illnesses that are due to organic
causes.

But other mental illnesses prove resistant to
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externalist, organic accounts.
disorders

The so-called functional

(e.g.,

schizophrenia, manic-depressive
illness,
neuroses), to the extent that they
can be viewed

in terms of

disease model, have to be regarded
as chronic diseases, but
diseases with a mixed etiology that
cannot be simply
attributed to an invading agent.
Klerman notes that an
illness like schizophrenia (unlike
syphilitic diseases of the
brain which fit the infection
or externalist model) may
be
more like diseases encountered in
internal medicine, such as
hypertension or leukemia, diseases with
uncertain etiologies
that are not easily explicable in
externalist terms. 14
a

As suggested at the close of the
preceding chapter,

Grunbaum implicitly embraces

a

nineteenth century externalist

concept of disease by demanding that
psychoanalytic

etiologies be validated along lines that are
closer to the
infection model.
Here we need to note that while Freud's
rejection of symptomatic treatment for mental
illness was

externa list, his later psychoanalytic theories reflect

generalist bias,

a

a

bias which sees theory as "a bundle of

assumptions that we test together."'*' 5
events can become causative only in

a

Specific external
reaction to them

mediated by internal beliefs and desires in

a

complicated way

that precludes the externalist accounts involving invading

organisms and their elimination.
I

have mentioned the generalism-externalism opposition in

medicine as if the two trends were easy to separate.

In

^
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practice, these two trends
become entangled, and the
historical influence of each
view on the other casts
suspicion on the validity and
significance of the
distinction. Ordinary pathogens
may or may not be
effective,
depending on the state of a
potential victim. This
generalist observation muddles
even straightforward treatment
of infectious diseases.
Not everyone who is exposed
gets

them.

Freud was never

generalist.

Although

a
a

pure externalist nor

a

pure

trauma that triggers neurosis
seems

to hit

like an invading pathogen on
the externalist model,
Freud's drive theory was more
generalist, likening disease or
imbalance to failures or disturbances
in the development,
function, or adjustment of the
organism's systems, including
the mental systems.
In this regard, symptoms were
viewed as

attempts to compensate for the imbalance.

Disease as

invasion and disease as imbalance
are contrasting

metaphysical metaphors which have influenced
theory and
practice throughout the history of medicine
and will
presumably continue to do so. While Freud
accepted medical
advances under the materialist, mechanistic
(externalist)

paradigm, he also increasingly noted the
short-sighted

misunderstanding resulting from medicine's failure to
give
credence to psychical processes and their determinant
role

pathology

.

^

The generalist-externalist controversy has spurred

advances in medicine because success for one paradigm tends

in
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to

fuel research in the competing
paradigm.

For example, an

externalist success involving the
insertion of a plastic tube
to replace a damaged blood
vessel or the administration
of
medication poisonous to a parasite
may ignore conditions
which might make the original
blood vessel regenerate or
make
the parasite innocuous.
The generalist response is to
look
for cases where the externalist's
treatment is rendered
superfluous because an organic repair
can be stimulated.
In
cases where the externalist's
treatment
is

generalist may look for
improvement.

a

harsh,

the

more gentle, long-term systemic

Vitamin therapy and special diets are
quiet

examples of the direction of generalist
successes.

Cases of

spontaneous remission fall under the generalist
umbrella in
light of the old adage,

"Nature cures."

view, treatment may interfere with cure

On a generalist's
.'*’

7

Neuroses,

psychoses, and other mental disturbances for which
there

is

no complete cure, perhaps because the
situation of the

patient continuously reproduces the problem, whereas others,
in

similar situations seem normal, push

a

theorist toward

generalist lines of thought.

Generalist and externalist theories are normative
analytic instruments, neither of which seems to generate
sound medical theories.

We would not expect Freud,

thinker, to represent either position.

a

subtle

Fried and Agassi

argue that Freud was basically an externalist early in his
career who moved toward generalism as his theories
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developed
patient

s

.

According to their analysis,
Freud's focus on the
inner life gradually
transposes mother
and father

U.e., important significant
others) into the unconscious,
where their representations
function as internal (not
external objects
Thic
3
ThlS 130 stl11 compatible
with a form of
external ism they are "thorns
in the patient's side." 18
Freud's move to generalism
seems to Fried and Agassi
to be
only partial.
While I think they are correct
in arguing that
Freud's move to generalism
was partial, their view
seems to
ignore the fact that the
pathogen is not necessarily the
internal psychic representation
of an external figure or
idea, taken in analogy to
an invading external pathogen.
A
person may fall ill due to lowered
resistance or an internal
disequilibrium. A breakdown in a
person's pattern of
interaction, a disturbance which in
turn may allow a pathogen
in the form of a hostile
idea to erupt as a causative agent
into consciousness, may be crucial
to the onslaught of
pathology.
in other words, a failure of
repression can
disturb equilibrium and create problems on
the generalist
view just as repression can be the
pathogen on
)

the

externalist view, and some combination of these
two views may
be more or less required to explain
a specific psychic
disorder in the context of an individual biography.
Viewing psychic disorders and Freud's theorizing
about
them within the context of medical theorizing and
related

debates allows us to place the development of his
thought

193

against its roots in medical
thought and practice.
Freud's
movement away from an early
externalist model involved an
expansion of the range of
conditions regarded as causal
to
include factors that would
not lie easily within the
relatively mechanical, causal
thinking of the medicine of
his
time.
Clearly, medicine has changed
its causal thinking
since Freud's time and has to
some extent reappropriated
the
psychological factors that Freud
noticed early
on as

pathogenic.

Current medical theorising allows
for emotional
factors as causative agents, or
as predisposing
one to

disease, and medical training
contains courses explicitly
designed to sensitize doctors to the
significance
of

increased stress.

Stress may not be indicative of

a

disease

but it certainly can indicate
disposition toward certain

symptoms.

Current medical thinking stops short, in
general,
from the luxuriant growth of psychic
pathogens studied
by

psychoanalytic theory, but therapeutic practice
has accepted
at

least some of the original insights of
Freud's new medical
science.
It's hard to reconstruct the shifts and turns
of
the complex history of the relationships
between medicine and

psychoanalytic theory, but Griinbaum remains with
century conception of medical causation.

a

nineteenth

His adherence to a

straightforward model of validation based on experimentation
utilizing control groups ignores the more complicated

multifactorial models of causation that are presently
employed in the biomedical sciences.

In effect,

Grunbaum
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restricts the study of disease
to disorders that are
accessible to his .methodological
conception, and ignores the
very real complexities
confronting medical theorizing.
Schaffner's recent work on
the structure of theory
and
explanation in the biomedical
sciences illustrates
some

important differences between
theories in biomedicine and
theories in the physical
sciences.
Unlike the more
hierarchical deductive models
of the physical sciences,
".most, but not all, theories
in the biomedical
sciences are
best construed as a series
of overlapping interlevel
temporal
models.
Schaffner calls these theories
"middle
range"

theories, theories which fall
between biochemistry at one
extreme and evolutionary theory
at the other.
Sciences such
as immunology, embryology and
physiology can be given this
characterization. Their generalizations
are more limited in
scope, are non-uni ve rsa 1 and are
closer to tendency

statements than to laws.
there will be

term

'

a

inter level

Within

a

"middle range" theory,

collection of overlapping models.
,
'

By the

Schaffner means to focus on the different

levels of aggregation that entities are
grouped under

molecular, cellular, tissue, organ, etc.).

(e.g.,

The different

entities that appear in the model are idealized
in that they
are abstractions from the full biological
details at their

particular level.

These models, which consist of collections

of entities at different levels of aggregation,

are termed

temporal models because they present collections that undergo
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change over time, change
that requires descriptive
theories
making essential use of
qualitative alterations of
properties
during development. 2 °
Unlike the case in physics
where
time is eliminated by making
it implicit in a
differential
equation, in biology a process
is the rule.
These biomedical
theories of the middle range,
though they do
not fit

epistemological analyses that take
physics and chemistry as
b b ^ i £ models
_
ere essential
esspnt ^
n the
biomedical field, at least
at this stage of its
development.
-

,
'

i

1

m
i

i. l*

.

Drawing on the notion of "exemplar"
developed by Kuhn,
Schaffner argues that generalizations
in the biomedical
sciences are not logical abstractions;
they are based on

analogical reasoning from exemplars
or shared examples.
According to Schaffner, "exemplar thinking
is more
Significant in the biomedical sciences
than in the physical
21
sciences ."
whether this is due more to the structure
and

limitations imposed by the ontological
structure of the
domain or more to the fact that a move from
the more

theoretical sciences to the applied sciences
leads to the
predominance of analogical-exemplar based theories
is

an

issue that Caplan raises and that needs more
investigation.

Analogical reasoning from examples would seem to be more
important as one moved toward the applied or practical

sciences where concrete cases serve as guidelines for how
to
proceed.

In clinical medicine,

clinical exemplar of

a

the patient functions as "the

(often multiple)

disease or
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pathological process. "22
iS 3130
in

discussed

^

Analogical reasoning in
medicine

Xing, „ h0 attributes
Villemin's success

proving that tuberculosis
was

a

transmittable disease to

the use of analogical
reasoning. 23

The point of this focus on
analogical reasoning in the
biomedical sciences and the
looser qualitative
generalizations that one often finds
in medicine is to
provide support for the view
that medical reasoning and
medical theory may have a different
structure that may not
allow explanations to be reduced
to the model of general laws
from which deductions can be
made.
On Schaffner's
view,

generalizations in some biomedical sciences
function as
positive analogies which connect a
family of overlapping
models.
The movement away from a focus on
necessary and
sufficient conditions for a disease is
reflected in
Schaffner's characterization of diseases
and therapies as
like Wittgensteinian "family resemblance"
concepts, concepts
which both reflect and encourage analogical
and comparative
reasoning. 24 Schaffner's work provides the
possibility of
a

methodological pluralism that can be given in

a

form

acceptable to the most rigid logical standards
proposed in

methodological inquiry.

it

is

only the possibility,

it

should be recalled, that is relevant to the question
of

whether Grunbaum

is

assuming too much when he deploys his

confirmatory models.
Freud's metaphorical and analogical reasoning appealed to
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such diverse fields as
literature, history, archaeology,
politics, medicine, and
jurisprudence. This was the way
in
which he attempted to find
a way to talk about,
to

characterize and ultimately to
develop theories about mental
processes and functioning. No one
sensitive to the rampant
problems of communication between
psychoanalytic theorists
would be tempted to endorse Freud's
theory as complete, or as
satisfactory in its formulation.
Freud made many proposals
that cannot all be organized into
a logically consistent
deductive theory.

I

have been discussing the question
of

whether psychoanalysis has roots in
scientific reason,
whether it can in principle achieve
recognizable scientific
progress.

if Freud's methodological outlook
was rooted in

medical thinking, then it has

a

basis in scientific

methodology, and it has been suggested here
that Freud's

analogical resources were precisely what would
be expected if
he implicitly assumed that he was creating
a new branch
of

medicine.

Grunbaum's standards, on the contrary, borrowing

from physics, make psychoanalytic theory
can't progress as

a

a

non-starter.

It

science until it conforms to principles

of reasoning in physics.

The appeal to the epistemological structure of medicine
as the framework for evaluating the scientific status of the

epistemology of psychoanalysis does not turn psychoanalysis
into

a

science but

it

does cut against some of Grunbaum's

restrictive proposals for establishing causality and proof.
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have noted the inadequacy
of the single and even
"necessary" cause version
of disease and some
of the
difficulties involved in
Grunbaum's proposal that
validation
come from experimentation
utilizing control groups.
Grunbaum's appeal to extra-clinical
data, both from control
groups and epidemiological
studies, must be set against
the
backdrop of the limitations
that plague generalizations
and
validation in this area.
I

Recently, Spaeth and Barber
have detailed some of the
problems associated with the
use of the statistical
model of
disease, a model that defines
disease by statistical
deviation from a conventionally
established norm. The norm
is itself statistically
defined in terms of
the mean.

According to Spaeth and Barber:
such

"The basic assumption of

model is that within the population
similarities
exceed differences ." 25 Unfortunately,
as Spaeth and Barber
note, this assumption is only an
assumption and an often
dubious one at that. Differing genetic
structure,
a

environmental influences, and the interaction
between these
factors, which together influence
individual
response,

complicate the assumption of homogeneity of the
population
being theorized. Whereas the variability
between the
individuals within

a

population may become the focus when

variability in clinical expression of known pathology
evidenced,

in terms of the

individuals within

a

is

statistical model of disease,

population who manifest differences from
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the average are considered
abnormal.

defining disease in this way

is

One problem with

that placement of an

individual within the normal
range on the bell curve does
not
accurately represent whether one
is healthy or diseased.
Spaeth and Barber illustrate
the fallacy involved in
generalizing from populations to
individuals using the
example of glaucoma.

Glaucoma

is

an example of a disease that
can be

statistically defined in terms of
abnormally high intraocular
pressure. The norm of intraocular
pressure, in terms of
which glaucoma is defined, is not,
however,

regularly

distributed.

The distribution is skewed, pushing
the mean
toward the tail of the distribution,
where differences may be
less significant.
Also, "one third of those with

glaucomatous disease (that is, optic nerve damage
and visual
field loss due to intraocular pressure
higher than the eye
can tolerate) have random intraocular
pressures within the

statistically defined range of normal ." 26

So one third of

those who biologically manifest the disease because
their eye

cannot tolerate the pressure do not satisfy the statistical

requirements for the disease.

Similarly, one could register

an abnormally high intraocular pressure and not suffer the

biological effects.

According to Spaeth and Barber,

extrapolations or generalizations from populations to
individuals will only be valid in statistical terms and
cannot be valid when generalizing to particular individuals
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because the statistical
characterizations themselves are
not
applicable to particular
individuals.
Causal explanations and
"proof" of the kind Griinbaum
insists upon, particularly
in clinical medicine,
may be close
to impossible.
Difficulties with establishing
the "true"
ct iveness of a particular
remedy or treatment explode
the
confines of testing using
experimental control groups, a
methodology which also assumes
homogeneity of the group
tested.
A remedy proven successful
in a large number of
cases may still be ineffective
with respect to a particular
case.
King reports on a paper discussing
the difficulties
involved in procuring evidence for
the value of remedies for
barbiturate poisoning as follows:
For among 100 affected patients,
90 or more will probablv
treatment, and perhaps 4 or 5 have taken
so large a dose that no treatment
will
only a very small portion of patients save them. So in
does treatment
there were a consistently successful remedy
tor these few, a large controlled
series would be
necessary to demonstrate it.
if a remedy, in fact, only
saves some of them, proof of its value is
almost
impossible to reach. '

Grunbaum's demand that psychoanalysis furnish
conclusive
proof for hypothesized causal connections between
theoretical

conjectures and clinical data ignores the very real

constraints endemic to theory validation in medicine.

Establishing the existence of causal connections, and
isolating

a

cause from an effect are rarely accomplished on

the basis of conclusive evidence.

Even if causes can be

isolated from their effects, the phenomenon of "delayed
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reaction" and the problems
with identifying traces
that may
last a long time mean that
medicine and psychoanalysis
may
have aspects that are more
like detective work than
the
development of mathematical
abstractions in theoretical
Physics. The old dictum, "the
absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence " 28 is perhaps
even more pertinent to
psychoanalysis than to medicine.
For although both medicine
and psychoanalysis require
that we attend to the "small
signs" and "feeble indications"
which reveal traces that have
previously gone unnoticed, in the
psychoanalytic case, our

subtle defenses may work against
recognition of the traces,
say in problematic utterances,
that reveal pathology and call
for interpretation.
In light of the difficulties
with establishing "proof"

medicine

,

in

we can return to the placebo effect and
Grunbaum's

use of it to undermine psychoanalytic
claims.

it

is

true

that the available evidence cannot prove
that the

psychoanalytic account rather than suggestion
for cures of neuroses

in

is

responsible

certain cases, and this failure to

prove causation is conclusively established by the
placebo
effect.

However,

in drug

therapy, the consideration of the

placebo effect does not destroy the notion of the therapeutic

effectiveness of drugs.

In fact placebo studies are used to

locate and improve therapeutic effectiveness, even if the

placebo effect

is

not itself well understood.

The

philosophical skeptic might argue that no medicines can ever

.
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be proven clinically
effective because there always
exists
the possibility of discovering
a placebo effect.
But this
clearly goes too far against
a medical background
where the
causal effect of at least
some drugs is well understood
by
the canons of medical theory.
Rather than attempting to

exclude the placebo effect,
regarding it as an anomaly or
a
contaminant that must be isolated
and expelled from medical
practice and research, recent
studies suggest studying the
placebo effect on its own terms and
utilizing it to modify
accepted views of the effectiveness
of certain therapeutic
strategies
It is well known that the
placebo effect is no less real
than the pharmacological effect of
drugs.
By real I mean

that placebos "modify both
subjectively reported and

objectively observed symptoms ," 29 and this

is

commonly

accepted by doctors as an aspect (possibly
inexplicable) of
mecical practice. Modification by placebos
may involve the
reduction of pain, the actual lowering of blood-sugar
levels
in

diabetics and other kinds of relief, but

well work in the opposite direction.

it

can just as

For example, placebos

have been shown to produce toxic side effects
just like those
of active drugs.

Brody's suggestion that we bring

placebo effects into the arena of medical investigation and
use our understanding of them to enlarge the dominant medical

paradigm of physical causation

is

a

more promising line of

development than Griinbaum's exclusionary approach.
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Grunbaum's use of the placebo
effect as

a

tool or strategy to

show that the therapy may
not be causally effective
seems to
rely on the legitimacy of
some unexpressed version of
a

psychogenic account.
offer

a

At the very least, Grunbaum
needs to

causal theory of how placebos work
if he

is

to have a

Platform for suggesting that the
global scientific status of
psychoanalysis can be questioned in terms
of placebo studies.
Extant accounts of the action of
placebos
more or less

accept that placebos must exert their
influence

psychogen ica lly

since they cannot initiate any

,

hypothetically effective physiological
reactions. These
accounts range from what have been termed
mentalistic
theories, which attribute the placebo
effect
to the

subjective awareness of the person, to
conditioning theories
which attribute the placebo effect to a
behavioristic
learning process.

However, to say that placebos work

psychogenica lly

not to hold that specific physiological

is

effects may not be induced by psychogenic causes.

because the causal mechanism

is

unknown,

it

does not follow

that perceptions or ideas can't function as causes.

therapeutic effectiveness of

Just

The

placebo could derive from

a

a

psychogenic activation of physiological mechanisms, and if we
could locate the causal link,

placebogenic for

a

a

treatment thought to be

particular disorder would turn out to have

specific remedial efficacy.

The point is, this kind of

research, the search for processes in the brain whereby
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psychogenic factors or experience
are converted to changes
in
regulatory mechanisms, has
received little attention.
According to recent studies,
the cerebral intermediate
links
between psychogenic processes
and somatic
ones must be

considered.

This remains true even if
''psychogenic”

causes turn out ultimately to
be physical causes whose
existence is not currently
understood.
Freud was aware of the
limitations of his notion of
psychical therapy and the sense in
which it was and was not a
causal therapy. 32 He attempted
to give a justification for
how suggestion could be harnessed
for therapeutic purposes
and he offered an account that
spurred further research or
investigation into the influence ideas
exert on physical and
somatic processes. This is scientific
theorizing; not

everything Freud said has to be true.

Freud's attempt to

account for anomalous phenomena, to
explain them in

a

way the

old model could not and to bring them
under scientific

scrutiny suggests

a

more inclusive view of the scientific

enterprise than the exclusionary, restrictive
approach of
Griinbaum.

If we bring into the picture the circumstance
that
^ ea ^-i n 9

contexts and individual reactions to them are

particular to the individual and the culture, and that there
is

no discernible "placebo personality type," then we
can see

the difficulties involved in controlling experimentation
to

isolate placebogenic factors.

Some version of

a
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psychodynamic explanation which

in turn

allows for the

interplay between the mind and
the body may be the best
potential source for the development
of an' ultimately
explanatory account of the placebo
effect.
in any case,
given that it's so useful for
therapy, it's highly debatable
whether ruling out this effect,
on the grounds
that

psychogenesis

not now intelligible,

is

is

scientifically

fruitful.

Balint notes that:

"placebos and 'reassurance' have

a

much better effect in physical
conditions, especially in the
case of fairly normal, not very
neurotic, people afflicted
with some organic illness but their
effectiveness decreases
rapidly the more that personality problems
become the

important factor

." 33

As such evidence is gathered,

the

natural domain for potential scientific explanation
can be
set into place 34
.

at

Perhaps doctors, patients and the public

large have more "faith" in the curative powers of
clinical

medicine and the technology that goes with
a

therapist with whom they merely talk.

it

than they do in

Medical practice has

not perhaps severed its roots in magic and ritual insofar
as
the physician relies on the power of her profession to

produce beneficial results.

Psychogenic and psychosocial

etiological factors and their specific influence are at
present insufficiently understood, but their causal role in

medicine

is

nevertheless not in serious doubt, and

more extensive than many realize.

Ruling it out in

it may be
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psychoanalysis could produce the
embarrassment that
more deeply rooted in medical
therapy.

it

is

it should not be
the task of methodology
to rule out topics of
investigation
that suggest themselves
in the unexplained
successes of

therapeutic practice.
The structure of medicine
is complex, and no
rational
systematization of that structure
has been attempted here.
have suggested that medicine
includes biomedical research
fields (serology, etc.) that
are scientific by the most
stringent epistemological and medical
standards.

m

addition,

practice

I

while not scientific by the most
stringent

,

standards

have suggested that clinical and
therapeutic

operate by analogical and informal
reasoning on
empirical material that involves correction
in the
,

face of

failed expectations.

The more metaphysical aspects of

medicine, for example, its concept of health
at
time and place, seem to be merely

a

specific

sharpening of societal

standards, and not philosophically imposed

categories on the patient.

a

a

priori

Though the patient poses and

posits clear limits to the methodology of therapeutic
practice, the clear anchor in empiricism calls for
an

assessment of medicine, vague and sprawling as
science

it

is,

as a

.

In any case,

the seemingly clear structure of physics is

not the sharp contrast that methodologists often suggest.

When physics

is

thought of as classical mechanics, classical

I
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electromagnetic theory, and so forth,
there is a contrast.
But this excludes an
older interest by physicists
in such
topics as optics where the
human observer

introduces weird

p radoxes

for the idea of an easy
confirmation of physical

theorizing 35
.

m

modern physics, in particular
quantum

Physics, the role of the observer,
the inevitable interaction
between knower and known, and
the impact of this interaction
on the status of objectivity,
mess up the tidy structure and

uniform methodology presented in
many philosophies of
science and assumed by Griinbaum in
his critique.
These
topics require a scrutiny that is
precluded
,

by the

presuppositions

I

am concerned with.

Perhaps my intuitions

regarding medicine will give way under
further analysis.
What I have claimed here is that
epistemic assessments that
are blind to the problems of the
question of the scientific

status of medicine are probably also blind
to the most likely

interpretation of Freud's self-assessment that he
was
(natural)

a

scientist.

Concluding Unscientific Diagnosis
"The whole is the truth; and the whole is false
If we view psychoanalysis as

a

." 36

potentially developing

scientific discipline that may use the analogical inference
patterns of medicine, the suggestion that psychoanalysis, to
progress,

needs to sharpen its predictive hypotheses against
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extraclinical data reeks of the
Procrustean imposition of an
epistemology derived from a
different science:
physics.

consequence of the context of
medical theory
suggests other paths of progress,

is

One

that it

such as the path of

progress that has occurred

in

medicine through the

development of new diagnostic
instruments.
Laboratory tests
provide an example of constantly
improving techniques of
considerable analytic value in
resolving questions of
treatment. Whether psychoanalysis
can or will develop
instrumentation that will break the hold
of theory on
clinical data and permit analogous
movement
by the

development of an impartial application
of instrumentation is
hard to judge.
In psychiatry, the electroencephalogram
has
proved useful for establishing some
correlations between
mental and neu ropatho log ica 1 changes. This
is

along such

a

path.

a

first step

Since psychoanalysis deals with disorders

which do not yet seem to have an organic basis,
or with

correlations to somatic processes that are insufficiently

established or understood, instruments of
will be needed.

a

different sort

Projective tests such as the Rorschach and

the TAT illustrate attempts at movement in this direction,

but they depend still too much on the hermeneutical insights
of the person administering the test.

The disanalogy at present between medicine and

psychoanalysis,

in

terms of progress through instrumentation,

resides in the psychoanalytic therapeutic procedure itself.
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Instruments in physical medicine
help create "objective"
data
by permitting the
physician to disengage from
the patient's
words and ideas (i.e., from
the patient's report of
her
symptoms and problems).
contrast, the psychoanalyst
needs
to and must engage with
the patient's words and
ideas.
The
patient's "subjective" report,
which is better characterized
as a "high level" finding,
may be the only sign

m

of

"disease" that calls for
treatment.

a

The analyst might

welcome instrumentation that could,
for example, record the
intensity and focus of fear in a
phobic patient, but the
content of that fear would also
be central to treatment, and,
at present,

the content cannot be divorced
from the language

used to express it.

In fact,

there is no content distinct

from the language expressive of
it.
At present the analyst functions
as

instrument

,

unconscious

a

clinical

using her own feelings and monitoring
her own
in

order to stay in touch with the analysand.

Instruments that could sharpen her clinical
listening and
interpretative constructions, etc. might come to
function
like the instruments of the meteorologist,
providing at least
a

common data base for scientific inference.

The way in

which pertinent data is now gathered both within
and outside
the clinical setting is different from data
collection in

medicine.

The process of gathering data, how something is

reported, the hesitations and resistances displayed, the

syntactical structure of the utterances, all of this

is
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integral to understanding
the data as data and
to
interpreting it. Though the
technique of free association
and its revolutionary
consequences for psychology
have been
likened to the microscope's
impact on biology 37 it
.

,

s

obvious that the instrument
of free association does
not
force the same find of
objective data text, free of
coloring
interpretation at the same level,
as do physical
instruments.

The data text produced is
not that of physical
instruments whose inscription
devices can replicate common
data for all investigators.
As Freud came to recognize
the
centrality of the immediate clinical
encounter as the clue to
the past, and as he came
to attend to the possibility
of
formulating psychogenic rather than
physical laws, he moved
away from his roots in the
externalist medical paradigm of
his day.
His extension of medicine, starting
from causal and
physiological paradigms, but moving toward
the explanation of
new diseases along part icula r ist
psychical lines may mean
that the same kind of progress as
that observed in medicine
may not be expected.
In this regard, the individual,
,

biographical component as well as the social
component, both
of which are more endemic to psychic disorders
than to

physical disorders, may mean that the epistemology
of psychic
disorders is more akin to the rare hereditary diseases
or

individual physical traumas known in medicine.

Though Freud, throughout his life, retained the idea that
neuronal and chemical explanations might one day replace
or
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at least supplement
his psychological
explanations, it may
turn out that there is
no microscope or
Wassermann test

for

psychoanalysis.

Unlike the case of medicine,
where physical
instruments produce new data
text that allows theory
change
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ltS accomn,odati °n to
it, psychoanalysis
seems to have no

way other than language
to report new data and
the reports
retain an essential perspective
contributed by the reporting
analyst.
A study of language
and the relationship
between
analyst and analysand may be
the only way to get at
the
relevant data. The fact that
the data text is generated
by
the method of analytic
inquiry, notably through

the use of
free association and attention
to the transference and

resistance, is not however grounds
for equating the data text
with fiction. The data text
is not fixed; more data
text can
be generated.
The possibility of expanding data
text means
that movement toward consensual
agreement as regards

interpretation

is

at

least a possibility.

if we grant that

psychical processes are purposive then
we can utilize the
existence of recurrent patterns and themes
to constrain
imaginative embellishments on data text.
Freud's methodology
both isolates and aids in interpretation
of new data text.
This is a scientific start and it remains
so even if a way is
never found to link psychological with neurological
or

neurophysiological events.
a

The eventual instrumentar ium for

fully scientific psychoanalytic theory cannot be

anticipated here; the requirements of the way around
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Grunbaom's critique only call
for an alternative to
the
extra-clinical experimentation
that he advises.

It's hard to say in what
direction psychoanalysis will
develop.
Although I have suggested
viewing psychoanalysis
against the background of the
epistemology of medicine, we
have seen that Freud's theory,
his ''science of the
unconscious,''

is an

extension of medical theorizing,

formulating psychogenic principles
and focusing on the
particularized history of the individual,
with or without
the development of
instrumentation, psychoanalysis may
not
make the same kind of movement as
medicine.
I have argued
for

broader conception of natural science
than that held by
Popper and Grunbaum.
It may turn out that psychoanalysis
does not grow into a fully natural,
scientific theory, even
given this wider conception, but attention
to the history of
science indicates that a field's scientific
character cannot
be ascertained on purely logical or
methodological grounds.
So,

a

in

view of the evidence,

it seems

premature to brand

psychoanalysis as unscientific.
My aim has not been to "save" Freud and
psychoanalysis by

claiming that Freud was
is

a

science.

I

a

scientist and that psychoanalysis

have opposed taking paradigms of acceptable

scientific methodology from physics and imposing them on
medicine and psychoanalysis.

Medicine is, intuitively at

least, partly scientific, and viewing psychoanalysis against
a

medical background forces

a

rethinking of the motives for

213

excluding psychoanalysis from
science on purely
epistemological grounds. Perhaps

more than any other

twentieth century thinker,
Freud opens up space for
broadening our notion of
scientific theorising. By
indicating the possibility
of objectifying our
psychical
acts, Freud paves the way
for possibly changing
how we
conceptualize and understand our
psychical productions, and
so how we understand
theorizing as itself a psychical
act.
Psychoanalytic theory may give way
in time to more reductive
theories and/or practices, but
the range and depth
of its

theorizing will have staked out
the areas for such future,
perhaps more narrow or focused,
investigations.
In

line with the other "Masters of
Suspicion," Marx and
38
Nietzsche
Freud has taught us that the most
obvious is
rarely the most true. Any interpretative
account, scientific
or otherwise, that purports
to be whole, complete, and true
can, under scrutiny, be unmasked
as partial and false.
The
whole, if we could capture it, would
be true; as it is, any
whole that we posit is false. As Ackermann's
dialectical
,

account of the status of scientific knowledge
makes evident:
All successful theories, as indeed all
successful
fictions, show us a way the world is without
revealing
the way that the world is, even partially.
They are thus
false of total reality, while they may be true
of some
aspect
of it.

Psychoanalytic theory

is

no exception here, and

not tried to claim exceptional status for it.
least,

I

I

have

At the very

have tried to indicate the possibility that

,

,
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epistemology, like science,
a study of the

is

not static and that

perhaps

development of psychoanalytic
theory can
enrich our conception of
epistemology and of scienc

,". ..

.
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